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Abstract
Acting according to one’s own internal goals is crucial to flexible behaviour. Clinical and 
lesion studies of patients with frontal lobe damage have demonstrated syndromes 
potentially resulting from deficits in the cognitive control system for internally-guided 
behaviours. Some patients can perform well on tasks that are well-constrained by the 
environment, including standard measures of IQ, yet show impairments in everyday life 
and laboratory equivalent ill-structured tasks that make planning and self-cueing demands. 
This thesis is concerned with the executive control o f such tasks in the healthy population. 
Eight experimental studies are reported which consider the role of endogenous and 
exogenous cueing in prospective memory (PM) and multitasking. Experiments 1-4 
integrated the two standard laboratory-based paradigms o f task-switching and PM to assess 
the independence of processes involved in externally-cued task-switching and self-initiated 
(i.e. internally-generated) PM task switches. These experiments suggested that these two 
types of task switches are enabled by independent processes. Focusing only on PM, 
Experiments 5-6 manipulated the degree of internal cueing required by the PM task and 
analysed the effects on performance o f the ongoing task. Participants exhibited poorer 
ongoing task performance in a time-based PM task without the presence of a clock 
(internally-cued) compared with PM tasks with stronger external cues (with a clock and 
event-based). The results support the view that the executive processes recruited for PM 
tasks reflect the demands made on internal control. In Experiments 7-8, individual 
differences in internally-guided control processes were explored after development of an 
advanced multitasking test (AMT) for the healthy population. AMT performance correlated 
with some real-life outcome measures. The evidence in this thesis supports the suggestion 
that different executive processes are employed depending on the demand for internally- 
generated behaviour. Individual variation in the cognitive control system for internally- 
guided behaviour may relate to everyday functioning.
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Chapter 1
The Frontal Lobes, Executive Functions and Internally-Guided 
Behaviours
‘Human cognition is forward-looking, proactive rather than reactive. It is driven by goals, 
plans, aspirations, ambitions, and dreams, all o f  which pertain to the future and not to the
past. ’
Goldberg, 2001, p. 24.
1.1. Introduction
Voluntary, willed behaviours are the keystone to humans’ unique abilities. Being 
able to follow one’s own internal goals and intentions, rather than reacting robotically to 
stimuli, allows for flexible and intelligent behaviour. Behaviours can be viewed as lying on 
a continuum between being strongly externally controlled (for example, reflexes) and 
strongly internally controlled or self-initiated (for example, planning how one should spend 
the day) (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Pashler et al., 2001). This thesis is concerned with the 
cognitive control of behaviours that are especially internally-driven, in other words 
behaviours for which there are few (if any) cues in the environment to prompt or guide it 
and which are directed by internal goals. The basic premise o f the thesis is that internally 
goal-directed behaviours are at the top of our behavioural repertoire; indeed, they are 
several abstractions away from stimulus-response actions. As such, they require ‘top-down’ 
control to coordinate the necessary cognitive operations. The pervasive distinction within 
cognitive psychology between ‘top-down’ (internally-generated) and ‘bottom-up’ 
(stimulus-driven) or ‘controlled’ and ‘automatic’ processes, is an important assumption of 
much of the research presented. Automatic processing occurs with little or no cognitive 
control, that is, without volitional control (Posner & Synder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 
1977), whereas ‘top-down’ processes are effortful and require conscious control (e.g. 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Miller & Cohen, 2001).
‘Executive functions’ is a term that has arisen as a metaphor for these top-down processes 
that control and coordinate lower-order cognitive processes in order to achieve internal
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goals. Lezak (1995) defines executive functioning as underpinning four key components of 
behaviour: 1) volition (intentional behaviour) 2) planning 3) purposive action and 4) 
effective performance. From this description, the importance of executive functioning for 
everyday life is evident. Measuring and assessing executive functions is thus essential to 
understanding much of human behaviour (e.g. Phillips, 1997). However, the mechanism(s) 
by which executive functions operate is a core debate in cognitive psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience, and some o f the various theoretical positions concerning this are 
discussed below.
Nonetheless, an almost universal principle o f executive function research is the association 
of these cognitive control processes with the frontal lobes. Thus, the successful 
performance o f self-initiated, voluntary behaviours has been specifically related to the 
functioning o f the prefrontal cortex (PFC) of the frontal lobes (e.g. Duncan, 1986; Stuss & 
Benson, 1986; Shallice, 1988; Passingham, 1993; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Stuss & Knight, 2002; Stuss and Levine, 2002; Wood & Rutterford, 2004), 
defined as Brodmann areas 8-13 and 44-47 (Fuster, 1997). According to another metaphor, 
these frontal regions act as the ‘conductor’ o f the brain’s orchestra (Goldberg, 2001) in that 
‘rather than themselves performing specific cognitive operations such as memorising, 
learning or reasoning, [the frontal regions] are instead concerned with the deployment o f  
the capacity to carry out such processes, which take place elsewhere in the brain. ’ 
(Baddeley et al., 1997, p. 61).
The link between cognitive control and the frontal lobes essentially derived from 
neuropsychological studies of patients with damage to these areas (e.g. Harlow, 1868; Stuss 
& Benson, 1986; Shallice, 1988). Shallice (1988) argued that the behaviours of patients 
with damage to the frontal lobes reflect the executive dysfunction stemming from deficits 
in supervisory control. Indeed, considering patients in whom cognitive control appears to 
be failing to operate remains an effective means of understanding these executive control 
processes. Utilisation behaviour is a good example (Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al., 1989). 
Lhermitte (1983) first described five patients with utilisation behaviour after they presented 
with unilateral and bilateral frontal lobe lesions. These patients feel compelled to ‘utilise’ 
an object even when they have no need or intention to do so, and indeed the context may be 
completely inappropriate. For instance, they might put on a pair of spectacles placed in
13
front of them despite not requiring glasses or having any instructions to do so. They may 
even place another pair of spectacles on top of the other if presented with more than one 
pair (Schott & Rossor, 2003). These are behavioural errors arising from a lack of inhibition 
of overleamed responses. The lower-level processes to produce the behaviour are intact; 
instead, there is a weakening o f intentional action control by the executive processes. 
Reason (1984) described similar slips and lapses of action produced by healthy individuals 
in everyday life. ‘Capture errors’ such as going upstairs to change and actually getting into 
bed, or ‘substitution errors’ such as placing the kettle in the fridge instead o f the milk after 
making tea, are commonly cited examples o f executive failure in healthy participants. 
Action slips such as these occur when the individual is distracted, so that conscious control 
is otherwise engaged and the environment triggers a routine, automatic response (see also 
Schwartz et al., 1991). Another feature o f frontal damage is repetitive behaviour or 
‘perseveration’ stemming from impairments in initiating switches between tasks (see 
Joseph, 1999, for review). This inflexibility o f behaviour is also due to a disruption of 
control processes that allow for disengagement from a previous response. Thus, damage to 
the PFC disrupts the executive control system that allows for internally generated goals, 
acting according to intentions and the overriding of automatic responses (Duncan, 1986; 
Shallice, 1988).
The frontal lobes, comprising 25-33% of the human brain, are larger in humans than in any 
other animal (see Stuss & Knight, 2002). The PFC in non-human primates such as gorillas, 
for instance, only occupies 10-12% o f the cortical area (Fuster, 1989). These properties, 
combined with their extensive reciprocal connections (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stuss & 
Knight, 2002) make them an ideal candidate for accommodating the higher-order, ‘human’ 
cognitive functions. Indeed, the neurologist Tilney (1928) believed that the ‘age of the 
frontal lobe’ could describe human evolution in its entirety. Current theories of the role of 
the PFC in executive functioning propose functional and anatomical distinctions between 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the more orbital and medial prefrontal 
cortex (OMPFC; see Stuss & Knight, 2002; Stuss & Levine, 2002). The DLPFC, 
encompassing Brodmann areas 9 and 46, has been associated with working memory 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Fuster, 1997; Smith & Jonides, 1999; Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 
2000), planning (Goel & Grafman, 2000), task-switching (Meyer et al., 1998; McDonald et 
al., 2000) and more broadly with general intelligence or IQ (Duncan, 2000a; Gray et al.,
2003). The OMPFC (also termed ventromedial PFC), which includes in its entirety 
Brodmann areas 8,9,10,11, 12, 13, 25 and 32, has been implicated in social and emotional 
higher order functioning (e.g. Damasio et al., 1990; Rolls et al., 1994; Tranel & Damasio, 
1994; Grafman et al., 1996; Stone et al.,1998; Anderson et al., 2000; O’Doherty et al., 
2001; Stuss & Levine, 2002; Wood & Rutterford, 2004) and self regulatory behaviours 
(Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Levine et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2000). Deficient OMPFC 
processing has been associated with several clinical disorders, including psychopathy and 
anti-social personality disorder (Blair, 2004), frontotemporal dementia (Lough et al., 2001), 
addiction (Volkow and Fowler, 2000) autism (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994) and alexithymia 
(Berthoz et al., 2002).
The accuracy and extent of these functional distinctions is under constant discussion (e.g. 
Duncan & Owen, 2000; Wager et al., 2004; Collette et al., 2005). Further subdivisions are 
often considered, for instance, research investigating the contribution of specific areas of 
the PFC, such as BA 10, to cognitive control has recently expanded (see section 1.3. 
below). Moreover, the fractionation of the executive processes and their contribution to 
different types of tasks is of great interest for theoretical and clinical purpose (e.g. Stuss & 
Levine, 2002; Burgess & Simons, 2005), although separating the cognitive control 
processes from the processes they control remains a complex methodological issue (see 
Burgess, 1997; Burgess et al., in press). By investigating two types of tasks that depend 
heavily on internal guidance for completion, multitasking and prospective memory, the 
objective of the thesis is to understand more fully the cognitive processes involved in 
achieving such higher-order behaviours. Multitasking is the self-initiated switching 
between several subtasks or as defined by the dictionary: ‘the ability to perform concurrent 
tasks or jobs by interleaving’ (see Burgess, 2000, p. 465). Prospective memory (or ‘the 
realisation of delayed intentions’, Ellis, 1996), is the ubiquitous task of remembering to do 
something in the future.
This literature review will therefore cover the following ground, 1) introduce the theories of 
cognitive control of self-initiated (or volitional) behaviours. This will include a review of 
the major theories of cognitive control including a discussion of the potential fractionation 
of these executive processes. 2) A review of the literature concerning tasks that load 
heavily on self-initiated processes, specifically multitasking, and the neural mediation of
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these tasks, and 3) a review o f the prospective memory literature, which is the focus of six 
of the eight experiments presented in this thesis and thus is covered in some depth in a 
separate Chapter. 4) Finally, I outline the broad aims o f this thesis.
1.2. Theoretical Models o f Cognitive Control
1.2.1. The Supervisory Attentional System
The idea of ‘top-down’ controlled processing is inherent to the influential and widely 
accepted theory of cognitive control developed by Norman and Shallice (1986 and also 
Shallice, 1988; Shallice, 1994; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; 1996; Burgess & Shallice 1997; 
Burgess et al., 2000; Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Cooper & Shallice, 2002; Shallice, 2002). 
This theory has argued that the PFC is the neural basis of the Supervisory Attentional 
System (SAS), a system that modulates lower-level cognitive processes according to both 
internal goals and environmental demands. Accordingly, the SAS is therefore the cognitive 
control system responsible for internally-guided behaviours.
This model distinguishes quite clearly between well-rehearsed, or routine, situations and 
novel, ill-structured situations arguing that they make different demands on the cognitive 
control system, as such the model is based on a hierarchal organisation of cognitive 
processing. Very routine behavioural sequences (such as brushing one’s teeth) may only 
make demands on the basic cognitive ‘actions or units’, requiring little executive control. 
As behaviours become more complex and flexible, enabling us to deal with novel 
scenarios, they require more cognitive control. In this sense, the term ‘attention’ within 
SAS is broad and refers to the allocation of processing resources (Burgess & Robertson, 
2002). Behaviour is comprised o f many ‘schemata’, or sets of actions that have become 
associated together through reoccurrence. For example, a set of schema might represent the 
actions involved in making a cup o f tea, such as boiling the kettle and pouring the water. 
Internal and external triggers can activate these sets o f schema, and a mechanism of 
‘contention scheduling’ is posited to control them at a lower level. Contention scheduling 
quickly selects the most appropriate set of schema based on prior knowledge or habit, as 
well as on the current level o f activation of each schema (e.g. when last used or how 
frequently used). Contention scheduling is effective when the behaviour required is routine
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or well determined by the environment. However, the SAS operates (rather than contention 
scheduling) under the following specified conditions (Norman and Shallice, 1986):
1) situations that involve planning/decision-making
2) situations that involve error correction or trouble-shooting
3) situations in which responses are not well-learned or contain novel sequences of 
actions
4) situations which are dangerous or technically difficult
5) situations that require inhibition o f a strong prepotent response or temptation
The SAS functions to activate certain actions and thoughts (i.e. schemas) whilst inhibiting 
others, according to an individual’s own internal drives, goals and conscious deliberations, 
by biasing the contention scheduling mechanism. This system then is concerned with 
effortful or controlled processing that relate to internal goal-directed behaviour (Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). It is not (or at least less) involved with automatic, stimulus-driven 
processes.
A common example cited for understanding the need for this type of cognitive control 
system is crossing the road in a country in which the cars drive on the opposite side of the 
road. As I am from England, I would automatically look right as I approach crossing a road, 
but if I were visiting the U.S. this automatic behavioural routine would need overriding. 
The SAS would have access to my internal knowledge and thus would (hopefully!) bias the 
schema set, such that I inhibited the automatic response, chose the correct response and 
safely cross the road. There are also classic neurospsychological tasks used to demonstrate 
the influence of top-down processes on routine behavioural output, the Stroop Task 
(Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991) and the Winconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST, Grant & 
Berg, 1948) are two tasks frequently employed for their association with ‘top down’ PFC 
control, these are discussed in detail below.
1.2.2. Fractionation of the Executive Control System
The question then, is how does the SAS operate to produce these top-down influences?
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Although originally the SAS was described as a single system, recently researchers have 
attempted to fractionate the executive processes that the SAS implements (Stuss et al., 
1995; Shallice & Burgess, 1996; Cooper & Shallice 2000; Shallice 2002; Stuss et al., 
2005). For example, Shallice & Burgess (1996) elucidated the functioning of the SAS 
further by arguing eight processes are required to produce schema appropriate for novel 
situations. These eight processes are, working memory, monitoring, rejection of schema, 
spontaneous schema generation, adoption o f processing mode, goal setting, delayed 
intention marker realisation and episodic memory retrieval. As mentioned, this 
fractionation o f the executive control processes, and indeed the PFC, is a key supposition in 
the field of cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience (e.g. Logan, 1985; Baddeley, 
1996; Robbins, 1996; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Ward et al., 2001; Fuster, 2002; Royall et 
al., 2002; Faw, 2003; Burgess & Simons, 2005). However, the ‘unity or diversity’ (Miyake 
et al., 2000) of the executive control system remains a healthy debate since some theorists 
argue that the executive control system precedes in a unitary manner (e.g. Duncan, 2001; 
Miller & Cohen , 2001; Grafman, 2002). Assessing these various theories is difficult 
because of methodological difficulties associated with this field of research, such as the 
widely acknowledged difficulty of ‘task impurity’ (see Baddeley et al., 1997; Burgess, 
1997; Stuss & Alexander, 2000).
Consider the commonly used executive tasks, the Stroop and the WCST. In the Stroop task 
the participants are presented with a colour-word stimulus and they must name the ink 
colour the word is written in (Stroop, 1935). For example, the word RED might be written 
in blue ink. Naming the ink requires the inhibition o f the prepotent tendency to read out the 
colour word. This is therefore a cardinal executive (or SAS) task because the novel non­
routine response is selected over the routine, automatic response, as a result of internal 
goals. There are several reports of frontal patients with deficits on the Stroop tasks (e.g. 
Perrett, 1974; Vendrell et al., 1995; Stuss et al., 2001). Neuroimaging studies have also 
demonstrated the role o f PFC in performance of the Stroop Task (e.g. Pardo et al., 1990; 
Bench et al., 1993; Banich et al., 2000). The Stroop effect (the cost o f inhibiting the word 
naming response) is robust and well-documented, but the causal basis is still debated, with 
researchers arguing it taps various functions, including working memory, inhibition and 
selective attention (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Royall et al., 2002). Moreover, although it is 
indicative of frontal pathology, a neuroimaging study has shown that there is non-frontal
involvement (Peterson et al., 1999) such that the authors attributed several processes (e.g. 
error monitoring, working memory, motor planning) to distributed neuronal networks.
The same is true o f the WCST; multiple processes are also assumed to be contributing to 
performance on this task. Participants must sort cards on the basis of the colour, shape or 
the number of symbols appearing on them. The rule for the dimension by which the cards 
must be sorted changes intermittently and the participant must learn and adapt to these 
changes in sorting dimension through a process of trial and error and examiner feedback. 
Milner (1963) reported impairments on this task in frontal lobe patients and the test is now 
widely used and characterised as a pre-eminent measure o f executive functioning (Heaton 
et al., 1993; Royall et al., 2002). Frontal patients often perserverate on a particular rule, 
showing a lack of flexibility in their processing. Concept generation, sustained attention, 
working memory, set shifting and response inhibition are all likely candidates for 
successful performance of this task. Unsurprisingly therefore, the task is also associated 
with a variety of frontal regions, including the DLPFC (e.g. Berman et al., 1995) and 
anterior PFC (e.g. Marenco et al., 1993). Moreover, damage to posterior regions of the 
brain can also lead to impairment on the WCST (Anderson et al., 1991).
Thus, the Stroop and the WCST demonstrate well the difficulties in assessing executive 
control and the localization o f this control system, or systems (see also Reitan & Wolfson, 
1994; Baddeley et al., 1997). Firstly, that it is difficult to find a ‘pure’ measure of executive 
functioning (Baddeley et al., 1997; Burgess, 1997). Executive tests necessarily entail the 
recruitment of other (lower-level) cognitive processes such as language or memory, and 
thus performance may be affected by disruption to processes unrelated to executive or 
frontal function, for example comprehension (Stuss et al., 1995; Stuss & Alexander, 2000). 
The point here is that it is difficult to dissociate the executive processes from the lower 
level cognitive processes they putatively control (Stuss & Alexander, 2000). Secondly, as 
part of the same issue, executive tasks are frequently complex, engendering it difficult to 
separate failure from task difficulty from failure from executive dysfunction. There is 
evidence that as complexity increases so does recruitment of frontal regions (Stuss & 
Levine, 2002). It has been therefore difficult to find one ‘gold standard’ measure of 
executive functioning (see Royall et al., 2002) because of these difficulties in dissociating 
the control processes. This might be better demonstrated with a further example from the
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WCST literature. Schizophrenic patients have shown impairments on this task but show 
great improvement if they are cued during the procedure (Goldman et al., 1992). The 
patients thus are able to produce the concepts required to complete the task, but do not 
apply these unless cued. Can concept generation therefore be considered an executive 
function when it seems to be the application of the concepts that is impaired? The question 
is really striking at the heart o f the difficulty with multiple process theories; there is no real 
agreed taxonomy of executive processes, making it easy for researchers to continue to 
append new processes as required to explain their empirical evidence (Burgess & Simons 
2005; see Uttal, 2001 for a more general discussion on this point).
Before discussing the benefits o f multiple process (i.e. fractionation) theories, I will first 
consider a unitary account o f cognitive control. Several unitary theories exist (e.g. Duncan, 
2001; Grafman, 2002), but as I have discussed the Stroop Task I will consider an account 
that has explicitly modelled the function o f the PFC in this test. Miller & Cohen (2001) 
argue that performance on the WCST may be tapping a variety of processes, but these are 
all essentially dependent on the overall function o f the PFC, which is ‘the active 
maintenance o f  patterns o f  activity that represent goals and the means to achieve them (p. 
171). The role of PFC is to modulate or bias other sensory modalities in order to direct ‘the 
flow  o f  neural activity along pathways that establish the proper mappings between inputs, 
internal states, and outputs needed to perform a given task’ (p. 171). In situations of 
ambiguity and multiple response options, this function becomes particularly crucial. This is 
achieved by the PFC representing context information (Braver et al., 2002; see also Cohen 
et al., 1996), which is any task relevant information stored internally such that it can 
produce biasing to the necessary neural pathways that are performing the task. This context 
information is maintained online (and in this way is a subset o f working memory) and 
always available to influence processing by resolving competition between local networks 
(by supporting one activation pathway (e.g. one schema) over another) (Braver et al., 
2002). The system works then under the assumption that the processing in the brain is 
essentially competitive and they argue that it subsumes other putative control processes, 
such as inhibition. From this description, it seems Cohen and his colleagues are advocating 
the PFC as both the seat of the SAS and the contention scheduling mechanism (at odds with 
the original SAS theory, which maintains these as qualitatively different mechanisms). 
They convincingly argue that the PFC has many of the properties necessary for such an
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illustrious position, for example diverse and abundant connections to other areas, the 
plasticity to maintain many learned associations (or rules), the feedback mechanisms to 
other neural areas and the capacity to maintain representations over time. Moreover, they 
provide evidence for this action o f the PFC from computational modelling of the Stroop 
Task (e.g. Cohen et al., 1990), as mentioned earlier, and for the example of crossing the 
road in a foreign country (see Miller & Cohen, 2001 for schematic diagram).
Another significant unitary account o f PFC is the adaptive coding model of Duncan (2001) 
who argues that neurons within the PFC have the ability to code many kinds of 
information. These neurons are able to adapt themselves to the current task context, acting 
as a ‘global workspace’ and producing a wide range o f functions. Evidence for this position 
stems from neuroimaging studies that show similar patterns o f PFC activation despite 
different cognitive demands (Duncan & Owen, 2000). In addition, electrophysiological 
studies have demonstrated this apparent neural adaptation o f PFC neurons as task 
boundaries change (e.g. Freedman et al., 2001). This alternative conception of PFC 
function is considered in more depth in Chapter 5, but for now the discussion of these 
unitary accounts brings a number of issues pertaining to the study of cognitive control into 
focus. Perhaps the most striking difficulty for these accounts is the lack of explanatory 
power to account for all the data on executive function, particularly the wide range of 
neuropsychological data. For example, there is little discussion of how the PFC is 
functionally organised in the theory put forward by Cohen and colleagues (although see 
Miller & Cohen, 2001 for discussion), and indeed they note it as a shortcoming. Several 
possibilities are posited in the literature, including regional functional specialisation (as 
described above), modality of information (e.g. Smith & Jonides, 1999) and a hierarchal 
organisation according to the degree of abstraction (e.g. Passingham, 1993 and see section 
1.3 below). Braver et al. (2002) discuss evidence that seems to suggest that this context 
representation mechanism could have a neural basis in DLPFC, (see also Kane & Engle, 
2002), rather than constitute the function of the entire PFC. Clearly, this issue can only be 
resolved with further neuroimaging research.
Anderson et al., (2002) argue that developmental studies are consistent with multiple 
process theories, rather than unitary accounts, because executive functions possess 
‘different developmental trajectories and possibly maturing at different rates. These
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varying patterns may reflect mediation by specific areas within the frontal lobes, which 
also mature at different ra tes’ (p. 509). Levin et al., (1991) for example, administered a 
battery of executive tests with children o f various age ranges and identified three executive 
factors with individual developmental patterns, concept formation, problem-solving and 
impulse control (see also Welsh et al., 1991; Anderson, 1998). Methodological difficulties 
apply with these developmental studies however, primarily the problem of divorcing the 
development of the lower-order cognitive processes in children from the higher-order 
executive skills. Moreover, it is not to say that a single system theory could not eventually 
account for this evidence, but that current positions are underspecified with regards to these 
data.
Burgess & Robertson (2002) and Burgess & Simons (2005) outline other empirical data 
that unitary accounts are often unable to account for. Firstly, correlations between executive 
tasks are often reported as low, rather than high, as would be expected from a unitary 
account (e.g. Robbins, 1996; Miyake et al., 2000). This supports multiple processes tapped 
by different tests, with no overarching executive process. Royall et al., (2002) conducted a 
metaanalysis of executive control studies containing factor analyses, and concluded that 
four factors presented most commonly: rule discovery (e.g. in WCST), working memory 
(e.g. Digit Span), attentional control (e.g. Digit Cancellation) and response inhibition (e.g. 
Stroop). This is broadly consistent with Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) assertion that the 
three executive processes asserted the most reliably by diverse researchers are: shifting of 
mental sets, monitoring and updating of working memory and inhibition of prepotent 
responses. The study by Miyake et al. also demonstrated that these control processes appear 
separable. They conducted a factor analysis o f executive measures and found mildly 
correlated but discriminable factors that each contributed differently to three executive tests 
(WCST, Tower of Hanoi and Random Number Generation). This evidence fits with 
multiple process theories; although the outcomes of these studies do not necessarily 
encompass all the executive processes that exist (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Burgess et 
al., 2000).
Secondly, the neuropsychological evidence speaks against the unitary accounts on many 
fronts. In a study with a group of mixed aetiology neurological patients Burgess et al. 
(1998) found that their symptoms of dysexecutive syndrome were inclined to cluster, rather
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than load onto a single factor. Moreover, these clusters o f symptoms were associated with 
impaired performance on specific, and different, executive tasks (this study is described in 
more detail below). Burgess & Simons (2005) also provide examples in which the same 
executive tests were used with a group of frontal lobe patients and a diverse collection of 
errors were committed (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Stuss et al., 2000). Indeed, Burgess & 
Shallice (1996) demonstrated a double dissociation between errors associated with response 
suppression and those associated with initiation in one frontal patient. Neuropsychological 
double dissociations are strong forms o f evidence for process separation and localisation 
(Shallice, 1988), providing a robust case for executive fractionation. Patients with very 
specific executive deficits are also reported in other case studies (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 
1991; Burgess & McNeil, 1999), including patients with multitasking deficits, as I will now 
describe.
1.2.2.1. Neuropsychological Studies Using Ill-structured Tasks
O f major theoretical and clinical interest are the patients that demonstrate many everyday 
difficulties and yet show intact performance on several executive and clinical tests, 
including IQ, memory and language tests (e.g. Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Mesulam 1986; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Goldstein et al., 1993; Von Cramon & Von Cramon, 1994; 
Duncan et al., 1995; Goel & Grafman, 1997; Levine et al., 1998). For instance, Eslinger & 
Damasio’s (1985) famous patient, EVR, was a high functioning accountant with an IQ of 
over 130 despite the removal o f an orbitofrontal meningioma six years prior to testing. He 
also performed within normal limits on a battery of neuropsychological tests. In everyday 
life, however, EVR behaved erratically and exhibited difficulties in organising and 
planning. He would take hours deciding on a restaurant for example, and more worryingly 
became bankrupt as well as suffered two divorces in 2 years. Shallice & Burgess (1991) 
described three case studies of patients with similar intact neuropsychological performance 
(including high IQ), but who also exhibited poor organisational capabilities in everyday 
life, with two of the three patients losing their jobs because of ‘tardiness and 
disorganisation’ (Burgess et al., 2000, p. 280). A patient described by Goldstein and 
colleagues (1993) showed no impairments on four memory tasks and a deficit on only one 
out of nine executive tasks (Proverb Interpretation), and yet manifest decision-making 
deficits ‘culminating in his taking 2 weeks to decide which slides to use fo r a work
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presentation; the decision was never reached’ (p. 274). In these cases the cognitive profile 
the patients display are not indicative o f their psychosocial outcomes.
Shallice and Burgess (1991) identified a potential reason for this dissociation between 
executive function test scores and real life behaviours. They have argued that in many of 
the tests utilised to measure executive functioning, clinically and experimentally, there are 
still many external cues present in the test framework, moreover, there is often only one 
correct answer (e.g. in the Stroop task, participants must still attend to the external stimulus 
to name the correct ink colour). The examiner themselves or the test structure may 
therefore ‘become the frontal lobes’ of the participant (Stuss & Alexander, 2000). In this 
way, the tests fail to evaluate frontal patients’ key deficits, to initiate and organise 
behaviours from internal cues and goals, and similarly partly fail to measure these 
processes in cognitive studies with healthy participants. As discussed, this is the 
fundamental role of the executive system and is essential in everyday life, in which tasks 
are often open-ended and driven by internal goals. Consequently, in order to improve the 
ecological validity of the neuropsychological tests, Shallice & Burgess (1991) designed 
laboratory-based multiple subgoal tests or multitasking tests that increased demands on 
participants’ self-organisation capabilities by being ill-structured. Reitman (1964) first 
discussed the qualities of tasks that are ill-structured, arguing they have poorly specified 
start states, goal states and transformation functions (the latter explains how to achieve the 
goal states; see Goel & Grafman, (2000) for further discussion on qualities of ill-structured 
tasks). Accordingly, in multitasking tests participants must initiate their own plans and 
strategies and carry out their intentions with little external guidance. As well as being 
ecologically valid, we can perhaps also be more certain of measuring executive control 
functions rather than the lower-level processes using these tests. Testing brain-injured 
patients on these ill-structured and multiple subgoal tasks has thus become a fruitful area of 
executive function research (e.g. Bechara et al., 1994; Whyte et al., (1996); Crepeau et al., 
1997; Robertson et al., 1997; Bisiacchi et al.,1998; Schwartz et al., (1998; 1999); Burgess 
et al., 1998; 2000; Levine et al., 1998; 2000; Goel & Grafman., 2000; Spikman et al., 2000; 
Manly et al., 2002; Law et al., 2004). Assessment of these types of behaviour prior to these 
new types of tests focussed on observational or interview data (e.g. of social awareness) 
and on the separate elements, such as planning (e.g. Tower o f London test) and flexibility 
(e.g. Alternate Uses Test) (Lezak, 1995). These ill-structured tests load highly on planning,
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prospective memory, self-initiated task-switching and decision-making and thus quantified 
what are arguably the most internally-guided behaviours, and as such, the most real life. 
Indeed, I took this approach in this thesis, assuming that executive control functions are 
best assessed in tasks that have little environmental support, that is in which responses must 
be almost entirely self-initiated (see Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005) for a similar 
argument with regards to task-switching).
Strategy Application Disorder (SAD; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Burgess et al., 2000) and 
Self Regulatory Disorder (SRD; Levine et al., 1998, 1999) are ‘frontal lobe’ syndromes 
associated with these patterns of performance. That is, they show the specific executive 
self-regulation (i.e. internally guided behaviour) deficits on ill-structured tests but perform 
at normal levels on many other neuropsychological tasks. The studies suggest the patients 
suffer from specific impairments to a cognitive control system that coordinates these highly 
self-initiated behaviours (rather than other executive tests) and in this way are consistent 
with multiple process theories (Burgess et al., 2000; Burgess & Simons, 2005). Is there 
evidence for a set of dissociable processes, and neural areas, that mediate strongly 
internally-generated behaviours? The next section will discuss relevant neuropsychological 
and experimental evidence detailing the studies with multitasking (and ill-structured tasks) 
so far discussed, as well as neuroimaging evidence, to assess this question.
1.3. Rostral PFC and Internally-guided Behaviours
‘An individual must have the flexibility to adopt different perspectives on the same 
situations at different times. The organism must be able to disambiguate the same situation 
in multiple ways and have the capacity to switch between them at will. Dealing with 
inherent ambiguity is among the foremost functions o f  the frontal lobes. ’
Goldberg, 2001. p. 79
1.3.1. Self-Regulation and Multitasking
1.3.1.1. Cognitive andNeuroanatomical Bases
At the beginning of this review, I briefly discussed neuropsychological patients who 
seemed to show over-responsitivity to stimuli in the environment, such as utilisation 
behaviour. This is quite an extreme example of disordered behaviour in which patients have
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damage to various areas o f the frontal lobes (Lhermitte, 1983; Eslinger, 2002) and 
environmental stimuli dominate behaviour. SAD and SRD patients are not necessarily 
dominated by environmental stimuli but they do show a pattern of behaviour in which they 
show ‘an inability to regulate behaviour according to internal goals ’ (Levine et al., 2002, 
p. 451). In other words, they exhibit marked impairments at the most ‘top down’ end of the 
continuum. As discussed, this becomes most apparent in ill-structured situations in which 
there are many and different ways to approach a task and participants must decide for 
themselves how they allocate their efforts (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Stuss & Levine, 
2002; Alderman et al., 2003; Knight et al., 2003). Daily time and task management in the 
workplace, everyday tasks such as preparing a meal and most social scenarios are common 
situations fitting this bill.
Shallice & Burgess (1991) introduced the Six Elements test (SET) and the Multiple Errands 
test (MET) to assess these patients. In the SET participants must earn as many points as 
possible by completing items from six subtasks (e.g. naming pictures, recounting a journey 
into a cassette recorder, basic arithmetic). Participants are told certain order rules about 
which subtasks they can attempt consecutively and which items are worth more points 
(instructions and rules are available throughout the test). They are then given fifteen 
minutes to complete the task without any further instructions or constraints, ensuring 
participants must use their own strategies and organisational skills. Similarly, the MET is a 
self-organising ecologically valid test in which participants follow a set of instructions and 
rules (again available throughout the test) in order to complete a series of ‘errands’ in a real 
life shopping area. Participants are given money and a series o f instructions to buy various 
items (e.g. buy bread), find out certain information (e.g. a shop closing time) and a place to 
be at a certain time (e.g. by the exit after 20 minutes), as well as certain rules (e.g. do not go 
into a shop except to buy something). The order in which they complete these errands, how 
long they spend on each, and where and how they complete them is left to the participant to 
decide.
Shallice & Burgess reported a variety of errors committed by their frontal patients on these 
multitasking tests that resembled their poor planning and organisation in everyday life. 
Errors included rule breaks, such as going into irrelevant shops, social rule breaks, such as 
trying to leave without paying for items, leaving tasks unfinished, and failing to carry out
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prospective memory items. These errors could not be attributed to motivation, memory (or 
rule understanding) difficulties or other cognitive deficits. Indeed, the subtasks themselves 
are very simple in comparison to the other tasks patients accomplished (e.g. the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scale; Wechsler, 1955). Instead, difficulties were attributed to defective 
processes of the SAS, specifically inaccurate plan formation or modification, faulty marker 
creation or triggering and/or poor evaluation and goal articulation. The study thus 
demonstrated the usefulness of these tests in capturing patients’ difficulties. Planning and 
the realisation of delayed intentions are highly implicated in these tests, but this study was 
unable to localise these functions to brain areas or be more specific about which processes 
were impaired in their patients.
To rectify this, Burgess et al., (2000) carried out a study, involving 60 head-injured patients 
and matched controls, which utilised a variety of scores on a new multitasking test to 
investigate the cognitive and neuroanatomical components of multitasking. Burgess et al., 
(2000) identified several key features of multitasking situations in the development of this 
new test, entitled the Greenwich test. These are as follows, as described in Burgess et al.,
(2000, p. 281):
1) Many tasks: A number of discrete and different tasks have to be completed.
2) Interleaving required: Performance on these tasks needs to be dovetailed in 
order to be time-effective.
3) One task at a time: Due to either physical or cognitive constraints, only one task 
can be performed at any one times.
4) Interruptions and unexpected outcomes: Unforeseen interruptions, sometimes of 
high priority will occasionally occur, and things will not always go as planned.
5) Delayed intentions: The time for a return to a task which is already running is 
not signalled directly by the situation (prospective memory).
6) Differing task characteristics: Tasks usually differ in terms of priority, difficulty 
and the length of time they will occupy.
7) Self-determined targets: People decide for themselves what constitutes adequate 
performance.
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8) No immediate feedback: There is no minute-by-minute performance feedback of 
the sort that participants in many laboratory experiments will receive. Typically, 
failures are not signalled at the time they occur.
Much like the SET, the Greenwich test comprises of three open-ended, simple subtasks 
with specific rules on maximising points (e.g. separating beads by colour, constructing a 
simple object from Meccano parts). The participants must coordinate and organise their 
own subtask performance, with the only constraint that they must attempt part of all three 
subtasks at some point during the whole test. The subtasks themselves also have specific 
rules for completion, giving this test a larger number of rules but fewer task switches. 
Participants were scored on several elements o f the test, including how successfully they 
learnt the rules, how efficiently they planned their strategy before beginning, how 
successfully they followed their plan, and overall task performance. They found that 
patients with specific lesions showed deficits on measures of the Greenwich Test compared 
to a control group, despite being well matched on IQ measures. Using a statistical 
modelling technique with the dependent measures from the Greenwich Test, Burgess and 
colleagues identified three constructs, and thus posited three specific cognitive systems that 
interact to support multitasking -  retrospective memory, prospective memory and planning, 
with the last two processes drawing on the first. The prospective memory or intentionality 
construct was identified as the most associated with overall performance on the task.
Burgess and associates also proposed that different neural bases might mediate these three 
cognitive constructs. Patients with damage to the medial PFC (BA 10) showed particularly 
poor overall task performance and poor plan following (i.e. impaired prospective memory). 
Patients with damage to DLPFC showed poor planning, and damage to posterior 
cingulate/forceps major resulted in retrospective memory deficits. Burgess et al., (2000) 
describe some caveats to the results, including difficulties in precise lesion localisation 
(subcortical areas could not be assessed) and note that a two construct model also fitted the 
data, albeit not as well. Despite this, Burgess et al. note that the results do have consistency 
with previous research into the function of these neural areas. For instance, retrospective 
memory has been associated with anterior and posterior cingulates (e.g. Mattioli et al., 
1996; Nyberg et al., 1996). Similarly, the link between DLPFC and planning is relatively 
well established (Goel et al., 1997; Goel & Grafman, 2000, although see Burgess et al.,
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(2005) for a discussion regarding planning processes). Finally, the implication of 
prospective memory residing in rostral PFC is also consistent with other studies of the 
neural basis of prospective memory (e.g. Yamadori et al., 1997; Okuda et al., 1998; 
Burgess et al., 2001). This issue shall be discussed further in the section 2.7.3 below.
There is further support for the role of the ventromedial or rostral PFC in these types of 
multitasking tests. Levine et al. (1998; 1999; 2000) tested various groups of participants on 
modified versions o f the SET and Greenwich test. Levine et al., (1998) developed a 
Strategy Application Test (SAT) that requires participants to develop their own strategic 
approach to the task to maximise their score and administered this test, along with other 
neuropsychological tasks, to various participant groups (focal frontal patients, TBI and 
normal aging plus young control group). As in the Greenwich Test, three subtasks (split 
into part A and B) that were well within the capabilities o f the groups tested were employed 
(picture naming, arithmetic, figure-copying). All other rules were similar to the SET (e.g. 
cannot complete part A and B of the same subtask consecutively, some items are worth 
more points, identified by a box around them). An efficiency score was devised from the 
SAT that reflected the number o f high payoff subtask items completed as a proportion of 
the total number of items completed. A high score was thus linked to successful executive 
control; the SAS was assumed to have inhibited the prepotent response to complete all 
subtask items in spatial order so that items worth more points could be completed first. A 
low strategic score was ‘assumed to reflect unmodulated contention scheduling’ p. 253). 
Low strategic scorers possessed an inability to hold a mental representation of the self 
online and to use this self-related information to inhibit inappropriate responses. Every 
participant with a focal medial PFC lesion (Brodmann areas 10,11,12,25 and 32) obtained 
impaired efficiency scores on the SAT, despite some having intact performance on other 
executive and neuropsychological tasks (including the WCST and the Stroop). The latter 
tasks were argued to tap essentially the DLPFC and thus provide evidence for fractionation 
of the PFC (Levine et al., 2002). Some patients with damage to other areas of the PFC also 
presented with non-strategic performance, and some non-strategic performers also showed 
deficits on other executive tests. Levine and colleagues thus described two subgroups of 
SRD patients, those with standalone strategic deficits and those with general diminished 
executive abilities. Thus, the presence of a SAD standalone group in the Levine et al.,
29
(1998) study provides support for the suggestion that multitasking processes are relatively 
circumscribed (Burgess et al., 2000).
Further evidence for this suggestion stems from a study showing low correlations between 
head injured patients’ scores on other executive tests (e.g. Verbal Fluency) and the SET 
(Duncan et al., 1997). In addition, Burgess et al. (1998) conducted a study that correlated 
patient carers or family members’ ratings of the patient on the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
questionnaire (DEX; Burgess et al., 1996) with the patients’ performance on the SET. The 
DEX assesses common symptoms associated with frontal lesions, such as perserveration, 
organisation difficulties and social inappropriateness. Interestingly, only the patients’ 
performance on the SET was significantly correlated with ‘intentionality’, a factor from the 
DEX analysis relating to everyday problems with organisation and planning (including 
prospective memory). No other measures employed (including executive and intelligence 
measures) correlated with this factor.
The weight of the evidence then, seems to lie in favour of dissociating executive processes 
involved in highly endogenously controlled tasks, and those involved in more externally- 
cued tasks. However, a few caveats should be mentioned here. Firstly, there remains a 
possibility that impairments on other executive or cognitive tests may have emerged with 
these SAD/SRD patients, but the appropriate tests were simply not included in the battery. 
For example, Worthington (1999) reports a patient, JW, who showed typical SAD 
characteristics but also impaired autobiographical memory, an extra test they included in 
the battery. Thus, Worthington argued these patients should not be cast as showing specific 
prospective memory deficits, but instead as ‘dysexecutive paramnesics’, that is a disorder 
of ‘the executive control o f  instantiation or utilization o f  contextual material necessary fo r  
eventual retrieval o f  target information ’ (p.54). In other words, they suffer a general deficit 
in using self-initiated strategies for retrieval, which are also required for autobiographical 
recall.
Secondly, although these ill-structured tasks may be more sensitive to deficits in internally- 
generated behaviours, and thus executive functions, than other tests, a difficulty still holds. 
The tasks are still complex and multicomponential and interpretation of the processes 
involved and thus impaired, is varied. Levine et al., (1998) discuss sustained attention,
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inhibition o f prepotent responses, maintenance and execution of intentions (i.e. prospective 
memory processes) and flexibility as processes contributing to strategy application, 
compared to planning, retrospective memory and prospective memory proposed by Burgess 
and colleagues. Indeed, Levine et al., (1999) also describe the role of inhibition and 
episodic memory impairments in a single case study with SRD. Another follow-up study by 
Levine and colleagues (2000) documented the usefulness o f a revised version of the SAT 
test for its sensitivity to traumatic brain injury and ventral (rostral) PFC lesions. However, 
the authors argued the R-SAT also required ‘inhibition or reversal o f  the response pattern 
reinforced at the beginning o f  the te st’ (Stuss & Levine, 2002, p. 419). Reversal learning is 
a process also associated with ventromedial areas o f the PFC (e.g. Dias et al., 1996; 
Freedman et al., 1998).
It is likely that all of these processes contribute to successful performance on these tasks 
but the difference in emphasis may arise partly from the different dependent measures that 
are analysed. In Levine et al., (1998; 1999; 2000) the principal measures were the strategy 
scores, compared to Burgess et al., who examined performance on a variety of measures 
including planning and plan-following. This is an argument for either simplifying the tasks 
(but risk reducing their sensitivity) or including a variety o f scores. Another means to 
approach this issue is to attempt to control one demand of the task (e.g. the planning or 
task-switching demands) and monitor the effects on the other test elements, an approach I 
discuss further and utilise in Chapter 5. An overarching commonality between these studies 
however, is the implication of prospective memory processes in these tests, and more 
generally a role for rostral PFC in internally-guided tasks.
These multitasking tests do comprise the need to delay internally-guided intentions (e.g. 
remember to switch sub-tasks in 2 minutes time). Some of the SAD patients’ key failures 
on multitasking tests are interpreted as failures of this ‘intent’ or prospective memory 
component (Burgess et al., 2000). The key idea being that the patients have difficulties 
implementing the executive aspects o f the prospective memory requirements (e.g. self­
initiated retrieval). This deficit in prospective remembering is also reflected in the everyday 
behaviour of the SAD patients, who miss appointments and fail to follow their plans 
(Burgess et al., 2000). Researching the cognitive processes involved in prospective memory 
is thus a tractable means of understanding the control of a highly self-initiated behaviour
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(Craik, 1986). Moreover, prospective memory is associated with the functioning of BA 10 
of the rostral PFC (Yamadori et al., 1997; Okuda et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2000, 2001), 
rather than DLPFC, this suggests a possible dissociation o f function based, at least partly, 
on the endogenous/exogenous continuum (see e.g. Dreher et al., 2002 for a similar 
suggestion and Lauwereyns (1998) for similar suggestion in visual attention). Before 
turning to a review o f the cognitive processes involved in prospective memory, I will 
briefly review the theories o f rostral PFC function in order to evaluate the validity of this 
claim.
1.3.2. Functions of Rostral PFC
The major organisational system o f the primate cortex is hierarchal (Passingham, 1993; 
Ramnani & Owen, 2004), with primary cortical areas as the basis of this system and 
information moving through processing pathways from these areas until it reaches the 
prefrontal cortex. The hierarchy is associated with increasing levels o f abstraction, with the 
PFC processing information at its most abstract level (Passingham, 1993). The motor and 
visual systems both share this common organising feature, and comparatively to the 
cognitive control system, are well elucidated. Consider the motor system, information can 
feedback from the prefrontal cortex to the primary cortex areas, via a pathway of 
intermediate premotor areas. This mechanism is acting to feed information about abstract 
rewards from the PFC to generate a series o f motor plans in the premotor system, these are 
turned into concrete motor actions in the primary motor cortex (Passingham, 1993). 
Moreover, the literature clarifies a further organisational principle. There appears to be 
some dissociation between the neural areas that process predominantly endogenously 
selected motor sequences and those that are involved in predominantly stimulus-driven 
movement sequences (e.g. Dieber et al., 1991; Chen et al., 1995; Thaler et al., 1995; 
Gerloff et al., 1998; Dieber et al., 1999). This organising principle is assumed to be 
replicated across the brain, including within the PFC (Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Koechlin 
et al., 2000; Pollmann 2004) and more specifically within the anterior part of the PFC (BA 
10), an area particularly associated with control of internally-generated behaviours 
(Koechlin et al., 2000; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Gusnard et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 
2002; Christoff et al., 2003; Frith & Frith 2003; Pollmann, 2004). This organisational 
system then is consistent with a possible endogenous/exogenous dissociation of function,
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and with the proposed function of the frontopolar (rostral) PFC. For instance, Christoff & 
Gabrieli (2000) state: ‘dorsolateral cortex may be sufficient fo r  the evaluation or
manipulation o f  externally generated information, whereas frontopolar cortex is 
additionally required when evaluation and manipulation o f  internally generated 
information needs to be perform ed’ (p. 183).
Several researchers have proposed models of the function o f rostral PFC in an attempt to 
account for the vast quantity o f neuroimaging data that has accumulated regarding this 
brain region (for a review see Burgess et al., 2005). The difficulty appears to be the 
ubiquitous activation in this area during neuroimaging studies (e.g. see Ramnani & Owen
2004), thus making any single process account of its function limited. As such, the models 
have tended to propose broad functional accounts. As described, Christoff & Gabrieli 
(2000) ascribe the role of this area as crucial to the processing of self-generated 
information. This proposition is based on studies showing activation in rostral PFC in 
which task demands are very low (such as baseline or rest conditions), consequently the 
activation may be occurring because of ‘stimulus-independent thoughts’ (SIT), that is 
mental activity related to internally represented information (e.g. Gilbert et al., 2005). This 
is certainly consistent with the hierarchal organising principle described above, and fits 
with the lesion data from the ill-structured tasks. It is also consistent with the role of this 
area in prospective memory, in which the maintenance o f the intentions could be described 
as SIT (e.g. Burgess et al., 2001).
At odds with their theory are imaging studies with episodic memory tasks that also reveal 
rostral PFC activation (Rugg et al., 1999). Several explanations have been offered for these 
data. For instance, one theory posits rostral PFC as responsible for the ‘retrieval mode’ 
(Tulving, 1983; Lepage et al., 2000). Fletcher and Henson (2001) describe this region as 
involved in ‘metaprocesses’ that coordinate optimal switching between working memory 
maintenance (DLPFC) and working memory manipulation (ventrolateral PFC). Burgess et 
al., (2005) however, criticise these theories as unable to account for all the activation data 
(e.g. motor learning). Christoff & Gabrieli (2000) analysed the role of rostral PFC within 
these episodic memory studies and reinterpreted the activation as ensuing from retrieval 
tasks in which there were fewer external constraints (e.g. recall vs recognition tasks). 
Damage to the frontal lobes certainly impedes performance on episodic tasks, especially
33
those that place high demands on internally-generated retrieval strategies (see Nolde et al., 
1998; Simon & Spiers, 2003). Nevertheless, as Ramnani and Owen (2004) point out, these 
lesion studies have failed to localise the damage to the PFC — so impaired control processes 
arising from DLPFC may well play a part. Several of the imaging studies of self-generated 
episodic retrieval also found activation in DLPFC (Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002; Ramnani 
& Owen, 2004). Overall, Christoff and Gabrieli’s theory suffers from underspecification at 
the functional level (how does BA 10 evaluate internal information?). Moreover, as 
Ramnani and Owen (2004) perceptively note, it seems a difficult concept to falsify.
Nonetheless, the neuropsychological evidence remains that rostral PFC has a particular role 
in internally-guided behaviours. Other theories signify this, for example a role for rostral 
PFC is implicated in self-referential processes (Gusnard et al., 2001), the ‘default mode’ of 
brain function (Raichle et al., 2001) and theory o f mind (Frith & Frith, 2003). To some 
extent though, these theories suffer from the same limitations as those mentioned above and 
are unable to account for some of the neuropsychological data, for instance theory of mind 
processes are not required for multitasking, although it is possible there is even finer 
fractionation of function (Gilbert et al., in press).
Burgess et al., (2005; see also Gilbert et al., 2005) used this neuropsychological data as a 
starting point for a new functional theory of BA 10. Their hypothesis describes the rostral 
PFC as a gateway that acts as an attentional bias between stimulus-independent thoughts 
(SIT) and stimulus-orientated external cognitions (SOT) (Burgess et al., 2005; Gilbert et al., 
2005; Burgess et al., in press). The region is further functionally divided with the proposal 
that lateral rostral PFC modulates attention towards internal thoughts and goals, including 
switches between internally- and externally-guided behaviours, whereas medial rostral PFC 
plays a role in the orientation of attention towards SOT cognitions (Burgess et al., 2005). 
The authors argue that the rostral PFC is acting as a ‘router’ for SIT and SOT information 
pathways, rather than being directly involved in the processing of the information. In this 
way, it resembles the SAS as well as the unitary cognitive control system devised by Miller 
& Cohen (2001) and described above. Perhaps this account and Cohen’s are 
complementary; Faw (2003) for example, argues that the DLPFC is involved in decision­
making in which there is a clear-cut answer, whereas more anterior regions are recruited 
during open-ended decisions for which there is no clear-cut answer and requires more
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internal guidance. Certainly, Miller & Cohen (2001) accept that their proposed theory as it 
currently stands cannot easily incorporate planning and prospective memory processes.
Burgess et al., (2005) took the lesion data as the constraints on their theorising, but also 
secured evidence for their hypothesis from imaging data. Gilbert et al. (2005) describe a 
study that compared activation as participants performed three simple tasks (e.g. classifying 
letters of the alphabet as containing curved or straight lines). The key comparison was 
between participants performing these tasks using visual stimuli on the screen and 
conducting the same task ‘in their head’, that is by imagining the stimuli themselves. 
Differences in activation were analysed whilst participants carried out each task in each 
condition, and at the point of the switch. Medial rostral PFC was active whilst the 
participants performed all three tasks using the external information (which of course also 
required some internal information e.g. recalling task rules). Conversely, lateral rostral PFC 
demonstrated higher activation during switches between the two modes of performing the 
task. This provided evidence for the basic premise that rostral PFC is involved in mediating 
attention between SOT and SIT, in addition it speaks to the proposed medial/lateral 
dissociation. A follow-up imaging study (Burgess et al., in prep) manipulated the 
internal/external requirements o f the tasks in four different conditions by changing task 
instructions (see Burgess et al., 2005). The authors report results that accord well with the 
Gateway hypothesis: medial rostral PFC was more active during the baseline condition in 
which basic attention to external stimuli is all that was required compared to when the same 
task also required SIT. Moreover, lateral rostral PFC showed higher activation during the 
condition that required increasing SIT. This hypothesis can also account well for the 
prospective memory imaging data, which also alludes to the involvement of this brain 
region (Okuda et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2001). I will discuss this data further in Chapter 
3, but that prospective memory requires modulation of attention between external stimuli or 
the current task, and internally represented intentions seems immediately apparent. 
Additionally, it is unsurprising that patients with damage to this area would show deficits in 
ill-structured tasks that require both SIT, SOT and switching between them (e.g. which task 
should I do next? And then engage with that task) if this area is acting as an attentional 
modulator between SIT and SOT. Nevertheless, it still difficult to understand why these 
patients might be able to produce normal performance on the Stroop or the WCST, as has 
been demonstrated, given they too require SIT and switches between them. Perhaps it is the
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degree of reliance on SIT that is crucial. In this way, the neural mediation may reflect the 
continuum discussed by Pashler (2001, see above), thus perhaps only behaviours at the far 
end of the spectrum are dissociable. Certainly, the Gateway hypothesis has the potential to 
explain these cases after further research has elucidated the precise mechanisms.
Any evaluation of these theories must acknowledge the dependency on neuropsychological 
and neuroimaging studies for their evidence. These types of evidence are without doubt 
useful and have produced a wealth o f data regarding structure-function relationships, but 
they naturally have their limitations (see for e.g. Willingham & Dunn, 2003 for discussion). 
Differences in lesion sizes and exact locations within patients o f neuropsychological studies 
are of course a key limitation in attempting to dissociate cognitive processes (Fletcher & 
Henson, 2001; Humphreys and Price, 2001; Uttal, 2001). Whereas neuroimaging studies 
make assumptions about changes in task demands from one condition to another, 
presuming that the cognitive process being manipulated by the experimenter is the only 
change in processing demands across conditions (the ‘pure insertion’ difficulty as described 
by Friston et al., 1996). This latter point seems particularly relevant in a field of study 
comparing SIT and SOT in which there may be a whole host of differences in cognitive 
processing between conditions (e.g. perceptual processing). Behavioural studies therefore 
have some advantages in testing the dissociation between strongly internally-guided and 
externally-cued behaviours as posited by several of these theories, and this methodology is 
used in this thesis. I will now turn to a review of the experiments concerning prospective 
memory, a higher order skill requiring a good deal o f internal guidance.
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Chapter 2
A Review o f Prospective Mem ory Research
‘Every intention is essentially connected with making decisions, and is therefore a 
necessary component o f  volitional behaviour. Thus, intention should be studied in the
context o f  volitional behaviour. ’
Kvavilashvili, 1992, p. 508.
2.1. Summary
I have discussed the role o f prospective memory (PM) in the multitasking tests of 
Burgess and colleagues. Patients with rostral PFC damage seemed to show select deficits in 
the intentionality components o f these tests and yet demonstrate intact performance on 
other executive and retrospective memory (RM) tests. Theories of rostral PFC function 
associate this area with cognitive control of internally-generated behaviours, including PM. 
Thus, PM is a useful tool for investigating cognitive control of these types of behaviours, 
possibly tapping a different cognitive control system, and neural area, to those tasks 
providing a good deal of external structure. The following review will explore this issue 
and focus on the cognitive components o f PM, as well as discuss evidence for the neural 
basis of PM.
2.2. Introduction to Prospective Memory
As described, PM refers to ‘the process and skills required to support the fulfilment o f  an 
intention to perform a specific action in the future ’ (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000, p. SI). It 
is a skill used frequently in everyday life, so much so that studies have suggested 50-80% 
of everyday memory problems are associated with PM difficulties (see Kliegal & Martin, 
2003). Examples of everyday PM tasks include remembering to give colleagues a message, 
remembering to post a letter on passing a postbox or remembering to attend a meeting at 
5pm. From these examples it is easy to understand how this memory differs from RM, in 
which an individual recalls an event or action from their past. In other words, PM is 
memory for the future. The reason why this type of task acquires the term ‘memory’ is 
because a delay ensues between creating the intention (e.g. to pass on a message) and
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executing that intention (e.g. colleague does not return from lunch for another hour). As a 
result, there are several similarities between PM and RM in terms of the cognitive stages 
involved, for instance there is both the encoding and retrieval o f intentions, terminologies 
that match the RM field (see Burgess & Shallice, 1997). The key functional difference, 
however, is that the cues for carrying out the delayed intention are often embedded in other 
ongoing tasks, or one is engaged in an ongoing task whilst maintaining the delayed 
intention (Ellis, 1996; Graf & Uttl, 2001; Burgess et al., 2003). For example, if one has to 
remember to give a colleague a message then one continues to work on other tasks as 
normal until she returns. If it were necessary to cease all other activities until the correct 
point of intention execution arrived, human progress would have been severely hampered! 
In contrast, RM is usually associated with a specific retrieval cue, at least in the laboratory 
setting, such as explicitly asking participants how many words they can remember from a 
previously presented list.
For clarity, I will list the key features o f a PM task identified by Burgess et al., (2003):
1) There is an intention, or multiple intentions to act.
2) The act cannot be performed immediately.
3) The intention is to perform the act in a particular circumstance (the ‘retrieval context’).
4) The delay period between creating the intention and the occurrence of the appropriate 
time to act (the ‘retention interval’) is filled with activity known as the ongoing task.
5) Performance of the ongoing task prevents continuous, conscious rehearsal of the 
intention over the entire delay period.
6) The intention cue (or retrieval context) does not interfere with, or directly interrupt, 
performance of the foreground task. Intention enactment is therefore self-initiated.
7) In most situations involving PM no immediate feedback is given to the participant 
regarding errors.
The cognitive components of any PM task are thus commonly depicted as the formation 
and encoding of the intention, intention retention across the delay (the retention interval), 
retrieval of the intention at the correct point (the performance interval), execution of the 
reinstantiated intention and finally evaluation of the performed intention (Ellis, 1996; 
Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996; Martin et al., 2003). Ellis (1996) split these phases into 
retrospective and prospective components also. Indeed, Ellis argues for use of the term
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‘realizing delayed intentions’ instead o f PM because it captures the multiprocess demands 
of this type of task, above and beyond memory. The term PM is maintained here primarily 
for its brevity.
Shallice & Burgess (1991) describe PM as the SAS enabling the following steps: 1) plan 
formulation or modification, 2) marker creation or triggering, 3) evaluation or goal 
articulation. The marker represents a message to the system that ‘some future behaviour 
should not be treated as routine, and instead, some particular aspect o f  the situation should 
be viewed as especially relevant fo r  action ’ (p. 737). The critical feature then is not just that 
the behaviour is non-routine but also the prompt to act is internally-generated, the system 
cannot rely on external aids to cue or to execute the intention. Indeed, there are several self­
initiated aspects of these components -  the planning (i.e. an aspect of encoding), the 
retrieval o f the cue as well as the task-switch. PM is a multicomponential process then, 
drawing on processes from a variety of domains. Ellis (1996) described PM as ‘an 
important means o f  exploring that interface between memory, attention, and action that the 
SAS/central executive is designed to address ’ (p. 18).
Much of the research in the PM field has actually narrowed to a debate concerning the 
extent to which one of these components, retrieval of the cue, requires self-initiated 
processing (Ellis & Kvavilashvili, 2000; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), that is the attentional 
and memorial demands of retrieval. The question pertains to the conceptual distinction 
between retrieval which is externally-prompted and retrieval which is strategic 
(Moscovitch, 1997; Moscovitch & Winocur, 1995; 2002). This can also be conceptualised 
as a distinction between automatic and controlled processing, as described previously. The 
easiest route to the understanding o f such a distinction is from the RM literature, 
epitomised in the distinction between recognition tasks (which of these words have you 
seen before?) and recall tasks (remember as many words as you can from the previously 
presented list). In the latter task, a group of processes not related to the memory traces 
themselves are required to perform the task successfully. These processes are responsible 
for the organisation, the search, the selection and the verification of the to-be retrieved 
information (see Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002). In contrast, recognition memory does not 
require such detailed searches, perhaps dependent on automatic association mechanisms 
(e.g. Moscovitch, 1994) such that familiarity with the exposed stimulus is enough to
39
retrieve the memory trace from long-term storage (Shimamura, 2002). The notion of 
automatic association mechanisms is described below, but for now a simple example makes 
the point quite successfully. Imagine, on hearing a song, that the woman’s voice reminded 
you of another singer. Her voice immediately creates a sense o f familiarity and if you are 
lucky the other singer’s name will automatically ‘pop’ into your head as you listen to the 
song. This is automatic recollection, prompted by the stimulus itself. However, if the other 
singer’s name does not pop into your mind then you might, to ease your frustration, initiate 
a detailed search o f female singers you know in order to recall it. You might even work 
through music genres in order to aid your search. This organised search is strategic retrieval 
based on internally-generated cues and the processes are thought to be mediated by the PFC 
(Hirst & Volpe, 1988; Stuss et al., 1994; Daum et al., 1995; Gershberg & Shimamura, 
1995; Moscovitch & Winocur, 2002; Shimamura, 2002). That RM tasks differentially 
recruit these self-initiated processes was suggested by Craik (1983; 1986) and has been 
used to explain deficits in ageing and frontal lobe patients (see Fletcher & Henson, 2001; 
Craik & Grady, 2002).
Einstein & McDaniel (1990) suggested that the role of self-initiated processes is likely to be 
particularly evident in PM tasks, since there is no explicit cue to retrieve the intention. 
Thus, controlled processing is required to strategically monitor the environment for the 
correct execution point and/or to periodically rehearse the intention (McDaniel & Einstein, 
2000). Consequently, this is the basic characterisation o f the role of the executive functions 
in PM and researchers have expounded theoretical accounts along these lines (e.g. 
McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Smith, 2003). The reliance on self-initiated retrieval is 
accepted to be even greater with certain types of PM tasks (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel,
1995). For example, tasks that are intended to be performed at a particular time (e.g. call a 
colleague at a particular time) are deemed more highly demanding of executive resources 
because there is no cue within the environment to trigger prospective remembering; it relies 
entirely on self-initiated responses. These types of tasks have been termed time-based PM 
(Einstein et al., 1992). Another type of PM task distinguished is event-based, referring to 
intentions that are realised when a certain event in the environment occurs (e.g. call 
colleague when the telephone becomes available). Although these are not the only 
distinctions made in PM tasks (e.g. activity-based, see Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1996), much 
of the theoretical discussions revolve around these two types. Furthermore, the cognitive
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structure of event-based PM (EB PM from now on) has been investigated much more 
systematically than time-based PM (TB PM from now on). Before discussing these 
cognitive accounts o f EB PM retrieval, I will briefly discuss the methodologies that have 
developed to research this crucial memory ability.
2.3. Methodologies
As with the study o f RM, both naturalistic and laboratory approaches are evoked to study 
PM. Early studies o f PM tended to employ more naturalistic techniques, whereas recently 
the emphasis has been on laboratory-based studies. These methodologies have been 
thoroughly evaluated by Kvavilashvili (1992), but I will review some key points here.
Naturalistic studies clearly have the advantage of possessing more ecologically validity. For 
instance, Wilkins & Baddeley (1978) asked participants to carry printed out clocks and 
press this button at pre-specified intervals, using the number of minutes late as a dependent 
measure. Similarly, participants in studies by Meacham and colleagues (1975; 1977) were 
required to post a card back to the experimenters on certain dates and deviations from this 
date were taken as a measure o f PM forgetting. Alternatively, participants might be asked 
to make a phone call to a number at a specific time over a period of weeks or days (e.g. 
Poon & Schaffer, 1982; May lor, 1990). Similar procedures but with more naturalistic tasks 
have been applied by other researchers. For instance, Levy and colleagues used real life 
opportunities to gain PM measures (Levy, 1977; Levy et al., 1979; Levy & Clark, 1980), 
such as asking individuals who had just received a flu jab to return a card after 24 hours on 
which they should detail any symptoms they may have suffered (Levy et al., 1979). Dobbs 
and Rule (1987) asked participants to remember to include the date and time on a 
questionnaire that they filled out at home. These latter tasks are all intentions that 
individuals may have in everyday life, and as such, can provide useful information about 
when and how people successfully perform them.
Nevertheless, there is a clear disadvantage to these tests from an experimental perspective; 
this is the lack of control of participants’ behaviours during the retention interval. Some 
participants may use external aids, such as diaries, whereas others may try and rely on their 
own self-initiated rehearsals. As such, different cognitive processes may be involved.
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Kvavilashvili also underlined the role o f motivation in these studies, suggesting that 
intentions such as those in Levy and colleagues studies may be influenced by such factors 
as whether they felt the medical procedure had been effective. In other words, there may be 
many reasons why the participants did not carry out the PM task, which makes 
interpretation very difficult.
In terms of laboratory studies, Kvavilashvili again distinguishes between two types of 
studies, those employing artificial tasks and those employing more naturalistic tasks. 
Artificial tasks in the laboratory have been administered by Harris and Wilkins (1982), Ceci 
& Bronfenbrenner (1985) and Loftus (1971). Based on these earlier studies Einstein & 
McDaniel (1990) developed an experimental paradigm now frequently used by many PM 
researchers because it successfully captures the key features o f an everyday PM task. 
Participants are engaged in an ongoing task(s) (such as arithmetic, word pleasantness 
rating, memory tests) but are also instructed to press a certain key when they come across a 
target (i.e. cue) embedded in the task stimuli (e.g. a word, a particular number). This 
target(s) occurs after a set retention interval but is long enough such that the intention 
cannot be continuously rehearsed without affecting ongoing task performance. For instance, 
a participant may be asked to decide if words are real words or nonsense words as the 
ongoing task, but to press the ‘f  key whenever an animal word appears. There are many 
aspects of the task parameters that can be manipulated by the experimenter in order to 
investigate the cognitive basis of PM. Examples of manipulations include: the type of target 
word used (e.g. McDaniel & Einstein, 1993; Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994; Einstein et 
al., 1995), the ongoing tasks (e.g. Hicks et al., 2000; Marsh et al., 2000, 2002), the length of 
the retention interval/ frequency of targets (e.g. Ellis et al., 1999; Hicks et al., 2000), the 
instructions regarding the importance of the PM task (e.g. Kliegel et al., 2001; Marsh et al., 
2005). The researchers measure the effects that these manipulations have on the number of 
correctly identified, and acted on, PM targets. Other dependent measures can include the 
reaction times and accuracy to the ongoing task (e.g. Smith, 2003), but these are measures 
only recently included in PM studies (see section 2.4.4).
Kvavilashvili (1992) argued that naturalistic tasks within the laboratory setting is the most 
effective way o f testing PM because, amongst other difficulties, the artificial tasks can lead 
to ceiling effects in PM performance (partly because they can guess this is the behaviour
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under investigation). For instance, in an early experiment by this author (Kvavilashvili, 
1987) participants were asked to hang up a phone after the 5 minute testing session, which 
had been left off the hook to ensure it did not ring during the session. Whether participants 
remembered to hang up the phone was taken as the dependent measure. This type of design 
has the advantages o f the lab along with ecological validity, since the participants’ 
behaviour is controlled during the retention intervals, motivation is presumably the same 
across individuals and ceiling effects are avoided. Finding suitable naturalistic tasks is the 
difficult design element, especially if a multiple-intention design is preferred.
In this thesis artificial tasks in the laboratory are employed as per the Einstein and 
McDaniel paradigm. This is primarily because it was important to control for any external 
cueing behaviour (since this thesis is investigating internally-guided behaviour) and it 
allowed for the development o f theoretical positions based on empirical work utilising a 
similar design. Further methodological issues are discussed in the experimental Chapters 
following this review.
2.4. Cognitive accounts o f Intention Retrieval
As mentioned, a great deal of effort by PM theorists has been directed towards explaining 
the intention retrieval processes in EB PM. On the one hand is the notion that executive 
control is required to ensure the cue is retrieved (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1997; Smith, 
2003), on the other is the notion that PM retrieval is essentially a memorial process which 
can occur quite automatically in the wake of encoding the intention (e.g. Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1996). There are also hybrid accounts that claim both attentional demanding 
control processes and automatic memory/attention processes participate in PM. These 
accounts will be sketched out in the following section since they differ in their conception 
of EB PM as an internally-guided task.
2.4.1. Automatic-association Accounts
McDaniel, Robinson-Riegler and Einstein (1998) described an ‘automatic-associative’ 
memory system which mediates intention retrieval if ‘the target event interacts sufficiently 
with the representation o f  the intended action so that the intended action is delivered to 
awareness’ (McDaniel et al., 2004, p. 606). Based on Moscovitch (1994) automatic-
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associative mechanism of RM, it shares many of the proposed features. After creating an 
intention, there is an associative link established between the intention and the action. This 
cue-action pairing resides with a certain level o f activation that may fall below conscious 
awareness during engaging ongoing tasks. This level o f activation will gradually decay 
(making a PM failure more likely) unless rehearsal occurs or other activities to raise the 
activation levels (e.g. priming, reminders). If the environmentally encountered cue interacts 
sufficiently with the memory trace then the intention will come to mind (McDaniel et al., 
1998; Guynn et al., 2001). On encountering the cue the retrieval process is rapid, obligatory 
and requires few cognitive resources (automatic), if the activation level is high enough. 
Certain encoding conditions increase the likelihood that increase the activation of the 
associative link of the cue-action pairing and thus that the cue will interact with the 
memory trace; these again parallel the RM literature. McDaniel et al., (1998, experiment 1) 
for instance showed that changing the semantic context at encoding and retrieval reduced 
PM performance (e.g. encoded cue word as ‘traffic jam ’, retrieval context appeared as 
‘strawberry jam ’). Similarly, cues processed at a deeper semantic level produced better PM 
performance than those processed at a shallower level (experiment 3). Guynn et al., (2001) 
also describe experiments that tested the effectiveness o f reminders on PM performance. 
Reminders that increased the associative link between the cue and the action to be 
performed were effective at increasing PM performance. In contrast, the researchers report 
that reminders that only targeted the cue itself did not improve PM performance. 
Furthermore, distinctive or unfamiliar cues may aid the interaction between the cue and the 
memory trace (Einstein & McDaniel, 1990; McDaniel & Einstein, 1993; Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1996).
Drawing on another theoretical position relating to the architecture of cognition (Adaptive 
Control of Thought, ACT*, Anderson, 1983), McDaniel & Einstein (2000) describe how 
these mechanisms might work. An unfamiliar or distinctive cue has fewer associative links 
therefore, according to ACT*, when such a cue is perceived the likelihood of activation 
spreading from its node to the associated intended action is much higher. As McDaniel & 
Einstein (2000) acknowledge this automatic process account is intuitive with the 
phenomenological experience of an intention ‘popping into mind’ (e.g. see Einstein et al., 
1990). It can also account for some of the ageing data (see section 2.6) and experiments 
which show no effect of dividing attention at retrieval on PM performance (e.g. Einstein et
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al., 1997; Otani et al., 1997). However, as described below there is other evidence that is 
simply not consistent with this viewpoint.
2.4.2. Noticing + Search Model
Einstein & McDaniel (1996) also developed a notice + search model of prospective 
remembering. This identifies two strands within PM, an initial automatic notice of the cue 
and then a directed search for the associated intention action. The notice of the cue may 
occur in an automatic fashion as outlined above and is similar to recognition memory (e.g. 
Mandler, 1980), but the directed search component is a result of strategic retrieval. The 
success of both of these components will affect the efficiency of prospective remembering 
(see also Guynn et al., 2001). For instance, the noticing aspect of the cue must elicit a 
feeling of familiarity so that a directed search is necessitated. Cues that are specific and 
distinctive will lead to greater feelings of familiarity, as the empirical studies suggest (e.g. 
Einstein & McDaniel, 1990). Moreover, ongoing tasks that are more demanding will make 
the noticing of the cue less likely (Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; McDaniel et al., 2004). On 
noticing a cue as familiar, the directed search must then also be efficient for the intention to 
be acted upon. This model can account for much o f the data that manipulates cue detection 
and can explain how intention retrieval can occur without an external prompt to initiate the 
search; an automatic familiarity with the cue can achieve this. The model also has useful 
predictions for research of older adults’ PM abilities which are described in section 2.6. 
below. Nevertheless, the model is perhaps limited by its focus on PM’s similarity with RM 
(see also Guynn et al., 2001) -  Einstein & McDaniel (1996) draw several RM analogies in 
describing this theory which are useful to some degree (e.g. comparing to familiarity and 
recognition) but there is also neuropsychological evidence that RM and PM do not always 
use similar processes (e.g. Cockbum, 1995; see also Guynn et al., 2001). More recent 
theories describe the PM process in attentional terms as well as memory terms (see below) 
and this seems to be more useful in explaining other empirical data. For instance, Smith 
(2003) found a cost to the ongoing task across all trials when a PM instruction was added to 
the baseline task, an effect attributed to ‘preparatory attentional processes’ (again detailed 
below). The notice + search model would not predict such a distributed cost because the 
noticing of the cue is thought to be automatic, rather than require monitoring that seems to 
be the case here.
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2.4.3. Multi process Framework
An updated account o f the cognitive structure o f EB PM from the same researchers is a 
detailed multiprocess framework o f PM in which the processes mediating PM, or at least 
the retrieval component, are various and dynamic (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).This theory 
maintains that PM retrieval can depend on both strategic (i.e. self-initiated and attention 
demanding) and automatic processes, according to various factors. Moreover, the strategic 
and automatic processes recruited can be of diverse types. For instance, McDaniel and 
Einstein describe two types of automatic processes: memory-driven and attention-driven. 
The first are described by the automatic associative system above, whereas the latter are 
related to an exogenous attentional system which involuntarily orients to salient stimuli 
(e.g. Berger et al., 2005).
In terms o f self-initiated processing, strategic monitoring is identified as an internally- 
controlled approach to a PM task which makes demands on the executive cognitive control 
system (McDaniel et al., 2004). Strategic monitoring involves a conscious monitoring of 
the environment for the cue (see Guynn, 2003; Smith, 2003, although monitoring may 
require attention without necessarily being conscious). This is where the description by 
Shallice & Burgess (1991) of the key SAS processes required for PM tasks is adopted, for 
instance, the monitoring for the markers that indicate an intended action is appropriate and 
then the switch to the intended action.
The factors that affect the types o f processes recruited for the PM task are elaborated upon 
at length in McDaniel & Einstein (2000), but include the perceived importance of the PM 
task (e.g. Kvavilashvili, 1987), the properties of the cue (e.g. McDaniel et al., 2004), the 
properties o f the ongoing task (e.g. task appropriate processing; Maylor, 2000), planning 
(e.g. see Ellis & Milne, 1996) and the properties of the individual (e.g. Goshke & Kuhl, 
1993). See Figure 2.1 for further details on these factors. Consider, for instance, the 
properties of the cue. McDaniel et al., (2004) report that the degree of association between 
the cue and the intended action will influence the processes recruited. Evidence for this 
stems from their study showing that increasing the demands of the ongoing task did not 
affect performance of the PM task when the cue and the intended action were highly 
associated (e.g. write the word spaghetti, cue word is sauce). They proposed that this
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implicates relatively automatic retrieval processes, which were not compromised by 
increased attentional demands. The high PM success rate and the low number of 
participants who forgot the content of the intended action also supported this view. 
However, when the cue and the intended action were not clearly associated (e.g. steeple- 
sauce) - strategic, controlled processes -  coordinated by the SAS -  were utilised to identify 
and retrieve the cue and as revealed by reduced PM performance in the divided attention 
condition. The authors propose several cue-focussed mechanisms that might achieve this, 
for example, discrepancy + search model or strategic monitoring for the cue. Based on 
evidence from preexposing participants to the cue and non-cue words, McDaniel and 
colleagues argued that in this paradigm during low-association (between the cue and the 
intended action) conditions, discrepancy + search processes are implicated (see Whittlesee 
& Williams, 2001). The experiments thus manipulated several variables simultaneously and 
different outcomes were reported according to the properties o f the cue; a convincing 
argument for the multiprocess framework. The authors did not however, measure RTs of 
the ongoing tasks, a dependent measure which may also index the degree of self-initiated 
processing occurring (see below and Smith, 2003). As such, the authors may not be able to 
conclude for certain that reflexive-associative processes were mediating PM in the low- 
association condition.
Other evidence for the multiprocess framework arises from two studies that manipulated 
the importance attached to the PM task. Kleigel et al., (2004) presented participants with a 
standard PM paradigm but also instructions that informed them that either the PM task was 
more important than the ongoing task, or vice versa. In the first experiment, the parameters 
of the task were set (according to McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) to increase the likelihood 
that cue detection would occur automatically, in the second experiment these parameters 
were altered to make strategic processing more likely. Perceived PM task importance only 
improved PM performance in the second experiment. Analyses showed that this was due to 
a self-initiated change in allocation o f attention between the ongoing and PM tasks. This 
study nicely demonstrates that the multiprocess framework can act as a useful heuristic in 
predicting the types of parameters that will affect PM performance.
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A number of studies have investigated the role o f strategic processes in PM by conducting 
studies in which an extra cognitive load is added to the basic ongoing task to determine the 
effects on PM performance. Presumably, if attention is divided or the cognitive load 
increased during the retrieval context and strategic processing is required for cue detection 
then PM performance should be worse (e.g. Marsh & Hicks, 1998, Marsh et al., 2002). 
Studies o f this type have reported mixed evidence for this effect, arguably providing 
support for the multiprocess framework.
For instance, Einstein et al., (1996) report that their participants who were presented with 
an ongoing task plus a background digit task (to monitor for 3 consecutive odd numbers) 
performed worse at the PM task than participants who just had the ongoing task alone. 
Stone et al., (2001) also established a negative effect o f cognitive workload on PM 
performance, although they found no effect of increasing the length of the retention 
interval. Otani et al., (1997) however reported no effect on PM performance when a group 
of their participants had an extra articulatory suppression task. Subsequently, Marsh & 
Hicks (1998) argued that the character o f the concurrent task affects the degree of 
interference. Using Baddeley’s central executive model o f working memory (Baddeley, 
1996; Baddeley & Della Sala, 1996) they found that only a concurrent task which was 
presumed to rely on central executive resources (random number generation) rather than 
added tasks that tapped purely the slave systems o f the visuo-spatial sketchpad and the 
phonological loop, impoverished PM performance. The concurrent tasks that did seem to 
interfere with PM performance showed a similarity in requiring planning and monitoring. 
Similarly, measures from the WCST and verbal fluency tests correlated with participants’ 
PM performances. The authors argue this is consistent with EB PM requiring strategic 
monitoring. They also suggest the central executive may be essential in allocating attention 
between the different tasks (e.g. performing the ongoing task versus monitoring for the PM 
cue). In a later study, Marsh et al., (2002) manipulated the ongoing task by creating 
conditions in which participants must either perform just one type of judgement task or 
switch between two judgement tasks, whilst the PM cues were embedded in the ongoing 
task stimuli. This task-switching negatively affected PM performance and was attributed to 
increased cognitive demands that forced participants to shift their attention away from the 
PM task towards the ongoing task (see Chapter 3, section 3 for fuller discussion on this
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study). In contrast, D’Ydewalle et al., (1999) demonstrated that the nature of an ongoing 
task did not affect PM performance in young or elderly participants.
These cognitive load studies provide evidence that a more cognitively demanding ongoing 
task can affect PM performance, but this is not always the case; supporting McDaniel & 
Einstein’s theoretical viewpoint. However, these studies presume that PM performance is 
only indexing the success of cue detection (i.e. successful retrieval). It is quite possible that 
cue detection does occur but the extra cognitive load actually affects the other processes 
required to switch to the PM task (e.g. holding online both the tasks, interrupting ongoing 
task, see Guynn et al., 2001 and section 2.7 below). Studies that break down the 
components o f the PM process may inform theory further, as also discussed below in 
section 2.7.1.
Figure 2.1. Factors affecting degree o f  self-initiated processing in PM
Factor Detail Example References
Encoding of Intention
Transfer appropriate 
processing
E.g. McGann et al., 2002, 
2003
Planning E.g. Mantyla, 1996 
E.g. Guynn et al., 1998
Properties of the Retrieval 
Cue
Distinctive/salient cue E.g. Einstein et al., 2000
Categorical/specific cue E.g. Ellis & Milne, 1996
Cue and intended action 
highly associated or not
E.g. McDaniel et al., 2004
Properties o f the Ongoing 
Task
Easy or demanding tasks E.g. Marsh et al., 2002
Metacognitive Factors Importance o f PM task E.g. Kvavilashvili, 1987 
Kleigel et al., 2001,2004
Properties of the Retention 
Interval
Length/nature o f retention 
interval
E.g. Hicks et al., 2000
Reminders/Priming E.g. Guynn et al., 1998
Properties of the Individual Individual differences in 
personality
E.g. Goshke & Kuhl, 1993
Working memory capacity E.g. Cherry & LeCompte, 
1999
Attention allocation/effort 
policy
E.g. Marsh et al., 2005
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2.4.4. PAM Theory
An alternative cognitive model o f EB PM is the preparatory attentional and memory (PAM) 
processes theory, which contests the notion that prospective memory cue retrieval can be 
accomplished automatically (Smith, 2003; Smith & Bayen, 2004). The PAM theory deems 
that executively controlled preparatory processes are a prerequisite for successful 
performance o f a PM task. In a series o f experiments to test PAM theory, Smith (2003) 
demonstrated that an EB PM task had costs to the ongoing task -  in the form of longer 
reaction times (RTs) - and that these latency costs represent the extra processing 
requirements. These longer RTs were found in trials that were non-PM cue trials, 
suggesting processes requiring conscious capacity were being recruited in preparation for 
the PM task. More specifically, Smith proposed these processes might include sustained 
monitoring for the PM cue and that they will increase the likelihood of successful PM 
performance. Thus, Smith & Bayen (2004) conclude that ‘resource-demandingpreparatory 
attentional processes are always requiredfor successful P M  performance. ’ (p. 757). This is 
in contrast to McDaniel & Einstein’s multiprocess theory then, which claims some PM 
tasks can be achieved automatically. A problem in evaluating this claim is that much of the 
previous PM research did not include RTs to the ongoing tasks, which Smith has 
demonstrated can be a useful index of self-initiated processing1. Furthermore, Smith & 
Bayen (2004) proposed a multinomal model of EB PM which provided further support for 
the PAM theory, and found that setting the model’s parameters according to the 
multiprocess theory did not fit their data.
A shortcoming of many PM studies then is the lack of data of ongoing task RTs or 
accuracy, to assess the degree of strategic processing. In addition, the ongoing task RTs can 
provide some temporal information with regards to the degree of strategic processing across 
retention intervals (hence the ‘preparatory’ processes), and indeed can show dynamic 
changes in processing requirements. This cannot be achieved with simply correct PM 
performance (i.e. the number of correct PM responses generated) as the key dependent
1 An abstract from a very recent study suggests no costs to ongoing task RTs were found under presumed 
automatic retrieval conditions (Einstein & M cDaniel, 2005).
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measure. This is a point not yet acknowledged in the literature, but that I make full use of in 
experiments 1-6 of this thesis, with some useful outcomes.
There are limitations that are common to several o f these theories. Firstly, they are only 
relevant to EB PM, rather than all types o f PM (e.g. TB). There is no reason to assume that 
all types of PM tasks recruit the same cognitive processes, indeed, the evidence suggests 
this is not the case, at least not with TB and EB PM (e.g. Sellen et al., 1997; Cicogna et al., 
2005; also see the ageing section below). Nevertheless, there are certain processes required 
that are unlikely to use different mechanisms, for instance the switch from the ongoing task 
to the PM task. TB PM tasks are assumed to be entirely self-initiated, and thus similarities 
between TB PM and EB PM could offer another source o f evidence regarding the self- 
initiated processing required in EB PM. This is an argument elaborated in Chapter 4. A 
further limitation of these theories is that they primarily describe the encoding/retrieval 
aspect, for example cue detection, of the PM process (e.g. see Dobbs & Reeves, 1996; Ellis,
1996). Naturally, they do not claim to be anything but theories for this end, but a fuller 
account of the entire PM process may aid our understanding of the retrieval component. 
The executive and attentional demands of the other components of the PM process remain 
underspecified. For instance, the interruption of the ongoing task to switch to the PM task 
and their coordination, which, although discussed as a core process (e.g. Marsh et al., 
2002), are not well detailed. Before discussing the role of executive processes in PM in 
more depth, I will review the theories concerning TB PM, a review which is necessarily 
short due to the comparative dearth in empirical and theoretical information.
2.5. Cognitive accounts o f TB PM
TB PM is remembering to perform an intended action at a particular time (e.g. attend a 
meeting at 5pm). Kvavilashvili & Ellis (1996) distinguish between ‘step’ and ‘pulse’ TB 
intentions. The former refer to intentions that must be realised within a certain time window 
(e.g. meet a friend tomorrow morning) whereas the latter refers to intentions that must be 
realised at a specific time (e.g. meet a friend at 10 tomorrow morning). Despite this 
intuitive distinction, few studies have investigated potential cognitive differences between 
these types, instead focusing on pulse type TB intentions, which will therefore be the focus 
of this review (e.g. Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Cicogna et al.,
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2005). This is unsurprising given how few studies investigating TB PM there are generally. 
Most studies that are reported generally compare older adults’ performances on TB and EB 
PM tasks (e.g. Einstein et al., 1995; Park et al., 1997; D ’Ydewalle et al., 1996; 1999). 
Manipulations of the parameters of TB PM tasks are rarer with only two recent major 
studies providing any new empirical data (Cicogna et al., 2005; Cook, Marsh & Hicks,
2005), these two studies are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
A fundamental premise of TB prospective remembering, which makes TB PM particularly 
relevant for this thesis is that since there is no external cue to prompt the intention (as is 
possible in EB PM) TB PM is thought to load even more highly on self-initiated or 
internally-guided processes (Craik, 1986; Einstein & McDaniel, 1995). Consequently, 
cognitive accounts of TB PM do not evoke memory-based processes (such as automatic- 
association) and focus on attentional control. Consequently, the two theories from the EB 
PM literature likely to be applicable to TB PM are the multiprocess account of McDaniel & 
Einstein (2000) and the PAM theory of Smith (2003). The application of these theories to 
TB PM is considered in detail in Chapter 4 but certainly a strategic (time) monitoring 
mechanism is a critical feature of theories of realising TB intentions.
Harris & Wilkins (1982) proposed that successful TB prospective remembering involves a 
Test-Wait-Test-Exit cycle o f time monitoring. This is a very intuitive model of time 
monitoring in which participants will initially test the time, and then wait for an appropriate 
amount of time to pass before checking the clock again. Eventually they will ‘test’ the time 
during the critical period o f realising the intention and the test-wait cycle is exited and the 
intended action performed. This time monitoring is a self-initiated process (Einstein et al., 
1995) which is executed in addition to the ongoing task(s) (Cicogna et al., 2005) and thus 
makes demands on strategic processes. Einstein et al., (1995), Park et al., (1997) and Logie 
et al., (2004) all found evidence for the Test-Wait time monitoring strategy as measured by 
their participants’ clock checking behaviour. However, there is little theoretical work 
addressing the cognitive processes that allow for time estimation in TB PM tasks. This is 
despite a large body of literature investigating the cognitive and neural basis of time 
estimation (e.g. Pouthas & Perbal, 2004; Zakay & Block, 2004). The relevance of time 
estimation processes to TB PM is again discussed in Chapter 4.
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Ceci & Bronfenbrenner (1985) conducted a study with children and TB PM to investigate 
time monitoring further. They asked male and female children to either ‘remember to take 
the cup cakes out of the oven in 30 minutes time’ or ‘remember to disconnect a charging 
motorcycle battery in 30 minutes time’. During these 30 minutes the children were engaged 
in a ‘Pac Man’ game. The researchers also manipulated both the environmental context (at 
home or in a lab) and the age o f the children. They established a strategic monitoring 
pattern that comprised three different phases of time-monitoring: 1) an early calibration 
phase during which participants ‘calibrate’ their psychological clock with the passage of 
real clock time by frequent clock checking; 2) an intermediate phase during which 
participants reduce their clock checking behaviour and focus on other tasks; and 3) a 
‘scalloping’ phase during which participants greatly increase their clock checking as the 
correct moment draws near. Thus, the children developed a strategic U-shaped pattern of 
clock checking, but this was mediated by the environmental setting (increased clock 
checking in the lab, termed anxious time monitoring), age (older children were more 
strategic monitorers), and task type (girls clock checked more during the cupcake task and 
boys during the battery task). Overall, the researchers concluded that a strategic U-shaped 
pattern of clock checking is most efficient and can be found in children as young as 10.
The key idea in both these models of time monitoring is that TB prospective remembering 
allows for some attentional disengagement during ‘Wait’ periods (Einstein et al., 1995; 
Park et al., 1997). Park and colleagues describe the reason why this dissociates TB PM 
from EB:
‘An important dimension on which TB & EB may differ is the amount of continuous 
sustained attention required for adequate PM. EB PM requires relatively more continuous 
attention, whereas TB memory requires the central executive to redirect short bursts of 
attention to the process of time-monitoring (as reflected in clock-checking behaviour)’ 
(p.325).
In Chapter 4, section 4.2.2. I discuss the implications of this proposed difference in more 
detail. Suffice it to say for now that the apparent differences in required sustained attention 
or strategic monitoring across the retention interval in EB and TB tasks implies different
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cognitive processing requirements across the delay. As such, there are no studies, to my 
knowledge, that address this issue head on.
Sellen et al., (1997) and Kvavilashvili (2005) also report differences between EB and TB 
cognition in their studies that are comparatively more naturalistic. In the former study, 
participants were asked to press a button they were supplied with at specific times or at 
specific places during their everyday activities. They also instructed participants to press 
the button whenever they thought about performing these tasks whenever and wherever 
they did so. An analysis of how thoughts regarding the PM tasks were distributed across the 
retention interval could then be considered. The ‘place’ task was conducted more 
successfully than the TB PM task and there seemed less need to think about the EB task 
during the retention interval. The place task allowed for contextual cueing, whereas the TB 
task did not (except for in one participant who tied the TB intention to a particular routine 
activity). The TB task, in contrast, required participants to internally control ruminations 
regarding its performance. However, these ruminations did not appear to increase 
immediately preceding intention performance, as demonstrated by Harris & Wilkins. The 
authors explained this discrepancy as a consequence of the lengthier retention intervals and 
coarser-grained measuring. Sellen and colleagues discuss two mechanisms for these two 
task types; TB PM required more ‘inside-out’ control, that is internally-generated 
promptings whereas the place task required ‘outside-in’ control, in which external cues 
triggered the intentions. In contrast, Kvavilashvili (2005) report that in one naturalistic 
study with diary reports only 9% to 14% of participants’ TB intention rehearsals were self­
initiated, and that most were also prompted by an external cue, albeit incidentally. The 
author thus remarks that TB tasks may also rely on automatic retrieval processing. Indeed, 
the retrieval demands o f TB PM have been discussed in relation to clock monitoring and 
internal reminders, but there have been few studies investigating how the parameters of the 
ongoing task, or the type of TB intention, or the cue (which is essentially the clock in 
experimental studies) might affect this monitoring and retrieval process. It is certainly clear 
that further research is required to understand the factors affecting processing demands in 
TB PM.
2.6. Ageing studies and PM
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An area of study that has revealed some empirical data regarding the cognitive processes of 
TB PM is with ageing populations. The fundamental assumption of the PM and ageing 
research is that an age-related decline in PM should occur since self-initiated processing is 
disrupted by ageing (Craik, 1986; Einstein & McDaniel, 1995; West, 1996). PM tasks 
particularly void o f environmental support will suffer the greatest, such as TB PM tasks. 
Research in the retrospective memory (RM) field has demonstrated differing patterns of 
age-related impairments on RM tasks that vary according to their dependence on self­
initiated retrieval processes (e.g. free recall vs recognition tasks, Craik, 1986; Craik & 
McDowd, 1987). As such, researchers have compared older adults’ performances on TB 
and EB Pm tasks (for a review see Henry et al., 2004). Evidence for the predicted 
hypotheses has been somewhat equivocal in the PM literature. Einstein et al., (1995) did 
find age-related decrements in TB PM compared to EB PM tasks. Their younger 
participants performed the TB PM task (press a particular key every 10 minutes) more 
accurately than the older adults, and monitored the clock more strategically (i.e. increased 
monitoring leading up to the correct time). They found no age differences in PM 
performance in a matched EB task. Park et al., (1997) found older adults manifested poorer 
performance on a TB PM task compared to younger adults and this impairment was 
exacerbated by adding a concurrent working memory task. However, they also report a 
deficit in EB PM in their older population, suggesting that ageing deficits are not simply 
confined to TB PM. In contrast, D ’Ydewalle et al. (1996; 1999) found no age impairment 
on TB PM tasks. Similarly, naturalistic studies appear to produce equivalent PM 
performance between older and younger adults, or even better performance by the older 
population (e.g. Moscovitch, 1982; Martin, 1986). May lor (1990) describe her elderly 
participants as turning the TB PM task into an EB PM task by anchoring the intention to the 
end of watching a TV show. By using this strategy, the older participants reduced demands 
on internally-guided processes. These types of strategies may be common ways of dealing 
with TB intentions in this population (Henry et al., 2004). Although, as Huppert et al., 
(2000) portray in their very large sample of elderly and early dementia participants, 
performance of the elderly can also be impaired in lab-based EB tasks.
Researchers have also reported ageing studies that manipulate the level of self-initiated 
processes required within just EB tasks. For example, Mantyla (1994) presented, to both 
young and older adults, typical and atypical exemplars of categories of words that acted as
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the PM cue. Although there was an overall age-impairment in performing the PM tasks -  
older adults were particularly poorer at this EB PM task when the cues were atypical words 
from a category. This was attributed to the larger demand on self-initiated processing 
required to recognise the atypical example as the PM cue. Consistent with this, Cherry et 
al., (2001) also provided evidence that age effects of PM performance depend on properties 
of the PM cue. These different findings associated with age and EB PM performance can be 
related to the multiprocess theory (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000). Variables, such as the 
properties o f the PM cue, determine the magnitude of the age effects (Vogels et al., 2002; 
Henry et al., 2004). The modulation o f age-related effects in TB PM remains poorly 
understood, except to say that older adults perform better in naturalistic scenarios rather 
than lab-based tasks, but this may be because they use compensatory strategies so they do 
not need to rely on internal control processes. Furthermore, whether ageing participants 
demonstrate a disadvantage on PM tasks because of failing executive functions remains an 
open debate. The next section will discuss the potential role o f executive processes in PM.
2.7. The Role o f Executive Processes in PM
Contemporary theories of PM accept that PM is ‘more than memory’ (Dobbs & Reeve, 
1996). The role of executive processes in PM has been discussed so far mainly in terms of 
the demands of self-initiated retrieval, such as those that are recruited in episodic memory 
retrieval (e.g. see Burgess & Shallice, 1997 and Stuss & Levine, 2002). Executive resources 
are involved in other stages of PM in both EB and TB PM (see Van de Berg et al., 2004). 
Although few studies have attempted to specify the exact executive functions involved in 
PM, apart from assumptions based on the task demands. As described, it is certainly 
expected that the SAS plays a role given the need to inhibit a prepotent response to stimuli, 
and also the novelty of executing the intended action instead of the routine action (Shallice 
& Burgess, 1991). Demands in PM associated with mediation by executive processes 
include planning, monitoring the environment for the cue or the time (as described above), 
inhibiting the ongoing task response, switching to the intended action and error monitoring 
(e.g. Martin & Schumann-Hengsteler, 2001; Kliegel et al., 2004). That PM is a combination 
of these processes and RM processes is partly evidenced by the SAD patients described in 
Chapter 1. These patients show intact RM performance and yet impaired PM (Burgess & 
Shallice, 1997). Other neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies provide evidence for
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executive control in PM, these will be discussed below, but first I will mention some 
behavioural studies that implicate executive processes in PM.
2.7.1. Complex PM Paradigm
Kliegel and colleagues have developed a complex PM test, which resembles the 
multitasking tests described in Chapter 1, section 1.3.1, to study the recruitment of 
executive processes (e.g. Kliegel et al., 2000; Kliegel et al., 2002; Kliegel et al., 2004). 
They have argued that the standard Einstein & McDaniel paradigm, in which only a single 
or few intentions are initiated, is not sophisticated enough to differentiate between 
processes over the course of the PM task, including planning. In Kliegel et al., (2000) 
participants performed a task very similar to the Six Elements Test and are scored on their 
plan, their plan-following and their execution o f a series of multiple intentions (i.e. 
switching between the subtasks). Older and younger adults performed this test plus a series 
of other neuropsychological tasks including the Stroop, a working memory test, the digit- 
symbol subtask o f the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and finally an RM test. Regression 
analyses established that inhibition (Stroop) and working memory were related to plan 
initiation and Stroop performance was associated with the number of subtasks attempted. 
These same PM and neuropsychological test scores were impaired in the older adults, 
leading the authors to argue that age-related impairments are due to deficits in more basic 
cognitive skills. The study also suggested only complex, multiple intention PM tasks were 
associated with working memory, rather than the single intention PM task (i.e. in which 
participants just had to initiate one intention at the correct time). They proposed that 
automatic retrieval processes, which made no demands on working memory, mediated the 
single intention task, whilst the planning required in the complex task encouraged 
participants to use strategic processing. Although this may be true, other elements of the 
PM process require executive processes (not just the retrieval of the cue), for instance the 
inhibition of the ongoing task to generate the PM intended action or the required task- 
switch (which also occurs in the single intention task e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Ellis, 
1996). Why at least then did inhibition not correlate with the single intention performance? 
No doubt because a single isolated switch is not powerful enough to generate a correlation.
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In a follow-up study, Kliegel et al., (2002) reported finding differential patterns of 
executive test correlations with separable components of the PM process. Again, they 
operationalised PM with a complex multitasking test rather than the standard paradigm and 
scored several components o f the test e.g. planning, plan-following, number of subtasks 
attempted to represent their proposed 4 stages of PM: intention formation, retention, 
intention initiation and execution. They then analysed the relationship of these scores with 
the participants’ performances on other executive tests. Planning (‘Plan a Day’ task) was 
associated with the intention formation phase o f the PM task, which was essentially 
operationalised as planning too. Problem-solving (‘Tower o f London’ task, which is 
actually often conceptualised as a planning task e.g. Shallice, 1982; Dagher et al., 1999) 
was associated with initiation of the complex PM task and ‘cognitive flexibility’ (WCST) 
was associated with execution of the delayed intentions. They thus argue much of the 
executive demand of a PM task appears in the intention formation and execution phases. 
Different executive tests were also differentially associated with different PM task types (a 
single intention task, a standard EB and TB PM task and a complex multitasking PM task) 
in a later study by Martin et al., (2003). Variance on the complex multitasking PM task 
could be predicted by differences in performance of the executive functioning tasks 
(WCST, Stroop and Tower of London), even after age had also been added to the 
regression analyses. This suggests an overlap of processes in these three tasks and in the 
multitasking test -  and in this sense this is different to the neuropsychological findings of 
Burgess et al., (2000) and Shallice & Burgess (1991). Executive functioning also predicted 
performance on the EB and TB PM tasks even after controlling for health, education and 
RM, but it did not predict performance on the single intention task, presumably because 
this latter task is much less demanding.
Finally, another study by Kliegel and colleagues (2004) supports the notion of executive 
functions as crucially involved in PM. They showed that a group of young participants with 
traumatic brain injury and a group of neurologically normal older participants were 
impaired on their complex multitasking PM test compared to a control group, despite intact 
RM. These same groups performed at a deficient level on the WCST also. The authors 
propose that this once more highlights the importance of executive functions and moreover 
that age-related deficits in PM are associated with their decline in executive functioning. 
They again emphasised the multi-phasic nature of PM, with executive functioning seeming
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to be particularly related to the intention formation and execution phases. They discuss the 
limitations of their study, which include the lack of information regarding speed of 
processing (which also declines in older age, e.g. Salthouse, 1996, and may affect PM 
processing, e.g. West & Craik, 2001) and their small group sizes. Nevertheless, this group 
of researchers is making headway in separating the component PM processes and their 
relation to executive measures. The ecological validity o f these multitasking PM tests also 
gives them advantages in the applied domain.
Unfortunately, difficulties remain in dissociating the executive functions involved in PM. 
In the correlational/regression studies described above the executive tasks correlated with 
PM performance are also multicomponential (as described in Chapter 1, section 1.2.2). For 
example, the WCST and TOL in Kliegel et al., 2002 are defined as ‘cognitive flexibility’ 
and ‘problem-solving’, which are very broad terms and not necessarily any more helpful in 
describing the executive role. Indeed, Rogers et al., (1998) deliberate over the 
psychological character of frontal patients’ deficits on the WCST, they question whether it 
is related to an inability to inhibit attention to previous stimuli, failure to keep task relevant 
info online in working memory or a general difficulty in complex problem-solving. Stuss & 
Levine (2002) discuss how separate scores from the WCST may be measuring different 
frontal areas, and thus potentially different processes, for instance DLPFC is associated 
with set-shifting whereas ventral PFC lesions cause set loss errors. One way of tackling this 
issue might be to use more componential measures of executive functioning -  such as 
working memory tests (e.g. n-back), inhibition (e.g. flanker) and task-switching. In 
addition, Kliegel et al. (2004) report the performance of their TBI patients on the PM tasks 
but there is little data as to the specific location of the lesion or the extent of the lesion. To 
the extent that dissociable executive functions are associated with different PFC regions 
(see Chapter 1) we have gleaned very little about the potentially different PFC areas 
involved in PM. For example, the review of Burgess et al. (2000) indicates that rostral PFC 
(particularly BA 10) may have a crucial role in PM and in Chapter 1, section 1.3.2. the 
potential functions of this area were described, with the suggestion that rostral PFC is 
involved in cognitive control of internally-generated behaviours. Neuropsychological 
studies of PM have not tended to discuss particular areas of the PFC however, and instead 
effort has been directed at assessing the role of RM impairment in PM ability. Executive 
functions have been included at a more general level, as with the studies of Kliegel and
59
collegues (e.g. McDaniel et al., 1999; Kopp & Thome, 2003; Mathias & Mansfield, 2005). 
I shall now turn to these other neuropsychological studies of PM in order to assess their 
conclusions about the role of executive processes in PM.
2.7.2. PM and Neuropsychological Studies
Several studies have demonstrated impaired PM performance in patients with traumatic 
brain injury (TBI), which is commonly associated with temporal and frontal damage (e.g. 
Hannon et al., 1995; Cockbum, 1996; Kinsella et al., 1996; Shum et al., 1999; Fortin et al., 
2002; Carlesimo et al., 2004; Schmitter-Edgecombe & Wright, 2004; Mathias & Mansfield, 
2005). Shum et al., (1999) demonstrated that a group o f severe TBI patients performed 
worse on three types of PM tasks: TB, EB and activity-based (see Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 
1996), and their performance on the TB PM task was the most deficient, presumably 
because of the increased demands made on self-initiated processing. Schmitter-Edgecombe 
& Wright (2004) correlated performance on EB PM task with the patients’ 
neuropsychological profiles and found strong relationships between PM performance, RM 
and attention/speed of processing scores. The authors thus emphasised the attentional 
requirements for PM tasks, specifically the lapses of attention that may be the cause of age- 
related and TBI decline (Craik & Kerr, 1996; West et al., 2000) and may be attributable to 
poor frontal functioning.
McDaniel et al., (1999) report a neuropsychological study that also suggests a frontal 
contribution to PM tasks. Older adults were assessed on two batteries of tests, the first 
assumed to test hippocampal (RM) processes and the latter to test frontal (executive) 
processes. From these composite scores the participants were split into high and low 
hippocampal and frontal functioning groups and an EB PM task was administered with 
salient and non-salient cues. Older adults with low scores associated with frontal 
functioning were impaired on the PM task compared to older adults with higher scores on 
these measures. There were no significant differences on the PM task between the high and 
low scorers on the tasks associated with hippocampus functioning. Acknowledging the 
indirect nature of the evidence, the authors nevertheless discuss the potential role of the 
frontal lobes in PM. Firstly, they suggest the role could be the monitoring for the SAS 
‘marker’, as previously discussed. However, if monitoring processes were deficient then
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PM performance of the low frontal functioning group should be even worse in the non­
salient cue condition compared to the salient cue condition. This was not the case. They 
also discuss the frontal/executive contribution as providing strategic encoding processes in 
order to raise activation thresholds o f the intended actions (e.g. Burgess & Shallice, 1997). 
Furthermore, they discuss the requirement to interrupt the ongoing task and initiate the PM 
task, a process the authors relate to working memory and PFC, but this is clearly also 
associated with task-switching (Rogers & Monsell, 1995, see Chapter 3), which remains an 
area unexplored with regards to PM. Their experimental design was unable to differentiate 
between these alternative roles.
Kopp and Thome (2003) used a similar experimental design to test brain-injured patients 
with high and low executive functioning scores and with high and low RM scores. Once 
more, those patients with low executive functioning scores showed diminished scores on a 
PM task, whereas the low RM scorers could still perform at control levels on the PM task, 
perhaps because the RM element o f the PM task was minimal (entailing remembering three 
cue letters). It is perhaps unsurprising, however, that the high scoring executive group 
performed better since they were assigned to the groups according to their scores on the 
Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS; Wilson et al., 1996). This 
is an executive battery that includes measures of PM, or tests that require PM related 
processes (such as the Zoo Map test and the Six Elements). In this sense, there is a degree 
of circularity to their study. Groot et al., (2002) found that patients with brain injury 
exhibited deficits in EB and TB tasks, with worse performance on the latter. Correlations 
with both RM and executive function tasks (including the Stroop, a version of the WCST, 
verbal fluency) and PM performance appeared in both the control group and the brain- 
injury group. Groot and colleagues found poorer TB performance in the brain-injury group 
because of deficits in inhibitory control mechanisms (see also Cockbum, 1995), but this 
was based on rather indirect evidence. Carlesimo et al., (2004) conducted a TB and EB PM 
study with patients with closed-head injury (CHI) in a design which separated the PM 
(remembering the intention) and the RM (remembering what the intention is) components 
of the task. CHI patients manifest both RM and PM deficits leading to impaired PM 
performance. However, overall they argue that the CHI participants showed insufficient 
utilization of strategic time monitoring and/or self-remindings, as a consequence of a 
disturbed attentional control system, since RM could be intact and clock checking was
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reduced in the TB conditions. Several proposals regarding the role of the attentional system 
in PM were offered by the authors, including planning the strategic behaviour, such as 
clock checking, and shifting attention to the PM task away from the ongoing task (see 
Chapter 3 for further discussion on this and also Guynn et al., 2001).
Mathias & Mansfield (2005) found no correlations between performances on RM measures 
and several PM tasks in participants who had sustained TBI. This is despite reporting 
impaired performance o f these participants on the PM and RM tasks. Executive 
functioning, as assessed by a verbal fluency task and WCST, did not correlate with PM 
ability, although the TBI participants performed significantly worse at the verbal fluency 
task. Measures of attention (trail-making tests) also produced poorer performance in the 
TBI participants, but both this result and the fluency impairment could reflect reduced 
information processing speed as they are both timed tests. These researchers could find no 
relationship between PM and traditional executive functioning tests, which is consistent 
with the neuropsychological findings of Burgess and colleagues.
Several explanations can be submitted to explain these discrepant findings; the usual 
difficulties with neuropsychological studies of course apply, such as small sample sizes and 
heterogeneous aetiologies (Mathias & Mansfield, 2005). In the studies described in this 
section there was little precise anatomical information about lesion sites, so several PFC 
areas may have been damaged. Moreover, there are inconsistencies with both the PM tasks 
used, for instance changes in retention interval lengths and PM cues, and the executive 
tasks administered. The same limitation applies to these studies as mentioned above in 
relation to the complex tasks: the executive tasks used to assess performance are 
multicomponential and tap a variety of processes. In some cases, composite executive 
scores have been utilised from several executive tests or battery of tests (e.g. McDaniel et 
al., 1999; Kopp & Thome, 2003), making interpretation difficult in terms of the exact 
processes contributing to PM. Theoretically, it would be useful to compare performance on 
executive tasks associated with specific regions o f the PFC, such as task-switching 
(DLPFC;) or purer working memory tasks (such as complex span tasks), and tasks 
associated with other PFC regions. This would test the hypothesis that there is fractionation 
of the executive processes and PFC, and tasks with different degrees of internal and 
external cueing may involve different PFC regions (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2). Thus,
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generally these studies are consistent with frontal contributions to PM but there is little 
understanding of the relationship between the control processes employed in PM with other 
executive processes. Imaging research can shed some light on this issue.
2.7.3. PM and Neuroimaging Studies
Support for the role of the PFC in PM has also been obtained from neuroimaging studies. 
Okuda et al., (1998) conducted PM studies in which participants’ blood flows were 
compared on blocks of ongoing task with and without an added PM demand (to tap their 
hand on identifying a certain word cue). Several sets of activations were unique to the PM 
blocks. These appeared in the anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 24), superior frontal gyrus (BA 
10) and parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28) in the left hemisphere and inferior frontal gyri (BA 
8, 9 and 47) and medial PFC (BA 8). These activations were similar (but not identical) to 
those found in a previous study by Yamadori et al., (1997), which also confirmed a role for 
BA 8-10 and the anterior cingulate gyrus plus some DLPFC involvement in the right 
hemisphere. The activations were related to the following functions by Okuda and 
colleagues: Right VPFC and the left frontal pole to maintaining the intention, left 
parahippocampal region to novelty detection and the medial PFC area to dividing the 
attention between performing the intended action and the ongoing task.
Burgess et al., (2001) also demonstrated BA 10 activation in the maintenance of intentions, 
along with increased activation in the right lateral PFC, the inferior parietal cortex and the 
precuneus and decreased activation in the insula of the left hemisphere. The realisation of 
the delayed intentions activated a different region, the thalamus and deactivated the right 
DLPFC. The maintenance versus realisation of intentions was differentiated by contrasting 
baseline with an expected intention condition (in which participants were given PM 
instructions but the cue never occurred) and baseline with an execution condition (in which 
the same PM instructions were given and the PM cue did occur). A role for BA 10 in PM 
and other PFC areas then is once more substantiated. Burgess and colleagues contend that 
the activation patterns in the ‘expectation’ condition represents ‘anticipatory’ processes. 
Although the nature of these anticipatory processes could not be described definitively from 
their experiment, the authors suggested that ‘there is no reason to assume that this state o f
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anticipation or readiness occurs in situations which do not require self-generated action ’ 
(p. 553). As such, the internal guidance required in PM tasks is once more highlighted.
Finally, another imaging study was conducted to investigate the neural basis of PM, but this 
time with the motivation to rule out the task difficulty hypothesis (Burgess, Scott & Frith, 
2003). Potentially the activations found in PFC in the PM conditions could be attributed to 
extra attentional demands, that is, task difficulty, challenging the maintenance of the 
intentions hypothesis. Burgess et al., found no support for this hypothesis because they 
demonstrated that BA 10 activation could be lower in more behaviourally effortful ongoing 
task conditions. The authors proffered a dissociation between the medial and lateral regions 
o f BA 10 based on the activation patterns, suggesting medial regions suppress internally- 
generated thought and the latter maintain it (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2. and another PM 
imaging study is described in Chapter 3, section 4.2.1. supporting this argument). Thus, 
Burgess and colleagues (2005) have made a convincing case for the role of these regions 
supporting the biasing of attentional modes between SOT (for ongoing task performance) 
and SIT (for maintenance of intention), with medial regions supporting the former, and 
lateral regions supporting the latter.
2.8. Summary
So what has this review of the PM literature established regarding the cognitive mediation 
o f this ubiquitous behaviour? Firstly, that there are several components to successful PM. 
These are intention formation, retention, intention instantiation, intention execution and 
evaluation. Some of these components require, or behave like, RM processes. However, 
several of these components, including retrieval and intention execution, require strategic, 
self-initiated processing which place demands on the executive control system. The degree 
of executive control required for retrieval is dependent on several parameters of the task; 
these parameters are well researched in the EB literature, but relatively unexplored in the 
TB domain. Moreover, the characterisations of the executive processes in PM tasks remain 
somewhat focussed on these retrieval demands. Broadly, the neuropsychological studies 
support a role for PFC and executive functioning in PM, although our understanding of the 
precise executive contribution to this behaviour remains weak, and this is particularly true 
of TB tasks. Behavioural and neuropsychological studies are still required to disentangle
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the precise executive control processes and neural regions involved in PM. This thesis 
hopes to fill some o f the gaps in our understanding.
2.9. Focus o f Thesis Research
There is no doubt that behaviours are both internally-generated and driven by the stimuli in 
the environment, with most lying somewhere in the middle. Nonetheless, PM and 
multitasking are voluntary, uniquely human behaviours that require a great deal of top 
down, self-initiated organisation. Thus, studying these behaviours can give us an insight 
into how executive control manifests itself. For instance, one line of evidence in the 
cognitive control literature described above suggests that tasks relying heavily on 
endogenous control, such as PM, may recruit different neural areas and cognitive processes 
to executive tasks that are more externally constrained. Theories of the functions of rostral 
PFC associate this area with these types of tasks, whereas the role of DLPFC seems 
apparent in other executive, more externally-constrained, tasks. This thesis explores this 
possible dissociation of function behaviourally by investigating the cognitive processing 
requirements o f performing internally and externally-cued tasks.
2.9.1. Broad Overview of Experiments
To achieve this aim, I describe four experiments in Chapter 3 that assess common 
processing in two tasks possessing a fundamentally similar demand (task-switch) but differ 
in whether this is internally- or externally-cued. By integrating the externally-cued task 
switching paradigm with a PM task, I hope to demonstrate an effective means of 
operationalising the distinction between internal and external cueing. The four experiments 
utilise slightly different PM instructions in order to manipulate the degree of external 
cueing in the PM tasks and uncover processing differences or similarities between these 
PM task types.
Next, in Chapter 4, I describe two experiments investigating the cognitive processes 
implicated in PM tasks that vary along an internally- and externally- cued continuum. This 
involved exploring the nature of TB PM tasks, specifically questioning the assumption that 
these types of PM tasks always depend heavily on self-initiated processing because of lack 
of external cues.
65
Finally, in Chapter 5, I take a slightly different approach to the study of internally-guided 
behaviours, by turning to multitasking tests. In two experiments, I investigate individual 
differences in multitasking in the healthy population, and explore the relationship of 
performance on these tests to externally-cued tests and real life outcomes. In the second of 
these experiments, some external cues were imposed on the multitasking test in order to 
determine their effects on performance.
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Chapter 3
Cognitive Control o f Internally-generated and Externally-cued 
Task-sw itches 
3.1. Introduction
The aim of this first empirical Chapter is to investigate the cognitive control of PM 
by combining a lab-based PM paradigm with another paradigm used to study executive 
control, task-switching. Task-switching is simply the switching between two task sets, such 
as from addition to subtraction and is a widely used paradigm for studying cognitive 
control (e.g. Jersild, 1927; Allport et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Meiran, 1996; De 
Jong, 2000; Rubenstein et al., 2001; Koch, 2003). By combining these two paradigms, the 
intention was to uncover the common processing of two similar procedures that differ, 
primarily, in the degree of endogenous and exogenous cueing. Thus, this provides a 
behavioural test of the functional dissociation of cognitive control along the 
endogenous/exogenous continuum, as proposed in the preceding Chapters. Before detailing 
the background and rationale for these experiments, I will first briefly review the task- 
switching literature.
3.2. Task-switching and the Study o f Cognitive Control
Task-switching experiments comprise of participants switching, according to cues provided 
by the procedure (such as + or -  if participants are performing addition and subtraction), 
between two or more simple cognitive tasks. Several procedural variations have emerged 
(e.g. alternating runs: Rogers & Monsell, 1995 versus alternating tasks: Miyake & 
Emerson, 2003) but a robust effect found in the reaction time (RT) data reveals that 
participants are significantly slower when alternating between tasks compared to when 
repeating the same tasks. Similarly, error rates can also be higher during task-switching (for 
review see Monsell, 2003). This switch-cost is largest when the tasks share the same 
stimuli. For instance, numbers can both be added or subtracted; indeed a whole range of 
responses can be produced in response to numerical stimuli (e.g. parity or magnitude 
judgements). Internal goals thus dictate the ‘task-set’ (in this context, a task-set is the
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appropriate configuration of mental resources to execute the task) employed on a particular 
group of external stimuli and as such the paradigm is accessing executive top-down control 
(Monsell, 1996; 2003; Allport et al., 2000; Ruge et al., 2005).
Different theoretical accounts of the source of the switch costs generally evoke top-down 
processes or bottom-up processes. In top-down accounts, executive control processes are 
required to ‘reconfigure the task-set’; such that the lower-level cognitive processes required 
to perform the upcoming task are prepared (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Monsell, 1996; 
Monsell et al., 2000). The ‘task-set-reconfiguration’ accounts then, explain the switch cost 
as though it reflected ‘mental gear changing’, with extra processes performing a variety of 
potential preparatory functions, such as ‘shifting attention between stimulus attributes or 
elements, or between conceptual criteria, retrieving goal states (what to do) and condition- 
action rules (how to do it) into procedural memory working memory (or deleting them), 
enabling a different response set and adjusting response criteria’ (Monsell, 2003, p. 135). 
The lengthier RTs to trials in which an individual has switched task, compared to repeating 
a task, reflect the duration of one or more of these processes (e.g. Rubinstein et al., 2001; 
Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Mayr & Kleigl, 2000, 2003).
Evidence for these accounts essentially derives from experiments showing reduced switch 
costs with increased preparation time (response-stimulus interval: RSI). Providing 
information in advance about the upcoming task and more time between the trials, allowing 
for increased preparation time and reduced switch costs (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995, 
experiment 3; Meiran, 1996). Generating random RSIs on a trial-by-trial basis did not 
produce this reduced switch cost (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995, experiment 2; although see 
Meiran, 1996). Consequently, the successful reduction of the switch costs was attributed to 
endogenous, SAS-driven control processes that can be initiated prior to the presentation of 
the stimuli (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Rogers & Monsell also posited another component 
to the switch cost. Although increasing the preparation interval reduces the switch cost it 
did not eradicate it altogether, a ‘residual switch cost’ still remains (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 
1995; Kimberg et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000). The authors therefore assumed that this 
reflects an exogenous, stimulus-driven control process that can only be triggered once the 
stimuli are available. Other models of task-set-reconfiguration models argue for control 
processes occurring at different stages of the switching operation. For instance, Rubenstein
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et al. (2001), present a model that includes an active process after stimulus identification, 
whereas Meiran (2000) suggests the active process appears before stimulus identification. 
However, Koch (2005) has argued the active control process is not specific to switch trials. 
He demonstrated that predictable task sequences (as opposed to random sequences) 
benefited RTs of both switch and repetition trials (see also Sohn & Carlson, 2000; Koch, 
2001; Dreisbach et al., 2002; Gotler et al., 2003). A specific task-set-reconfiguration 
process for task switches cannot explain this pattern o f data. Instead, the authors argue that 
a control process (e.g. goal updating) must be occurring before task repetitions and task 
switches, but for some reason this process(es) takes longer in switch trials.
In contrast, bottom-up accounts of task-switching argue that the switch cost is not a result 
of active control processes, but arise from passive, involuntary interference carried over 
from the previous task-set. According to Allport and colleagues, (1994) and their task-set- 
inertia hypothesis, residual activation from the previously used task-set interferes with 
producing the required task-set following the switch. Moreover, there is a carry-over of 
inhibition from the trial previously, in which the response to the ‘switched-to’ task-set was 
prevented from being executed. These priming effects generate the switch costs because of 
increased competition between the task-sets. Allport and colleagues thus argue that the 
extra processes posited by the authors above are unnecessary to explain the switch costs 
(e.g. Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003).
Evidence for this position stems from a series of task-switching experiments showing that 
the magnitude of the switch cost was sensitive to whether the participant had previously 
performed a different task-set afforded by the same stimuli. This resulted in ‘pro-active 
interference’, which dissipates only after performing the new task-set for some time 
(Allport et al., 1994). Moreover, larger switch costs appear when participants switch from a 
non-dominant task (e.g. colour-naming in Stroop task) to a well-learned, dominant task 
(e.g. word-reading in Stroop task) than from a switch into a non-dominant task. The task- 
set reconfiguration models provide no reason why there should be different size switch 
costs in these cases. These data can be reconciled by suggesting that the dominant, well- 
leamed task requires extra inhibition to prevent the usual response and this inhibition is 
carried over into the next trial. During this trial the dominant task-set is required and longer 
RTs are therefore produced to counteract this residual interference (although see Monsell et
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al., 2000 who report no asymmetric switch costs). Allport & Wylie (2000) also present 
evidence that interference may occur from the target stimuli themselves, since they 
automatically retrieve the previous task-set from memory (i.e. priming). This leads to 
competition between the two response-sets and longer RTs.
A difficulty in this field is that often evidence can be accounted for by both sets of theories 
(see e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2005; Hsieh & Liu, 2005). Thus, theorists now argue that 
several component processes could be responsible for the switch costs, including carry over 
interference and active control processes (e.g. Meiran 2000; Meiran et al., 2001; Sohn et al., 
2001; Monsell, 2003; Rushworth et al., 2005;). Evidence for these multiprocess accounts 
comes from ERP data collected by Rushworth et al., (2005) and empirical dissociations of 
the subcomponents (e.g. Meiran 2001). Rushworth and associates measured ERPs as 
participants first initiated a task-switch (i.e. shown the task-set cue) and as they then 
implemented that task-set with a response (i.e. when the stimuli appeared). The authors 
concluded that ERP modulations suggested both active task reconfiguration processes and 
passive task interference processes exist.
3.3. PM and Task-switching
As Chapter 2 has illustrated, several explanations have been advanced to characterise the 
role of executive processes in PM, and especially EB PM. However, researchers are only 
just beginning to note the similarities between PM tests and task-switching experiments. 
PM tasks, whether TB or EB, involve a self-initiated task switch from the ongoing task to 
the PM task during the correct performance interval (Ellis, 1996). PM tasks also require 
internal switches between the ongoing task and retrieval of the intention. Kvavilashvili 
(1998) also describes the process of interruption of the ongoing task to switch to the 
unrelated prospective task. However, a qualitative difference is apparent between the nature 
of the task switches in the PM type tests and the tests of the task-switching literature. In the 
former, the task switch is self-initiated; during PM tests there is a switch of task because of 
internally represented goals. The participant is responsible for ignoring the current task-set 
(the ongoing task) and producing the PM task-set, and there is little direct environmental 
cueing to initiate this switch (a discussion of how EB PM fits into this picture occurs 
below). In the task-switching literature, task switches are externally-cued; the participant is
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instructed of a task switch because o f a specific, associated cue (e.g. + or — indicate which 
task to perform in addition and subtraction tests). Consequently, these cues set into motion 
the switching of the task-set. Indeed, it can be argued that the key element within PM tasks 
that is indisputably under endogenous control is the task-switch (retrieval for example can 
be automatic, see Chapter 2, section 2.4). Thus, the comparison of externally-cued task- 
switches and internally-driven task-switches can speak to the independence of the cognitive 
control of these two sources o f behaviour (see also Weidner et al., 2002).
Marsh et al., (2002) produced two experiments that combined task-switching and PM as 
part o f their investigation into the effects o f the ongoing task on PM performance. During 
their first experiment participants were engaged in two different types of ongoing task -  
word-pleasantness rating and syllable counting - whilst also maintaining an intention to 
make a particular response whenever they saw an animal word in the ongoing task stimuli. 
Two versions of the experiment were administered in which only one aspect was different. 
In experiment la  participants randomly switched between performing the two types of 
ongoing task (i.e. they task switched), whilst in experiment lb  participants performed only 
one of the ongoing tasks throughout (i.e. with no task-switching.) The authors noted 
reduced performance of the PM task in experiment la  compared to lb, they also noted 
longer RTs of the ongoing task in experiment la  (as would be expected from the task- 
switching literature.) They interpreted this as the PM component of the task drawing on 
resources from the central executive (Marsh & Hicks, 1998), resources which, they argue, 
are also required in task-switching.
However, this is an incomplete analysis of the relationship between task-switching and PM. 
Firstly, the purpose of the Marsh et al. studies was to manipulate the executive demands of 
the ongoing task in order to assess the impact on EB PM performance. The task-switching 
paradigm offers a convenient and well-researched methodology with which to manipulate 
the level of executive resources used in the ongoing task. However, beyond concluding that 
EB PM tasks do require some executive resources, demonstrated by the reduced PM 
performance in the task-switching conditions, these studies were unable to elaborate further 
on the specific or overlapping processes involved in either task-switching or PM. Secondly, 
the authors did not recognise the PM task as a task switch in itself (as described above) and 
thus failed to have a matching externally-cued condition to assess the voluntary task switch
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cost (this is outlined in more detail below). Finally, the experiment only considered EB 
PM; no study has investigated the relationship of time-based PM and task-switching.
3.4. Internally- and Externally-cued Task-switching
Despite little research directly comparing PM and task-switching, studies have begun to 
manipulate the degree o f environmental cueing within the task-switching paradigm. Kray 
and Lindenberger (2000) conducted a study in which they presented no external cues to 
prompt the task switch. Adult groups o f different ages were presented with two tasks that 
were afforded by the same stimuli (colour-naming or shape-naming) and response keys. 
Participants were told to switch between these tasks in a predictable AABB procedure. 
They found that switch costs behaved similarly as with the external cueing procedure, such 
that increased preparation time reduced the switch cost. This was interpreted as evidence 
for an endogenous control process to reconfigure the task set. Koch (2003) highlighted that 
this study did not provide an additional control condition in which external cues were 
provided. Such a control condition would have allowed for a comparison between 
internally-cued and externally-cued switches. Hence, Koch (2003) carried out such a study, 
asking participants to switch tasks according to the AABB procedure. One group were 
provided with an external cue (the shape o f the stimulus presentation frame), whereas 
another group were not presented with a cue and thus relied on internal (i.e. memory based) 
retrieval to know when to switch. Participants for whom an external cue was provided 
exhibited reduced switch costs with longer preparation time, whereas the internal cue group 
did not. In other words, there were differential effects o f internal and external cues. Several 
processes are discussed as potentially producing these differential effects, for example, task 
selection by goal updating (Rubenstein et al., 2001) or retrieval of task-specific stimulus- 
response rules (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000). Koch argues that task selection could occur faster 
with external cues or retrieval of task rules could be more effective because external cues 
are more salient (this issue o f saliency/cue strength is addressed in Chapter 6, section 6.5.1. 
Whatever the explanation, Koch argued that internal and external cues have differential 
effects on task-switching costs and thus recruit different cognitive processes.
Koch’s internal cueing condition resembles a PM paradigm, participants had to retrieve 
from memory the correct task to execute, except the RIs were very short (switch every two
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trials, a matter of seconds) and thus the PM task (essentially to remember to switch) is very 
frequent and may be considered more similar to vigilance tasks (see Brandimonte et al., 
2001) . In addition, the participants also know in advance when the intention must be 
carried out. This is somewhat like TB PM, in which participants know exactly when the 
task switch should occur, but different to EB PM in which the participants must monitor for 
the cue (although it is not like TB PM in that the cue in TB PM is external to the ongoing 
task). The important point here is that there is a difference in task switch predictability 
between the two paradigms o f EB and TB PM. The predictability of the cue affects the 
switch costs (and the neural mediation o f the task switch, see Dreher et al., 2002 below). 
For instance, Monsell and associates (2003) investigated runs of task repetitions after 
predictable and unpredictable task switches. They identified a differential effect on the 
subsequent trials. After predictable task switches participants’ RTs ‘recovered’ after just 
one trial, whereas after unpredictable trials participants RTs were slowed for several trials 
post switch, perhaps because o f incomplete reconfiguration. Hence, task switch 
predictability may be o f relevance in comparing TB and EB PM, this is discussed below.
3.5. Voluntary Task-switching Paradigm
Recently a new approach has developed to investigate task-switching, which has examined 
the cognitive control of a voluntary, self-initiated task switch (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 
2004, 2005). Within this voluntary task-switching paradigm, participants are simply 
instructed to switch between performing two easy digit tasks whenever they wished. 
Arrington & Logan (2004) contend that this is measuring endogenous control processes, 
because clearly, there are no external cues and the participant is making an active decision 
about whether to repeat or switch tasks. Consequently, this type of task-switching 
procedure is more directly comparable to PM. Analyses revealed that these voluntary task 
switch trials also generated longer RTs compared to voluntary task-repetition trials. 
Moreover, these switch costs were comparable to those found in externally-cued task- 
switching studies and behaved the same, in that they decreased (though did not completely 
disappear) with a longer RSI. Increasing the RSI is thought to allow increasing active 
preparation for the task switch (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In addition, the authors found a 
pre-switch slowing when they analysed the trials before and after a voluntary switch. As the 
authors acknowledge, this study was not designed to tease apart the type of processes these
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voluntary task switch costs represent, whether top-down reconfiguration processes or 
bottom-up interference. It simply established that a residual switch cost still exists even 
when participants have voluntary control over task-switching.
The second voluntary task switch study by the same authors replicated the initial results 
that there is a switch cost in endogenous controlled task switching (Arrington & Logan, 
2005). Participants consistently showed voluntary switch costs that decreased with 
increased preparation time, again suggesting top down control processes. In addition, they 
showed this time that the switch costs were different to that o f the explicit cueing (i.e. 
extemally-cued) procedure, actually showing comparatively lower differences in RTs 
between the switch and repetition trials. Thus, Arrington & Logan concluded that the 
explicit task cueing procedure generates switch costs for different reasons to the voluntary 
task switching procedure, with the former arising predominately (but not entirely) from 
bottom up processes and the latter from predominately top down processes. They attribute 
this difference to the degree of environmental support provided by the tasks, with the 
explicit cueing procedure constraining and directing behaviour with external cues and the 
voluntary task procedure leaving the task open for internal control.
With this evidence in mind, it is reasonable to suppose that any cost to the ongoing task in 
the PM paradigm could be partly a consequence of task switch processes, as demonstrated 
in the Arrington & Logan voluntary task switch studies. Arguably, the slower RTs in the 
ongoing task may be a result o f the cost o f task-switching, rather than completing just the 
‘pure’ ongoing task. In EB PM the switch is unpredictable and thus there may be a longer 
cost to the ongoing task after the PM response (Monsell et al., 2003). In contrast, TB PM 
could produce slower RTs prior to the self-initiated task switch because of preparatory 
processes involved in predictive task-switching (Monsell et al., 2003). Equally, slower RTs 
could be a result of bottom up processes, such as task-set-inertia from the PM task-switch, 
interfering with the ongoing task (this is discussed further in Chapter 6, section 2). Since 
PM tasks have previously not been conceptualised as self-initiated task switches this 
possibility has not been taken in account within the theoretical models. For instance, Smith 
(2003) included a control group that kept the maintenance of intentions equal but 
manipulated the monitoring aspect of the PM task, that is, the control group maintained the 
PM intentions but did not perform the PM task until after the ongoing task. However, there
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was no control group included that did not have the PM intentions but did have the 
equivalent task switch, that is, a control group who were extemally-cued to make the same 
PM response at the same time points. By including such a control group, it would have 
been possible to dissociate the slowing due to PM task switch task set reconfiguration 
processes from that due to monitoring and/or maintaining the intention. The experiments 
reported here included such a control group in order to investigate this possibility.
3.6. Further Evidence for a Dissociation between Internally- and 
Externally-cued Task-switching
O f relevance here is the evidence indicating that cognitive control over extemally-cued 
tasks may engage the lateral areas of the PFC, particularly BA 9 and 46 (Christoff & 
Gabrieli, 2000; Stuss & Levine, 2002), whereas control of internally-cued tasks may 
engage more rostral areas (see Chapter 1, section 1.3). This supplies a neural basis for the 
dissociation proffered by Arrington & Logan above. For example, imaging studies using 
the task-switching paradigm are providing evidence for a role of lateral PFC in cognitive 
control (e.g. Meyer et al., 1997; Dreher et al., 2002; also ventrolateral PFC (BA 47) e.g. 
Dove et al., 2000; Sohn et al., 2000), as does neuropsychological evidence (e.g. Rogers et 
al., 1998; Mecklinger et al., 1999). The exact contribution that lateral PFC provides for 
extemally-cued task-switching is uncertain but several theories have been posited, for 
example, to inhibit the irrelevant task sets in working memory (Arbuthnott & Frank, 2000; 
Mayr & Keele, 2000) or load the task-set into working memory (Dreher et al., 2002).
In one neuroimaging study, performed by Dreher et al. (2002), the authors manipulated 
both the timing and the predictability o f a task switch. In certain blocks, participants could 
predict the upcoming tasks, which allowed for endogenous preparation, whilst in other 
blocks the tasks were determined randomly. Anterior medial (BA 10) activation was 
demonstrated when the concurrent task was predictable, but lateral PFC activation when the 
task was unpredictable. They describe a ‘functional organisation o f  the PFC along a 
mediolateral axis on the basis o f  task order predictability ’ (p. 104). Since participants in the 
predictable condition are aware of the next task and are not awaiting a cue to prompt them 
to perform a certain task, this activation is consistent with this area’s involvement in the 
control of internally generated information (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.). Dreher et al, argue 
that the role of BA 10 may involve monitoring the expected outcome (from internal
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knowledge) and comparing with the actual outcome, thus is more involved in intemally- 
cued task-switching. Dreher et aks results are also consistent with Burgess et al, (2001) 
proffered role of this area in PM. The activation of BA 10 may represent the internal 
knowledge of the correct time and rule that are appropriate for the next task while 
performing the current task. Similarly, Forstmann et al. (2005) found a specific BA 8 
activation for internally-generated task-sets compared to directly cued task-sets. Although 
they demonstrated a different neural area, which can perhaps be explained by the different 
methodology that they used to manipulate the endogenous/exogenous continuum, the 
findings are still consistent with a possible dissociation between extemally-cued and 
voluntary task control.
On account of the evidence described above, that different neural bases and executive 
processes are implicated in the cognitive control o f self-initiated and extemally-cued tasks, 
it may well be possible that the processes involved in PM (self-initiated task switches) and 
task-switching are distinct. I f  this were the case, we would expect no interaction between 
task-switching and PM performance. The present study therefore has three aims. Firstly, to 
investigate the possible dissociation between self-initiated cognitive control and extemally- 
cued cognitive control by adding PM demands to a well-established task-switching 
procedure. As part of this, the second objective is to conceptualise PM as a self-initiated 
task switch and include a novel, extemally-cued task switch control condition that matches 
the PM task switches in every way, except for the volition. By doing so, it is possible to 
draw conclusions about the nature of the RT cost to the ongoing task in PM conditions. 
Finally, these experiments aimed to contribute to the theoretical debate of the executive 
processes involved in TB and EB PM and task-switching.
3.7. The Experimental Paradigm
In order to investigate the issues described above a new experimental paradigm was 
developed utilising additive factors logic (Sternberg, 1969). According to this logic, two 
given variables affect the same cognitive processes or stages if they interact, whereas if 
their effects combine additively it is taken to indicate that they affect discrete processes. 
Thus, a factorial design was employed which crossed the factors of task-switching and PM.
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Participants performed either task-switching or pure task arithmetic verification as the 
ongoing task. In the task-switching conditions participants switched from addition to 
subtraction on every trial (ABAB procedure), whereas in pure task conditions participants 
performed only addition or subtraction (AAA or BBB). This factor was crossed with the 
prospective memory factor in which PM task demands (either TB, experiments 1-3 or EB, 
experiment 4) were also required or not. To complement the usual PM paradigm, an 
extemally-cued condition was added, in which the PM task switch demands were carried 
out automatically by the computer during the non-PM conditions.
During the PM conditions, participants were asked at specific time intervals and for specific 
cues to carry out a particular action: press the Space Bar on the keyboard and continue the 
ongoing task on similar stimuli in a new spatial location. The extemally-cued conditions 
(i.e. non-PM conditions) automatically moved participants to the new spatial location after 
similar intervals. With such a procedure, it was possible to investigate the nature of the 
preparatory processes that may occur in self-initiated task switches.
Within these experiments, the PM task was also manipulated with the purpose of varying 
the demands made on self-regulatory processes (i.e. reliance on internal cues). For example, 
TB PM tasks have previously been argued to make more demands on self-initiated 
processing (e.g. Einstein et al., 1995) than EB tasks (though see Park et al., 1997) and thus 
a different pattern of results was expected between these two types of PM task.
3.8. Experiment 1
The aim of experiment 1 was to explore the relationship between TB PM and task- 
switching and investigate the costs o f the PM task switches on the ongoing task. The 
experiments started with a TB PM procedure for three reasons. Firstly, because there has 
been little research into the effects o f TB PM demands on the ongoing task generally. 
Secondly, because the multitasking tests of Burgess et al., (2000), which show a particular 
deficit of PM in medial PFC patients, and therefore are the basis of the proposed cognitive 
control dissociation, produce TB PM demands. Thirdly, the increased reliance on self­
initiated processes would be more likely to demonstrate the predicted dissociation of 
executive processes used in task-switching and PM, if such a dissociation exists. The
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hypothesis for this study was therefore that the PM task demands would not differentially 
affect performance in the task-switching conditions compared to the pure task conditions 
(i.e. will have additive rather than interactive effects) because o f the reliance on different 
executive resources.
3.8.1 Method
Participants & Design
Twenty-four volunteers recruited from a participant database ran by the UCL Psychology 
department participated in the experiment in return for monetary compensation. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 26, 13 were female and 11 were male. Participants 
completed a health screen questionnaire to establish any history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders, but no participants were excluded on this basis. All participants 
reported a similar level of educational background, with the majority being current UCL 
undergraduates. Testing was administered on an individual basis in a session lasting 
approximately 55 minutes. All participants performed all eight conditions of the experiment 
in this repeated measures factorial design (see Figure 3.2. below for list of conditions).
Materials & Equipment
The task was presented on an IBM compatible Dell notebook with a 14 inch monitor and 
controlled by software written in Cogent (UCL, Institute o f Cognitive Neuroscience). The 
viewing distance was approximately 60cm. Two sums, including the solution (e.g. 56 + 3 = 
59), appeared on the screen simultaneously. The first aligned in the centre vertically and 
approximately 2 cm from the left edge of the screen. The second also centrally aligned and 
approximately 2cm from the right edge of the screen. Digits were displayed in white Arial 
font size 40 on a black background screen. The program randomly generated the addition or 
subtraction sums from the integers 10 through to 99, however, the second addend and the 
subtrahend were always 3. The sums were set to be correct on 50% of the trials and 
incorrect on 50% of the trials. Sums on the left and the right of the display were generated, 
and changed, simultaneously.
The participant only attended to one sum at a time; this was indicated by which sum 
appeared in white text. The sum not being attended to appeared in dark grey and was barely
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visible. The side to attend to at the beginning of the block was decided randomly by the 
program. When the active sum (i.e. that being responded to) switched side (i.e. participants 
switched from responding to sums on the left to the sums on the right because of the PM 
task or because the computer switched them — see below) the colour of the sums changed 
accordingly. The participants’ task was arithmetic verification, such that if the solution to 
the sum was correct they pressed the right arrow key (on a QWERTY keyboard) marked 
with a green sticker and if the solution was incorrect they pressed the left arrow key marked 
with a red sticker. After a correct or incorrect response had been made, new sums were 
immediately generated; thus, responding to the trials was self-paced. In the pure task blocks 
(i.e. non task-switching) the sums were either all addition or all subtraction. In the task- 
switching conditions the sum changed from an addition sum to a subtraction sum on each 
trial.
A clock face, 2cm in diameter, with a minute and second hand (but no digits) was also on 
display in the centre of the screen between the sums (see Figure 3.1). In the PM conditions, 
the clock was functioning correctly so participants could use it as an indicator of seconds 
passed. The hands of the clock always began at the 12 o ’clock position at the start of any 
block. In the equivalent extemally-cued conditions the clock hands were not functioning in 
a manner useful to the participants. Instead, the second hand flipped between the ‘quarter- 
to ’ position and the ‘quarter-past’ condition, once a second. The minute hand stayed at the 
‘12.30’ position. Consequently, the visual image was very similar in the two contrasting 
conditions but the clock in the extemally-cued conditions could not interfere with the 
participants’ performance.
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Figure 3.1. The screen design for experiment 1. In the PM conditions the clock was 
functioning, in the externally-cued side switch conditions the clock hands flipped between 
quarter-to and quarter-past.
2 3  + 3  = 2 8
Procedure
Firstly, participants were asked to remove any watches or other time-keeping devices and 
hide these out of sight for the entire experiment. Participants read instructions for the 
arithmetic verification task on a sheet of paper. They were instructed that their task was to 
identify sums as correct or incorrect as accurately and quickly as possible. They were 
informed that the experiment was split into sections and that each section would change in 
the type of sums they were verifying, i.e. addition, subtraction or alternating between 
addition and subtraction. They then completed 3 short practice blocks. This practice 
consisted of just the arithmetic verification ongoing task, specifically 30 seconds of 
addition, 30 seconds of subtraction and finally 30 seconds of switching between addition 
and subtraction. Participants’ attention was directed to the sum in white text and they were 
required to place their left index finger on the left arrow key and their right index finger on 
the right arrow key to make their responses. Participants were told that the non-functioning
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clock in the middle of the screen should be ignored for these practice sections. Following 
this practice, participants were given a second set of instructions on paper regarding the PM 
element of the task. They were instructed that during some sections of the experiment they 
would also be required to do an extra task. This extra task was to remember to switch to 
verifying the sum on the other side of the display every 30 seconds (i.e. the TB PM task). 
Thus, if they were attending to sums on the left hand side of the screen then at the 30- 
second point they should begin on the right-hand side, or vice-versa. To switch to sums on 
the other side of the screen they were told that they would need to press the Space Bar on 
the keyboard and this would then change the text on the new side into white text and darken 
the current side. They were also instructed that there would be no cue to help them 
remember to make this side switch but that there would be a functioning onscreen clock 
displaying the time. Short retention intervals (RIs) of 30 seconds were employed in these 
experiments to keep the PM task switches frequent, such that they were more similar to the 
task-switching demands. Furthermore, only short RIs could generate sufficient data to 
analyse RTs in time bands across the RIs, as will be explained below.
Participants were also informed that during sections where they did not need to remember 
to switch sides, the computer would do it automatically for them. They were told therefore 
that they could forget all about the intention to switch sides (i.e. the extra task) during these 
sections. Thus, during the extemally-cued side switch conditions the computer was 
programmed to switch the text colours of the sums on each side at every 30-second point; 
to indicate a side switch. Participants then completed a practice block of 70 seconds with 
the extra PM demands and with alternating addition/subtraction sums as the ongoing task, 
in order to familiarize themselves with the display and procedure. A verbal prompt to 
switch sides was given ten seconds after the correct timepoint if they did not switch 
correctly at the 30-second point. Any other instructions were clarified by the experimenter 
as necessary.
Participants then began the experiment, which was split into the 8 different block types (see 
Figure 3.2.) each 5 minutes and 10 seconds long. Note that two task-switching blocks were 
presented in each PM condition to compensate for the two types of pure task blocks 
(addition and subtraction). A total number of 10 side switches occurred in each block (or 
should occur in the PM conditions). Before each block began a screen informed the
participants about the type o f block they would be undertaking - whether adding, 
subtracting (pure task condition) or alternating between the two (task-switching condition) - 
and whether they had to remember to switch sides (PM side switch condition) or if the 
computer would be doing it automatically for them (extemally-cued side switch condition.) 
Participants were informed that they could take breaks whenever these information screens 
appeared, for as long as they required, before beginning the next section. Block order was 
counterbalanced across participants with the constraint that the PM side switch blocks and 
extemally-cued side switch blocks alternated.
Figure 3.2. Factorial design -  list o f  block types each participant performed
BLOCK TYPES
Task-switching Factor Prospective Memory Factor
Pure task -  Addition PM
Pure task -  Subtraction PM
2* Task-switching PM
Pure task -  Addition No PM -  Extemally-cued Side Switches
Pure task -  Subtraction No PM -  Extemally-cued Side Switches
2* Task-switching No PM -  Extemally-cued Side Switches
3.8.2. Results
The chosen alpha level for statistical significance is set at .05 for all the analyses reported 
in the following experiments, unless a specific p value is noted. Furthermore, for all the 
experiments reported, the results include analyses of the error rates of the ongoing task, the 
RT data of the ongoing task and accuracy o f the PM performance. Multivariate statistics are 
reported from the analysis of variance (MANOVA) throughout this thesis for two reasons. 
Firstly, in some instances, this was because the sphericity assumption was not met and 
secondly because they are more conservative tests, which ensures against making Type 1 
errors.
3.8.2.1. Ongoing Task Results
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Accuracy o f Ongoing Task
Participants completed a mean o f 1574 (SD = 395.15) trials (sums) across all 8 blocks (self- 
paced). The first trial of each block was excluded from the following analyses. Accuracy 
was high with a mean error rate o f only 5.44% (SD=4.7). A 2 (PM: PM side switch, 
extemally-cued side switch) x 2 (Task Switching: pure, task-switching) repeated measures 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) on the error rates showed no significant main 
effects of task-switching or PM and no significant interaction.
Reaction Time Data o f  Ongoing Task
Participants’ mean RTs to the ongoing task were included in the following analyses. 
However, in this experiment and in the following experiments within this Chapter, error 
trials, post error trials, outliers of below and above 3 standard deviations from the mean (in 
each condition) and one trial before and after a side switch (in order to remove variance 
from eye movements) and the first trial o f each block were excluded from all analyses. The 
resulting RT data were subjected to a 2 (PM: PM side switch, extemally-cued side switch) 
x 2 (Task Switching: pure, task-switching) repeated measure MANOVA. There were main 
effects of both PM, F(l,23) = 6.2, p < .05, and task-switching F(l,23) = 23.82, p < .001 on 
RTs, but the interaction of PM and task-switching was not significant (F < 1). This pattern 
of data is considered further below.
Figure 3.3. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching and PM  trial type.
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Task Switch RTs
Mean RTs were slower for the task-switching blocks than the pure task blocks (see Figure 
3.3). Thus, using a simple measure of switch costs (comparing mean RTs for pure trials and 
mean RTs for alternating trials) the robust effect o f task-switching on RTs was replicated in 
this study.
Prospective Memory RTs
Rather surprisingly, the means o f the RTs in the conditions with the added PM demands 
were faster, than in the equivalent extemally-cued side switch conditions (see Figure 3.3). 
This is the first study to show an RT advantage in the ongoing task when PM demands are 
added. Because this result contradicts other studies that show an RT disadvantage to the 
ongoing task when PM demands are added (e.g. Smith, 2003), and an aim of the 
experiment was to understand the effects of the PM task switches, further analyses were 
carried out on these RT data. Mean RT’s of trials in time periods between a side switch (i.e. 
PM target) were calculated and used in the analyses as a method o f investigating the effect 
of the extra PM demand on RTs across the RIs at a more fine-grained level. Periods of 30 
seconds within blocks were divided into three time bands -  0-10 seconds (i.e. representing 
the trials just after the completion o f a side switch), 11-20 seconds and 21-30 seconds (i.e. 
representing the 10 seconds leading up to a side switch.) A repeated measures MANOVA 
with PM (PM side switch, extemally-cued side switch) and task-switching (task-switching, 
pure task) and time (0-10 secs after a switch, 11-20 secs after switch and 10-0 secs before 
switch) as the factors. The results again showed a main effect of task-switching, with the 
task-switching conditions producing significantly slower RTs, F(l,23)= 27.67, p<.001 and 
a main effect of PM that approached significance, F(l,23) = 4.04, p= .056, with faster trials 
in the PM conditions. In addition, the analysis revealed a significant interaction between 
PM condition and time, F(2,22) = 8.08, p=.002. No other main effects or significant 
interactions reached significance (F < 1 for 3 way interaction).
Posthoc t test analyses of this interaction revealed several significant findings. Firstly, trials 
from within the same time bands, collapsed across the task-switching variable, but in the 
different PM conditions were compared. Thus, the trials just after a PM response (i.e. time 
band 1 - 0-10 secs after a side switch) were associated with significantly faster RTs than the 
same trials in the extemally-cued conditions, t(23) = 4.1, SE = .022, p<.0001.
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Secondly, trials from the same conditions but in different time bands were compared. Thus, 
in the PM conditions, trials were significantly slower before a PM response (i.e. time band 
3 -  0-10 secs before a side switch) than after a PM response (i.e. time band 1 -  0-10 secs 
after a switch), t(23) = 2.33, SE =.017, p<.05. Finally, in the extemally-cued task 
conditions, trials were significantly slower after an automatic side switch (i.e. time band 1 -  
0-10 secs after a side switch) than before an automatic side switch (i.e. time band 3 -0 -1 0  
secs before a side switch), t(23) = 3.72, SE = .017, p<.01.
This contrasting pattern o f data in the PM and extemally-cued conditions is clearly 
illustrated in Figure 3.4. Participants RTs gradually slowed down over the course of the 30 
seconds in the PM conditions but in the matched extemally-cued side switch blocks they 
showed the opposite pattern, speeding up as they progressed through the 30 seconds.
Figure 3.4. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  PM  and time band trial type.
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3.8.2.2. PM  Task Accuracy
For all the experiments reported here (and the following experiments within this Chapter), 
the correct number of side switches in the PM conditions across each experiment was 40 (4 
blocks of PM side switches each block lasting 5 mins 10 secs and switch every 30 secs = 10
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per block.) In this experiment, there was very high PM accuracy. The mean number of PM 
side switches was 39.83 (SD=2.68). The mean RI between PM side switches was 30.20 
secs (SD=2.72).
3.8.3. Discussion
Consistent with the task-switching literature (Jersild, 1927; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), the 
present results indicated a significant cost to RTs when participants had to switch between 
verifying addition and subtraction as the ongoing task. In contrast to the PM literature, 
however, the results indicated the somewhat surprising finding that there was a facilitation 
of ongoing task RTs during the PM conditions, compared to the matched extemally-cued 
side switch conditions. This finding is discussed in detail below. The main finding remains 
that there was no interaction between PM and task-switching; indeed they had opposite 
effects on performance. This supports the suggestion that there is little common processing 
between PM and extemally-cued task-switching.
At first glance, the finding that an added PM task facilitates RTs of the ongoing task is 
difficult to reconcile with past research. However, the post-hoc follow-up analyses can aid 
explanation: these data showed that when participants initiate the PM task switches their 
performance of the ongoing task slows as the point o f the switch arrives. After the PM task 
switch (and they return to the ongoing task on the new side) the participants are much faster 
to recover compared to the extemally-cued side switch condition. This faster recovery from 
the side switch in the PM task switch conditions compared to the extemally-cued condition 
may partly explain the apparent RT improvement in these conditions. Moreover, studies 
that have analysed the effects of interruptions on the ongoing task performance have 
demonstrated faster RTs as a consequence of interruptions (e.g. Speier et al., 1999; Zijlstra 
et al., 1999); which these data are consistent with if the PM response is considered an 
interruption (see Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.).
The patterns of the RT data provide important insights into the cognitive processes of PM. 
The pre-switch slowing is consistent with Arrington & Logan’s (2004, 2005) studies that 
also showed a slowing of RTs prior to a self-initiated task switch. They attributed this 
slowing to the recruitment of active reconfiguration processes and these data indicate that 
some active preparation may be occurring before carrying out the PM task switch also (i.e.
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PM response), as this would explain both the pre-switch slowing and the faster recovery 
post-switch. However, it seems possible that this preparation for a PM task switch employs 
different processes from those involved in the extemally-cued rapid task-switching that is 
occurring in the ongoing task.
An obvious limitation to this experiment, however, is that it is not possible to eliminate the 
possibility that the slowing prior to the PM task switch is a result of eye movements related 
to checking the clock as the time for the PM response approaches. Logie et al. (2004), for 
instance, have shown an increase in clock checks as participants approach the time to 
initiate the PM task switch. Accordingly, a further experiment was designed to examine this 
possibility.
3.9. Experiment 2
The aim of experiment 2 was to replicate the results of experiment 1 whilst additionally 
controlling for participants’ eye movements to the clock. New participants were presented 
with almost identical instructions and procedure as in experiment 1. The key difference was 
that during the PM conditions the hands of the clock were no longer on permanent display; 
instead, if participants wanted to check the time they were required to press a button to 
reveal the clock (see Cicogna et al., 2005 for similar methodology). This allowed us to 
exclude trials pre and post clock checks and thus remove trials relating to eye movements 
to the clock. It also allowed us to monitor the number of clock checks participants made, as 
previous studies in this field (e.g. Ceci & Bronerfenner, 1985; Einstein et al., 1995; May lor 
et al., 2002; Cook et al., 2005). As in experiment 1, the hypothesis remained that there 
would be no interaction between the effects of PM and task-switching, with the further 
prediction that PM performance would be slightly poorer than in experiment 1, because 
there was a further reduction in external cues (omission of the clock hands.)
3.9.1. Method
Participants and Design
Thirty-two healthy volunteers recruited from the psychology database, the majority of 
whom were undergraduates of UCL, participated in experiment 2. Twelve of these 
participants were male and 20 female, with an age range of 18 to 36. No volunteer who had
87
participated in experiment 1 was included in this experiment -  indeed novel participants 
were used in all the experiments reported in this thesis. Participants were screened for any 
neurological or psychiatric history, and again none were excluded on this basis. Testing of 
participants was completed individually in a session lasting approximately 55 minutes. All 
participants completed all 8 blocks of this experiment.
Materials and Equipment
As described, this experiment used identical materials and method of generating stimuli, as 
in experiment 1. The clock face remained on screen throughout all blocks of the experiment 
(see Figure 3.5.). However, during the PM conditions, pressing the Control button on the 
keyboard revealed the hands of the clock. Once pressed, the hands of the clock were 
remained for 1.5 seconds, after which they disappeared again. In the extemally-cued side 
switch conditions the hands of the clock could not be revealed, and the clock face remained 
blank throughout.
Figure 3.5. The screen design for experiment 2. The clock face remained empty in all 
conditions, but in the PM conditions the clock hands could be revealed for 1.5 secs.
4 2  + 3  = 45
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Procedure
The procedure for experiment 2 was almost identical to experiment 1. Participants were 
given the same instructions and practice, with the exception that they were instructed that in 
the PM conditions they could check the time, as often as they wished, by pressing the 
Control button to reveal the clock hands. The same 8 block types, each lasting 5 minutes 
and 10 seconds long, were presented in counterbalanced order across all participants with 
the identical constraint that PM and extemally-cued blocks alternated.
3.9.2. Results
One participant was excluded from the analyses because they checked the clock an 
exceptional number of times (e.g. 228 in one block) leaving few ongoing task trials for 
analysis. Another participant was excluded for exceptionally long RTs (mean: 3033 ms).
3.9.2.1. Ongoing Task Results
Accuracy o f Ongoing Task
Participants made an average of 6.2% (SD=2.78) errors and performed an average of 1351 
trials (SD=346.23). A repeated measures MANOVA was conducted on error rates with PM 
(PM side switch, extemally-cued side switch) and task-switching (task-switching, pure 
task) as the factors. There was a main effect o f task-switching, F( 1,30)= 14.12, p<.01, with 
participants making significantly fewer errors in the pure task conditions (mean: in pure 
task blocks and collapsed across PM condition = 5.64% versus 6.89% in task-switching 
conditions). There was no main effect o f PM and no significant interaction (F < 1).
Reaction Time Data o f  Ongoing Task
The same types of trials were excluded from the RT analyses as described above, plus pre 
and post clock checks, and the same analyses executed. Thus, firstly a 2 (PM: PM side 
switch, extemally-cued side switch) x 2 (Task Switching: pure, task-switching) repeated 
measure MANOVA was conducted on the data. The results revealed main effects of both 
task-switching, F(l,29) = 41.38, p<.001, and PM, F(l,29)=17.95, p < .001, but the 
interaction of PM and task-switching was not significant (F < 1).
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Figure 3.6. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching and PM  trial type
1900
1850
fa 1800 
£ 1750 
I 1700 
P 1650 
5 1600
S 1550 * 1500
1450
1400
Switching task 
Pure task
Externally-cued
(no-PM)
PM
Task Switch RTs
As in experiment 1 mean RTs were slower for the task-switching blocks than the pure task 
blocks (see Figure 3.6.). The task-switching conditions thus did produce the expected 
switch costs to the ongoing task.
Prospective Memory RTs
Participants in experiment 2 replicated the behaviour of those in experiment 1. Participants 
responded to the sums significantly faster during the PM conditions than during the 
extemally-cued side switch conditions (see Figure 3.6.). To investigate if the pattern of RTs 
was the same as in experiment 1, trials were again split into 10-second time bands between 
the side switches in both the PM and the extemally-cued conditions. A second repeated 
measures MANOVA was conducted with these data and PM (PM side switch, extemally- 
cued side switch), task-switching (task-switching, pure task) and time (0-10 secs after a 
side switch, 11-20 secs after side switch and 10 secs leading up to a side switch) as the 
factors. There were highly significant main effects of task-switching, F( 1,29)=41.13, p< 
.001, and time F(2,28)= 10.21, p<.001. The main effect o f PM was no longer significant.
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There was also the same significant interaction as in experiment 1 between PM condition 
and time, F(2,28)=17.19, p<.001. However, a new interaction also became significant in 
this experiment between task-switching and time, F(2,28)=6.94, p=.004. No other main 
effects or interactions reached significance.
Follow-up t-tests revealed significantly faster ongoing task RTs in the 10 secs leading up to 
an extemally-cued side switch (time band 3) than in the 10 secs following a side switch 
(time band 1) collapsed across the task-switching variable, t(29)=5.91, SE=.015, p<.0001. 
In contrast, RTs were faster after a PM response side switch (time band 1) than the trials 
before a PM response (time band 3), although this did not reach significance collapsed 
across the task-switching variable. This pattern did reach significance in the task-switching 
PM conditions, t(29)=2.66, SE=.041, p<.05, suggesting this slowing pattern was somewhat 
stronger in the task-switching conditions. However, trials after the side switch were 
significantly faster in the PM conditions than in the extemally-cued conditions, t(29)=3.53, 
SE=.025, p<.01. These different patterns of RTs across the RIs are illustrated in Figure 3.7.
Follow-up t-tests regarding the task-switching and time interaction, revealed significantly 
faster ongoing task RTs in the 10 secs leading up to a side switch (time band 3) than in the 
10 secs following a side switch (time band 1) in the pure task conditions and collapsed 
across the PM variable, t(29)=3.91, SE=.018, p<.001. This same comparison was not 
significant in the task-switching condition. These patterns of RTs across the RIs are 
illustrated in Figure 3.8.
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Figure 3.7. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  P M  and time band trial type
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Figure 3.8. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching and time band trial type
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3.9.2.2. PM  Task Accuracy
Participants completed a mean of 38.87 (SD=3.82) side switches (PM responses) in the PM 
conditions again indicating high PM task accuracy. The mean retention interval between
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PM side switches was 30.88 secs (SD=2.44). A repeated measures MANOVA with the 
total number of PM side switches in each PM block as the factor, revealed no significant 
differences between number of prospective switches in task-switching and pure task 
conditions (p>.05).
3.9.2.3. PM  Clock-Checking
Figure 3.9. shows the details of the participants’ clock checking behaviours. Firstly, a 2 
(Task-switching: pure, task-switching ) x 3 (Time: 0-10 secs after a side switch, 11-20 secs 
after side switch and 10 secs leading up to a side switch) repeated measure MANOVA on 
the number o f clock checks showed a main effect o f time, F(2,28) = 64.34, p<.001, but no 
main effect o f task-switching or interaction (p>.05). To understand the effect of time on 
clock-checking behaviour, the number o f clock checks were collapsed across pure and task- 
switching conditions and paired sample t-tests performed on these data. This revealed 
significantly different numbers of clock checking between each time band. There were 
significantly more clock checks in time band 1 (0-10 secs after PM response) than in time 
band 2 (11-20 secs after PM response), t(29)=2.69, SE=1.74, p<.05. There was also 
significantly more clock checks in time band 3 (10 seconds before PM response) than in 
either other time band, (time band 3 compared to time band 1 = t(29)=6.93, SE= 3.47, 
p<.001, and time band 3 compared to time band 2 = t(29)= l0.58, SE= 2.72, p<.001).
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Figure 3.9. Number o f clock checks in the PM conditions (collapsed across task-switching 
conditions) as a function o f time band
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3.9.3. Discussion
To some extent, the data from this experiment replicate that of experiment 1 and support 
the primary hypothesis. A robust task-switching effect was demonstrated as well as the 
more surprising facilitation of RTs in the PM conditions. There was no interference 
between these two effects, which supports the hypothesis that PM and externally-cued task- 
switching have little common processing. There was also a task-switching effect on 
accuracy of the ongoing task, which is line with previous experiments (e.g. Sohn & 
Anderson, 2000), however, there was no interaction within the ongoing task accuracy data 
and no effect of task-switching on PM performance (which was almost at ceiling).
The two significant interactions between the variables of PM and time and task-switching 
and time demonstrate that recovery from the side switch was quicker in PM conditions than 
in the externally-cued conditions, but that the trials before the side switch were slower in 
the PM conditions. However, these effects did not always reach significance in the pure 
task conditions (this is discussed further in the General Discussion below and in Chapter 6, 
section 6.2.3.). This slower recovery in externally-cued side switch condition may partly
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explain the faster RTs in the PM conditions. Additionally, with the removal of trials before 
and after clock checks we have strengthened support for the hypothesis that active 
preparatory processes may be employed to prepare for PM task switches, rather than simply 
variance from eye movements explaining the data. Thus, these findings entail the same 
question: could endogenous preparatory processes, prior to TB PM task switches, be part of 
the cost to the ongoing task in PM studies?
Finally, the results indicate that there were no significant differences in the number of clock 
checks between pure and task-switching conditions, suggesting it was not any more 
difficult to hold the PM intentions in mind during the task-switching blocks (otherwise 
decreased clock-checking behaviour in the task-switching conditions might have been 
expected, see Park et al., 1997). There were significantly more clock checks in the 10 
seconds leading up to the self-initiated side switch, and immediately after a PM response -  
with the most in the 10 seconds leading up to the switch. This J-shaped pattern of 
responding is consistent with past studies Ceci & Bronfenbrenner (1985) and supports Park 
et al.’s (1997) hypothesis that during TB tasks there may be ‘attentional disengagement’ 
from PM demands. Park et al. (1997) argue that this disengagement from the PM task 
entails that the need to remember to switch back to the time-monitoring aspect of the PM 
task is increased. They hypothesised that this switching may be more difficult if the 
ongoing task makes demands on executive resources (e.g. a working memory ongoing 
task.) However, here these results do not agree with Park and colleagues’ (1997) 
speculations. In this experiment, participants were equally accurate at PM responding in 
both pure and the executively-demanding task-switching conditions, and made equivalent 
numbers of clock checks. These findings again suggest therefore that self-initiated, internal 
switching - between the ongoing task and the PM task - does not require the same executive 
resources as the background task-switching.
A criticism may be directed at experiment 1 and 2 that potentially limit these conclusions. 
The on screen clock (or simply the clock face in experiment 2) could be acting as an 
external cue for the PM demands, and reducing demands on self-initiated processes. By 
doing so, the reliance on executive processes may be reduced and this could explain the 
non-interaction with task-switching. Indeed, the facilitation of RTs in the PM conditions 
could be cited as evidence for this argument, and the almost ceiling level of PM
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performance. A further experiment was thus conducted to increase the demands on self­
initiated processes.
3.10. Experiment 3
As described above, the TB PM tasks used thus far have provided some external cues to 
switch for the participants in the form of the onscreen clock. To increase the demands on 
internal guidance in experiment 3 the clock was removed, and participants were therefore 
forced to remember the PM demands with no aid. The same hypothesis underlies this 
experiment: task-switching and PM will not interact, but that also PM performance would 
decrease compared to experiments 1 and 2 because of the extra self-initiation demands. In 
addition, if the same pattern of RTs is found across the RIs in the PM conditions then the 
explanation that the pre PM response slowing is simply due to increased clock monitoring 
can be ruled out by this experiment.
3.10.1. Method
Participants & Design
Thirty-two healthy volunteers recruited from the psychology database, the majority of 
whom were undergraduates o f UCL, participated in experiment 3. Sixteen of these 
participants were male and 24 female, with an age range of 18 to 27. Participants were 
screened for any neurological or psychiatric history, and again there were no exclusions on 
this basis. Testing of participants was completed individually in a session lasting 
approximately 55 minutes. All participants completed all 8 blocks of the experiment. 
However, as will be explained below, only 24 of these participants were included in the 
final statistical analyses.
Materials & Equipment
The set-up and stimuli for the arithmetic verification task was identical to experiment 1 
except in this experiment the level of self-initiation required in the PM element of the task 
was manipulated by providing no external PM cue at all. Thus, participants were shown the 
two sums, but they did not have any indicator o f time available to them on screen (there 
was neither a clock, nor an empty clock face presented, otherwise the screen was identical 
to experiment 2). Instead, participants were instructed to switch sides “whenever they
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thought 30 seconds had passed. ” The screen thus looked identical in both PM and 
extemally-cued side switch conditions.
To ensure complete matching of the extemally-cued side switch condition and the PM side 
switch condition (because now the time o f the PM side switches would be idiosyncratic), 
the task was designed such that the exact times at which the participants switched sides in 
the PM conditions were extracted. These timings were then used as the exact times that the 
participants were automatically switched in the extemally-cued side switch condition. 
However, because of counterbalancing constraints half o f the participants began with an 
extemally-cued side switch condition first. Thus, to provide the times of these first blocks 
o f extemally-cued side switches, 12 of the participants were tested with the PM conditions 
first. Their side switch times from the first PM block were extracted and set as the side 
switch times for matched participants who began with the extemally-cued conditions. The 
12 participants from whose first block o f PM times were extracted, were not included in 
any of the analyses, they had simply performed the test for their switching times. Thus, 24 
participants were included in the analyses.
Procedure
The procedure used in this experiment was identical to experiment 1 except there was no 
mention of a clock in the instructions. Instead, participants were instructed that in the 
blocks with the ‘extra task’ they should remember to switch sides whenever they thought 
30 seconds had passed. They were informed that there would be no cue to help them 
remember to do this. They were asked to pay special attention to the information screens 
before the beginning of each section in order to be certain of whether they would be 
required to do the extra task or not (since the screen looked the same in both PM and non- 
PM blocks).
3.10.2. Results
3.10.2.1. Ongoing Task Results 
Accuracy o f  Ongoing Task
The mean number of trials performed by participants was 1304 (SD=406.64). The mean 
total percentage of errors in the ongoing task = 7.03% (SD=3.65). A repeated measures
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MANOVA with percentage o f errors with the factors PM (PM side switch, externally-cued 
side switch) and task-switching (task-switching, pure task) showed a significant drop in 
accuracy in the task-switching conditions, F(l,23)=9.75, p<.01, (mean: 7.71% in task- 
switching blocks collapsed across PM condition and 6.44% in pure task blocks). There was 
no main effect of PM or a significant interaction (F < 1).
Reaction Time Data o f  Ongoing Task
As before the relevant RTs were excluded before submitting participants’ mean RTs to a 
repeated measures MANOVA with PM (PM side switch, externally-cued side switch) and 
task-switching (task-switching, pure task) as the factors. This produced main effects of 
task-switching, F(l,23)=22.32, p<.001, and PM, F(l,23)=8.25, p<.01, but with no 
significant interaction (F < 1).
Figure 3.10. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching and P M  trial type.
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Participants were significantly slower identifying the sums as correct or incorrect in the 
task-switching blocks compared to the pure task blocks, as can be seen in Figure 3.10.
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As can be seen in Figure 3.10., participants in this experiment performed significantly 
slower during PM blocks than the equivalent externally-cued side switch blocks. This is in 
contrast to experiments 1 and 2 in which participants performed faster on the ongoing task 
in the PM blocks. In the previous experiments, the change in RTs in the 30 seconds 
between side switches was analysed. In this experiment, the number of side switches (and 
thus the length of the RIs) was idiosyncratic to each participant; thus, to examine the 
pattern of RTs across the RIs the mean RTs for the 6 trials before (pre) and 6 trials after 
(post) a side switch were analysed. Six trials were analysed on the basis that 6 trials 
averaged corresponded to approximately 10 secs, which matches the time bands used in the 
previous experiments (participants’ overall mean RT collapsed across all conditions was 
1.81 secs). These RT data were subjected to a 2 X 2 X 2 repeated measures MANOVA 
which included PM (PM side switch, externally-cued side switch) and task-switching (task- 
switching, pure task) and pre and post switches (6 trials pre side switch and 6 trials post 
side switch) as the variables. This analysis revealed significant main effects of task- 
switching, F(l,23)=36.72, p<.001, and PM, F(l,23)=5.74, p<.05, such that participants 
were slower to respond to the sums in the task-switching blocks and the PM blocks. The 
main effect of the prepost factor also reached significance, F(l,23)=4.26, p=.05, with the 6 
trials pre side switch being slower overall than those post side switch (see Figure 3.11.). 
There were no significant interactions.
However, for consistency with the previous experiments, paired sample t-tests were 
conducted to examine further the differences between pre and post side switch trials of the 
same conditions. Analyses revealed only one significant difference between the 6 pre side 
switch trials and 6 post side switch trials. This significant difference was found in the PM 
task-switching condition, t(23)=3.04, p<.01, such that the 6 post side switch trials were 
significantly faster than the 6 pre switch trials. No significant differences between pre and 
post switch trials in other conditions approached significance (p>.05).
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Figure 3.11. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching, PM  pre and post trial type
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3.10.2.2. PM  Task Accuracy
The mean total number of PM side switches = 27.17 (SD=11.15). The mean time between 
switches = 47.22 secs (SD=15.71). A repeated measures MANOVA with the total number 
of PM side switches in each PM block as the factor, revealed no significant differences 
between the number of PM responses in the task-switching and pure task conditions 
(p>.05).
3.10.3. Discussion
This experiment produced similar results to experiments 1 and 2 in that two main effects of 
the variables in question -  task-switching and PM -  were observed, but with no interaction. 
Robust switch costs were demonstrated when switching between two tasks than compared 
to repeating either of the two tasks alone. There was also an increase in RTs in the PM 
conditions compared to the externally-cued side switch conditions in this experiment; 
which is, notably, the opposite effect of PM in experiments 1 and 2. Nevertheless, the same 
conclusion can be derived; task-switching and PM demands produced separate effects on 
performance of the ongoing task and therefore require difference processes. This remains in 
line with the original hypothesis. Indeed, the manipulation of the clock variable shows
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dissociable effects on the two factors of task-switching and PM, which strengthens the 
argument that they share little overlap in processing.
Slower responding to the ongoing task during PM blocks is a finding also reported by 
Smith (2003) within an EB PM task, but is the reverse of the data observed in experiments 
1 and 2. This experiment increased demands on self-initiation processes (e.g. self-initiated 
retrieval and time estimation) accounting for the overall slower RTs. However, inspecting 
the pre and post side switch data does reveal a similar pattern of RTs as in experiments 1 
and 2, albeit slightly weaker. The 6 trials before a PM response were significantly slower 
than the trials after the PM response in the PM task-switching conditions, as was also 
apparent in experiments 1 and 2 (in which the pure task conditions also showed this 
pattern). Again, then the interpretation of these findings is that preparatory processes for the 
PM task switch are being recruited, since the opposite pattern appears in the externally- 
cued task-switching conditions (i.e. slower responses after the switch and gradually 
speeding up). Arguably, this brings into question the theory (Smith, 2003) that denotes 
monitoring processes as the basis for the slower responding to the ongoing task during PM 
conditions (instead it may be preparatory processing). This theory has not been directly 
applied to TB PM tasks as the empirical basis for the theory has been developed using EB 
PM. Indeed, these are amongst the first experiments, to have examined ongoing task RTs 
during a TB PM task. Combining Smith’s PAM theory and the speculations of Park et al. 
(1997) the equivalent TB theory would predict increased slowing as participants 
approached the correct PM target time, because o f increased time-monitoring. Latencies 
after a PM switch might be faster because of temporary ‘attentional disengagement’ from 
the PM task, that is, reduced prospective time monitoring. However, the theory would not 
necessarily predict the difference between the ongoing task latencies in the externally-cued 
side switch conditions and PM conditions immediately after a side switch. The former are 
slower in all three experiments, presumably because there can be less preparation. These 
data therefore need incorporating into a cognitive model of TB PM.
If preparatory processes are occurring in TB PM it is because they are predictable and 
under complete endogenous control (e.g. Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Arrington & Logan, 
2004, 2005). Conversely, EB PM task switches are unpredictable (or at least less 
predictable) because participants wait for the external cue to signal that the intention must
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be acted upon (the process of identifying the cue is still self-initiated of course). 
Unpredictable task-switching may not always generate the same degree of preparation 
(Monsell et al., 2003). Thus, to understand if any preparatory processes are occurring in EB 
PM conditions (and therefore question Smith’s PAM theory as the explanation for the 
ongoing task slowing) another experiment is required with EB PM task demands.
3.11. Experiment 4
The aim of this experiment was to test the same hypothesis that task-switching and PM 
recruit separable processes, but now using an EB PM task. Much of PM research has 
focussed on EB PM and thus the theoretical picture regarding the effect o f PM demands on 
the ongoing task is clearer. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) for example, produced a multi­
process theory claiming that identification of EB PM targets, under certain task conditions, 
can be automatic (see Chapter 2, section 2.4.3.). In contrast, Smith’s (2003) PAM theory, as 
discussed in claims that there will always be self-initiated monitoring for the PM target. If 
the former is the case in this experimental paradigm then there may be little cost to the 
ongoing task and no interaction with task-switching on this basis. The PAM theory predicts 
there will be a cost to the ongoing task, but the prediction is that this cost will be unaltered 
by the task-switching conditions.
As previously discussed, an EB PM task switch is more similar to an unpredictable task 
switch in the task-switching paradigm. Indeed, the nature of the external cueing in EB PM 
means it resembles task-switching more closely. For this reason, the data may reveal a 
different pattern of behaviour than the previous experiments, for instance there may be 
slowing immediately after the PM response. The difference in the degree of endogenous 
control required however, still leads to the same prediction: that task-switching and PM 
will not interact.
3.11.1. Method
Participants and Design
Twenty-four healthy volunteers o f similar educational background, the majority of whom 
were UCL undergraduates, recruited from the same UCL database and ranging in age from 
18 to 26 participated in experiment 4. 10 were males and 14 were females. Again a health
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screening ensured participants had no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. 
Participants attended one session of testing lasting approximately 55 minutes and 
completed all 8 conditions.
Materials and Equipment
This experiment used the same materials, and method o f generating the sums, as in 
experiment 1. The task screen looked identical as experiment 3, without the clock. In this 
EB PM study however the targets for a side switch were embedded in the trial stimuli as in 
previous EB PM studies (e.g. Einstein and McDaniel, 1990). Thus, the targets for side- 
switching were no longer associated with a time point, instead the event cue became a 
repeated digit within the first addend, minued or solution of the sum. Participants were told 
to switch on detecting any term with a repeating digit. Thus, if sums such as 33 + 3= 39 or 
58 -  3 = 55 appeared -  the participant should press the space bar to switch sides.
Each participant received a novel and pseudorandom schedule of PM targets and 
externally-cued side switches in each block. The program generated the PM targets and 
automatic switch schedule from the following constraints: the target/automatic switch 
occurred 10, 20, 40 or 50 seconds after the last switch with 15% probability and after 30 
seconds with 40% probability. This irregularity of targets was intentional in order to avoid 
ceiling effects. However, since a large proportion of targets had a RI of 30 seconds, the 
experiment is comparable with the previous TB experiments. If the participant missed a PM 
target, the program continued presenting targets every second trial until the participant 
switched. No repeating digits were presented in the stimuli of the externally-cued side 
switch condition.
Procedure
The procedure for experiment 4 was the same as for experiment 1. Participants were 
provided with the same instructions and practice, with the exception that they were 
instructed that in the PM conditions they must switch sides whenever they saw repeating 
digits. One example of a repeating digits target (00) was supplied in the instructions, 
although the target 00 never appeared in the actual stimuli. The experimenter ensured that 
the participants understood all instructions correctly before beginning testing. The same 8 
block types as in experiments 1-3, each lasting 5 minutes and 10 seconds long, were
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presented in counterbalanced order across all participants, with the same constraint that PM 
and externally-cued blocks alternated.
3.11.2. Results
One participant was excluded from the analyses because of an exceptionally high error rate 
(mean: 17.53%). The results below are therefore based on 23 participants.
3.11.2.1. Ongoing Task Results
Accuracy o f  Ongoing Task
The mean error rate for the arithmetic verification task was 5.71% (SD=2.23) with an 
average of 1422 trials performed (SD=287.42). A repeated measures MANOVA using the 
accuracy data (percentage o f errors) and with PM (PM side switch, externally-cued side 
switch) and task-switching (task-switching, pure task) as the factors. This revealed only a 
significant effect of PM, F(l,22) = 7.56, p< .05, with participants making fewer errors in 
the externally-cued side switch conditions (mean: 4.99% in externally-cued conditions 
collapsed across task-switching conditions and 6.56% in PM conditions).
Reaction Time Data o f  Ongoing Task
The same trial types were excluded as in the previous experiments, participants’ mean RT’s 
were then subjected to a 2 X 2 repeated measures MANOVA with PM (PM side switch, 
externally-cued side switch) and task-switching (task-switching, pure task) as the factors 
confirmed main effects o f PM, F(l,22)=56.28, p<.0001, and task-switching, F(l,22)=19.73, 
p<.0001. Participants were faster to respond to the ongoing task in the pure task and 
extemally-cued side switch conditions (see Figure 3.12.). There was no significant 
interaction between these two effects (F < 1).
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Figure 3.12. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching and PM  trial type.
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Task Switch Reaction Times
Participants were significantly slower identifying the sums as correct or incorrect in the 
task-switching blocks compared to the pure task blocks, as can be seen in Figure 3.12.
Prospective Memory Reaction Times
As can be seen in Figure 3.12., participants in this experiment performed significantly 
slower during PM blocks than the equivalent externally-cued side switch blocks. A further 
MANOVA on RTs with 6 trials before (pre) and after (post) PM response and the matched 
externally-cued side switches, task-switching (task-switching, pure task) and PM (PM side 
switch, extemally-cued side switch) as the factors revealed main effects of task-switching, 
F( 1,22)= 16.61, p= 001, PM, F(l,22)=74.95, pc.OOl, and prepost, F(l,22)=26.73, pc.OOl. 
Participants were slower to respond to the sums in the task-switching, PM and pre side 
switch blocks (see Figure 3.13.). The interaction of the prepost and task-switching variables 
approached significance, F(l,22)=4.0, p=.058, but no other interactions approached 
significance (and the 3 way interaction showed F < 1).
Again for consistency with the previous experiments, paired sample t tests were performed 
and revealed the following significant differences: in the PM blocks, trials were 
significantly faster after a PM response than before a PM response in both the pure task,
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t(22)=2.71, SE=.023, p<.05, and the task-switching, t(22)=3.56, SE=.034, p<.01, 
conditions. In the extemally-cued (non-PM) blocks, trials were significantly faster after a 
side switch than before a side switch in the task-switching condition only, t(22)=2.79, 
SE=.02, p<.01.
Figure 3.13. Overall mean RTs as a function o f  task-switching, P M  pre and post trial type.
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3.11.2.2. PM  Task Accuracy
The accuracy of the PM task was measured by assessing the proportion of correct targets 
each participant detected (this included trials where participants switched sides after 
mistakenly completing the arithmetic verification task first i.e. late detection of target). The 
mean number of targets presented to participants across all the PM blocks was 72.70 
(SD=36.84). The mean percentage o f correct PM targets detected was 61.49% (SD=20.08). 
A paired samples t-test found no significant difference between the mean correct PM 
targets detected in the task-switching blocks (mean=63.11%, SD=20.08), and the mean 
correct PM targets detected in the pure task blocks (mean=63.13%, SD=23.95). This 
suggests it was no more difficult to detect PM targets in task-switching conditions than in 
pure task conditions, t(22)=.004, p>.05.
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3.11.3. Discussion
The major finding of this experiment is consistent with that of experiments 1-3. The results 
suggest that the rapid switching between two simple tasks has little common processing 
with EB PM. Participants showed slower performance on the ongoing task during the task- 
switching conditions and slower RTs, along with significantly poorer ongoing task 
accuracy, during PM conditions. There was also relatively poor PM task accuracy such that 
participants were only identifying approximately 60% of the targets, although there were no 
differences in PM performance between the task-switching conditions. These data suggest 
that this EB PM task may be more cognitively demanding than the previous TB PM tasks. 
It is thus unlikely that there was automatic noticing of the targets. The slowing of RTs 
during the ongoing task is instead consistent with Smith (2003); who maintains that EB PM 
tasks require some executive resources, in the form o f monitoring for the target.
Pre and post PM responses showed the same pattern over the RIs as the externally-cued 
non-PM conditions (within this experiment), with slower pre side switch trials than post 
switch trials. This is consistent with the idea of EB PM task switches being more similar to 
unpredictable task switches because the RTs match the externally cued side switch 
conditions, which are also essentially unpredictable task switches. The implications of these 
data are discussed in more detail in the next section.
3.12. General Discussion
The four experiments presented here explored the relationship between PM and task- 
switching, with the prediction that they would show little interference because of the 
difference in the degree o f internal guidance required. Across all four experiments, task- 
switching and PM produced separate effects on the RTs of the ongoing task and did not 
interact; these data addressed this initial hypothesis. Accuracy data of the ongoing task also 
failed to indicate any interaction between these two variables. This lack of interference was 
attained using four variations o f the PM task: TB with a clock, TB with a ‘revealable’ 
clock, TB without a clock and EB PM. In the first two experiments, RTs to the ongoing 
task were found to be faster in the PM and pure task conditions. In the third and fourth 
experiments however, participants were still faster in the pure task conditions but were now 
slower in the PM conditions, which demonstrates another dissociation of PM and task-
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switching because of the differential impact o f the clock variable. The accuracy of PM 
responding was high and was unaffected by the task-switching manipulation across all four 
experiments. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that self-initiated, PM 
switches and rapid, extemally-cued task-switches employ potentially separable cognitive 
processes.
These data are inconsistent with a previous experiment that has combined task-switching 
and EB PM (Marsh et al., 2002) which did show interference to PM performance in the 
task-switching conditions, but this can be explained by theoretical and methodological 
differences. Firstly, Marsh et al., (2002) only measured PM performance and not the 
ongoing task itself. Secondly, the experiments presented here were the first to recognise 
that any PM response involves a self-initiated task switch, and consequently provide a 
suitable extemally-cued PM response control condition. Interesting data have emerged 
from this methodological procedure, primarily, from analyses comparing ongoing task RTs 
before and after PM responses with the equivalent RTs o f the extemally-cued condition. 
The findings have provoked the consideration that task switch preparation processes, and 
other task switch costs, may be partly responsible for the negative effects of the PM 
conditions on the ongoing task (e.g. Smith, 2003). These processes cannot explain all of the 
cost to the ongoing task (because experiment 3 and 4 showed an increased cost), 
nevertheless the results do have some important implications which are discussed further 
below.
Initially, the discussion will focus on the apparent independence of processing between PM 
and task-switching. There are three theoretical possibilities to explain the results from these 
experiments. Firstly, there is the explanation that fits the original hypothesis: that rapid, 
extemally-cued task-switching involves independent cognitive control processes to those 
involved in PM (internally-generated) task switches. Secondly, there is the possibility that 
rapid, extemally-cued task-switching actually requires few executive control processes than 
previously conceived, and for this reason does not interact with PM. Finally, the opposite is 
also possible: that PM tasks actually require few executive control processes and thus does 
not interact with task-switching. I will now consider these three theoretical possibilities.
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Potential Explanation 1: Task-switching and PM  rely on independent 
executive control processes
The theoretical basis o f this interpretation rests on the concept of multiple executive 
processes, and the functional fractionation of the prefrontal cortex, as discussed in Chapter 
1, section 1.2.2. There is gathering support for this concept of multiple executive processes 
and for fractionation (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Burgess et al., 1998; Shallice, 2002; Stuss 
& Levine, 2002; Burgess & Simons, 2005). More importantly, there is also evidence that 
this self-initiated/extemally-cued dissociation exists. For example, lesion data has 
demonstrated that frontal patients may selectively suffer in tasks that are ill structured and 
unconstrained (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Goel et al., 1997; Levine et al., 1998, Levine et 
al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2000), whilst performing within normal limits on IQ tests, memory 
tests and other executive function tests. Multitasking tests have been particularly successful 
at drawing attention to these selective deficits and mimicking the patients’ everyday task 
difficulties. From a large lesion study, Burgess and colleagues (2000) argued that the 
cognitive components of multi-tasking appeared to involve retrospective memory, planning 
and ‘intentionality’; any of which could be selectively disrupted. The latter component was 
associated with the medial areas o f PFC (BA 10 and some parts of 8 and 9) because 
damage to these areas resulted in poor self-initiated task-switching and plan and rule 
following. The other cognitive components were also tentatively linked to different neural 
bases (left anterior and posterior cingulates, DLPFC respectively.) Recent imaging studies 
also support a role for BA 10 in PM (Yamadori et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2001, 2003). 
Thus, evidence from these multitasking tests shows a possible selective self-initiated task 
control deficit (self-regulatory disorder). This implies the dissociation of the cognitive and, 
possibly, neural mediation of self-initiated and extemally-cued tasks (refer to Chapter 1, 
section 1.3.2. for further discussion on this).
With respect to internally-guided and extemally-cued task-switching there is evidence for 
different processes and neural mediation which corroborates the results of these 
experiments. Firstly, Koch (2003) compared extemally-cued and internally-generated (i.e. 
task sequence retrieved from memory) task-switching and argued that non-identical 
processes appear to be responsible for the switch cost given the differential effects of RSI 
on each condition. For instance, he contends that the external cues may aid in the process of
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inhibiting competing tasks because of their association with the respective task, a process 
that would reduce switch costs. Secondly, Arrington & Logan (2004, 2005) deemed 
voluntary task-switching as operating differently to task-switching performed using the 
explicit-cueing procedure. This too was based on the differential effect o f RSI on switch 
costs in these two task types, but this time voluntary task-switching with longer preparation 
time was shown to reduce switch costs compared to the explicit-cueing procedure. Thus, it 
was postulated that the source of switch costs in voluntary task-switching was disparate to 
the source within the explicit-cueing procedure. The authors argue that voluntary task 
switch costs must reflect endogenous control processes (because it requires entirely top- 
down control), whereas extemally-cued task switch costs may represent the processes 
required to overcome priming (e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000). Thirdly, neuroimaging evidence 
pinpoints involvement of the DLPFC in extemally-cued task switching (Meyer et al., 1997; 
Dove et al., 2000). Dreher et al., (2002) report involvement of the medial areas of PFC in 
predictable task switches (which can thus be internally-generated) and lateral areas in 
unpredictable task-switching. These different processing demands can convincingly explain 
the non-interference between PM and task-switching (see also Koechlin et al., 2000; 
Weidner et al., 2002).
Potential Explanation 2: Externally-cued task-switching makes few  demands 
on executive processes.
It is possible to argue that self-initiated task-switching and extemally-cued task-switching 
produce no interaction because actually extemally-cued task-switching does not make 
demands on executive control processes at all. This is consistent with the task-set inertia 
hypothesis o f Allport and colleagues’ (1994). This theory claims that performance in task- 
switching conditions is slower because o f task-set interference from the different response 
to the task-set on the previous trial. In other words, response selection is slowed because of 
previous task-set priming. This model emphasises the bottom-up processes involved in 
task-switching (e.g. priming) and thus has little emphasis on the role of top-down executive 
processes. Switch costs are viewed as a result o f passive, involuntary processes, which are 
therefore unlikely to interact with the executive processes involved in self-initiated task- 
switching. Data from these experiments might be considered to support this model, 
although there is no direct support from the methodology or data to explain the source of
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the switch costs. Although possible, this conclusion is at odds with the ‘active process’ 
model of switch costs proffered by Rogers and Monsell (1995) amongst others (e.g. 
Rubenstein et al., 2001; Sohn & Anderson, 2001; Mayr & Keele, 2000; Mayr & Kliegl, 
2003), which states that endogenously controlled task-set reconfiguration processes (that is, 
executive control processes) generate the switch costs.
A recent review of the task-switching literature (Monsell, 2003), suggests that the empirical 
evidence endorses a view that combines these two models. Experiments (e.g. Meiran et al.,
1996) demonstrating that increasing the time available for preparation reduces the switch 
cost shows Allport et al.s’ task-set inertia theory to be lacking in explanatory power. 
Similarly, experiments showing an asymmetrical switch cost between strong and weak 
task-sets cannot easily be accounted for by the task-set reconfiguration model. Monsell 
argues that a combination o f different processes produce the switch cost (and the residual 
switch cost) and are likely to include some top-down preparatory processes. With this 
review in mind, and also considering the evidence that task-set priming may lead to the 
recruitment of active processes (namely inhibition, e.g. Mayr & Keele, 2000; Mayr, 2002) -  
it is unlikely that rapid, extemally-cued task-switching as used in this experiment is not 
mediated by some executive control processes.
It is worth noting that much o f this theory regarding the source o f switch costs is based on 
experimental manipulations o f the altemating-runs procedure (AABBAA) of Rogers and 
Monsell (1995), rather than the ABAB procedure. However, Rogers and Monsell (1995) 
have argued that performing the task-switching blocks in this ABAB procedure, as used in 
these experiments, places greater demand on executive control since two task sets have to 
be maintained in a state o f readiness. The use of this methodology then should increase the 
likelihood of interference with PM if they do share executive resources.
Potential Explanation 3: PM  makes few  demands on executive processes.
The finding of facilitation of RTs in PM conditions is unique to these experiments. The 
reason for this speeding-up is discussed in more detail below -  but one could contend that 
this provides evidence that few executive resources were being used. It might suggest 
participants had little difficulty in performing the PM task, and indeed accuracy of PM was
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high. Arguably, the external cue, in the form of the clock, was enough to reduce self- 
regulatory executive (retrieval) processes to such an extent that there was no conflict with 
the background task-switching. Indeed, Einstein & McDaniel’s (2000) multi-process theory 
suggests that PM cue recognition can be automatic, depending on the ongoing task 
properties and PM cue properties (e.g. Cherry & LeCompte, 1999; McDaniel et al., 2004), 
in which case it is unsurprising there was no interaction with task-switching.
There are several ripostes to this argument. Firstly, on closer inspection of the pattern of 
RTs, the facilitation can be (at least partly) attributed to the slower task-resumption after a 
side switch in the matched extemally-cued conditions. This was presumably because 
participants were unable to prepare for this unpredictable side switch. For this reason, it 
seems some endogenous preparation processes are occurring in the PM conditions, again 
this is discussed more fully below. Secondly, latency data from experiments 3 and 4 did 
show a slowing of RTs to the ongoing task during PM conditions. Experiment 3 removed 
any external cues and thus placed further demands on self-initiated processing and the EB 
PM task in experiment 4, according to PAM theory, creates monitoring demands. Thus, 
experiments 3 and 4 did make demands on executive processes, and again these processes 
did not seem to interfere with the background task-switching. Further to this, Einstein et al., 
(2003) found evidence that maintaining intentions for even 5 second delays used moderate 
amounts of executive resources because participants periodically activated the intentions 
over the delay period. Finally, Arrington and Logan (2004) also established that there were 
switch costs to voluntary, self-initiated task switches, and although somewhat speculative, 
they ascribed this to active reconfiguration processes. From the evidence above, it is 
reasonable to believe that the PM tasks employed in these experiments did utilise executive 
processes, and that these were thus different to those employed in extemally-cued task- 
switching.
3.12.1. Time-Based and Event-Based PM
At the broadest level, the results from these experiments confirm what is becoming more 
obvious as PM research progresses, that there are different cognitive mechanisms at play 
within TB and EB PM (e.g. Einstein et al., 1990, 1995). These are the amongst the first 
experiments to show the effects of TB PM demands on the ongoing tasks. Experiments 1
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and 2 (TB with clocks) showed a different pattern o f performance, in both RTs and 
accuracy, than experiment 4 (EB). In the former, participants were actually faster to 
respond to the ongoing task during PM conditions than in the extemally-cued conditions -  
whereas the opposite is true in experiment 4. Interestingly, experiment 3 (TB with no clock) 
also showed a different pattern o f performance to experiments 1 and 2. Without any 
external cues, and therefore increased reliance on self-initiated processes, TB PM in 
experiment 3 induced longer ongoing task RTs. The results o f experiment 3 are as would be 
expected from the TB PM literature, which has argued that TB PM has high dependence on 
self-initiated processes (Craik, 1986; Einstein et al., 1995; see Chapter 2, section 2.5.) and 
thus will have a cost on the ongoing task. There are also o f course extra demands made in 
the form of time-estimation and time-monitoring processes in this experiment (Ceci & 
Bronferbrenner, 1985; Cicogna et al., 2005).
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are fewer theoretical models of TB PM than EB PM, but 
any model must now be extended to account for these data illustrating a novel distinction 
between types of TB PM tasks. Firstly, a type in which the time is obvious and externally- 
signified by an environmental cue, that is a clock, and secondly a type in which the cue is 
internally-signified by one’s own time estimation, which places greater demands on self­
initiated processing, as evidenced by longer RTs. Thus, the former type might actually be 
conceptually related to an EB task, but clearly from the difference in RT patterns there is 
something unique about it. This ‘unique’ aspect may be that the clock acts as a threatening 
deadline on performance; consequently producing faster RTs. Plainly, there is a continuity 
and predictability about time, which is simply not present in an unpredictable EB paradigm, 
which provokes this ‘deadline’ hypothesis. This ‘deadline effect’ will certainly require 
replication and further research, and indeed, I address this in experiment 5 of this thesis.
With respect to experiment 4, involving the EB PM task, participants demonstrated slower 
RTs and greater inaccuracy in the PM conditions. The detrimental effect of EB PM 
demands on ongoing task performance replicates Smith (2003). According to Smith’s PAM 
theory endogenously controlled monitoring for the cue produces the slowed ongoing task 
performance in PM conditions. Other evidence supports this viewpoint. Marsh and Hicks 
(1998) in a series of experiments that manipulated the ongoing task found that only 
ongoing tasks which made demands on planning and monitoring affected PM performance.
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Similarly, Burgess and Shallice (1997) also emphasised the links between planning, 
monitoring and PM. Although monitoring for the cue can sufficiently explain the ongoing 
task slowing, another hypothesis is also proposed in the section below that can also account 
for this effect.
The lower accuracy to the ongoing task during the EB PM conditions suggests that EB PM 
actually may be more demanding than TB PM (at least with the parameters in this 
experiment), despite hypotheses that the opposite will be the case (e.g. Craik, 1986). As 
Park et al. (1997) have previously argued, this may be because TB allows for some 
attentional disengagement from the PM task immediately after a PM response that enables 
participants to focus more successfully on the ongoing task during these periods. 
Conversely, as described above, EB PM requires constant preparatory attentional processes 
to monitor for the cue. This potential difference is also explored further in the subsequent 
Chapter, but it seems a reasonable explanation for this finding.
3.12.1.1 .Explaining the Pattern o f  RTs Across the Retention Intervals
That PM requires a self-initiated task switch is axiomatic and yet these are the first 
experiments, to my knowledge, to incorporate an externally-cued version of the PM task 
switch to understand the effects, if any, of this voluntary task switch on ongoing task 
performance. This also motivated the methodologically novel approach o f analysing RTs 
across the RIs in TB PM, by splitting the trials into equal time periods between PM 
responses and looking for significant changes. The data from experiments 1 to 3 revealed 
significant effects of time band (i.e. position of trial within the RIs) on ongoing task 
performance between the PM task switch and its equivalent extemally-cued switch. As 
Ruge et al., (2005) comment, ‘the involvement o f  a task preparation process can be 
inferred only indirectly from  the beneficial impact it has during the subsequent task 
implementation. ’ (p. 341). The interpretation o f these data is that task preparation processes 
can be inferred from the beneficial impact of task implementation, in this case indicated by 
the comparatively faster recovery from the side switch in the PM conditions (i.e. after the 
PM task switch) compared to the extemally-cued conditions. It seems difficult to reconcile 
another explanation for these data. For instance, increased time monitoring or increasing 
retrieval processes, although able to account for the pre-PM response slowing, cannot
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explain the faster recovery after the side switch compared to the control condition (this is 
discussed further in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3.). This is consistent with Burgess (2001) et al., 
who described neural activation associated with ‘anticipatory processes’, which could be 
associated with these task-switching preparation processes, although they used an EB 
paradigm.
Theoretically, this argument is also consistent with Monsell and colleagues (2003) 
argument that predictable task switches allow for task-set reconfiguration (or ‘task- 
readiness’) before the task switch, which then reduces the switch cost and produce one-trial 
recovery from the task switch (again this argument is developed further in Chapter 6). The 
findings of the TB PM experiments also corroborates Arrington & Logan’s (2004, 2005) 
studies with voluntary task-switching, which as described above, demonstrated that the 
switch costs decreased with preparation time, presumably reflecting endogenous control 
processes. Both internally- and externally-signified TB tasks (i.e. with and without the 
clock) showed this cost to the ongoing task ‘pre switch’; in contrast to the cost to the 
ongoing task during the extemally-cued side switch, which was ‘post switch’. However, 
these effects did seem to be stronger in the task-switching rather than in the pure task 
conditions (although the interactions were not significant). This is discussed further in 
Chapter 6, section 6.2.3., but it is possible that the self-paced alternating trials procedure 
used here (i.e. ABAB) with its short RSIs only allows for some preparation for these task 
switches, and this explains the lack of interference in these pre-switch time bands.
In the EB PM experiment the trials prior to the side switches were slower than the trials 
post side switch in both the PM and the externally-cued conditions. In other words, there 
was no difference in the RT pre and post side switch patterns between the PM and no-PM 
conditions. This is in contrast to the TB PM experiments in which participants showed a 
differential RT pattern in the PM and extemally-cued (non-PM) conditions. Firstly, this 
provides extends the evidence that EB PM is qualitatively different to TB PM. Moreover, 
this qualitative difference may again be partly attributable to the predictability of the PM 
task-switches in each paradigm. Whereas a TB PM task-switch is comparable to the 
predictable, highly endogenously controlled task-switching, an EB PM task-switch is more 
similar to those generated in the random, unpredictable task-switching paradigm (e.g. 
Meiran, 1996; Tomay & Milan, 2001; Monsell et al., 2003; Milan et al., 2005).
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Accordingly, as is the case, these EB switches should produce a similar RT pattern (pre and 
post side switch) as the extemally-cued conditions, which are also unpredictable.
However, although the EB PM conditions and the extemally-cued conditions produce the 
same pattern of RTs, as expected, this pattern is inconsistent with previous unpredictable 
task-switching studies. Monsell et al., (2003) showed that several trials were required to 
recover from an unpredictable task switch, whereas these data show faster trials after an 
unpredictable side switch, at least compared to the trials preceding the side switch. Why do 
these data show a fast recovery rate in an unpredictable task-switching condition compared 
to previous studies showing a slow rate o f recovery? Firstly, the post side switch RTs are 
only faster compared to the pre side switch RTs, RT data from the entire RI is not 
considered. The decrease in the need to monitor for the cue immediately after the PM 
response can perhaps explain the faster RTs here and mask the effects o f the unpredictable 
task switch cost. (Although this cannot explain why the same pattern occurred in the 
extemally-cued conditions, given there is no need to monitor for a cue). Moreover, Tomay 
& Milan (2001) have argued that unpredictable task-switching allows for fuller task-set 
reconfiguration (i.e. preparation) since they found faster trials after the switch. These 
findings seem consistent with their data.
The EB PM switch, although unpredictable, is still self-initiated, thus, the processes of cue 
monitoring and cue interpretation are different to those in unpredictable task-switching in 
which a specific cue immediately signals which task to perform (e.g. Monsell et al., 2003). 
Forstmann et al., (2005) describe distinct PFC regional activation for tasks directly cued 
compared to tasks in which the participant must intemally-generate the task because of 
indirect task-cue associations. Behaviourally, their data revealed higher switch costs for the 
internally-generated task-switches compared to the directly-cued task-switches, but they did 
not report RTs of any trials following this switch trial, which would be the trials equivalent 
to the post trials here.
Some qualifications must be considered to the interpretations discussed so far. Firstly, in 
the task-switching literature, it is clear that preparation processes are inferred from the 
beneficial impact of task implementation judged by the RTs to the ‘switched-to’ task (i.e. 
not the RTs to the trials after the task-switch). This data is unavailable in this experiment;
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the PM task itself is computationally different to the ongoing task (i.e. the PM task just 
involves pressing a different key to initiate the side switch, there is no arithmetic) and a PM 
task repeat trial is not included (i.e. the RTs o f two consecutive PM responses). The first 
trials immediately following a side switch were also not included because of the noise 
created by eye movements from switching from one side o f the screen to another. However, 
the trials after the switch trial are also considered in the task-switching literature and used 
in the method of inferring preparatory processes (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005; 
Milan et al., 2005).
Secondly, it could be argued that the PM response was not really a task switch, because the 
same task was carried out on the other side, it was rather more like a ‘location’ switch. The 
definition of a ‘task-switch’ and a ‘task-set’ is certainly a negotiable feature of experiments 
in the executive functions field (and arguably the question o f what does constitute a task-set 
remains uncomfortably open, note Tomay & Milan’s (2001) attempt to define this concept 
as ‘a particular set o f  processes, linked together in a certain way', p. 786). For some 
researchers a ‘task-switch’ is as simple as a change in dimension, for instance, Ruge et al., 
(2005) considered the requirement to switch between judging if a filled white square 
appeared up or down or if the square appeared left or right was indeed task-switching. On 
the other hand, Weidner et al (2002) have argued that a visual search task that required 
participants to switch between searching different dimensions such as motion and colour 
(e.g. which stimulus is moving compared to following trials of which stimulus is red) is not 
a task-switching paradigm. In the current experiments, I would argue that the PM response 
is a task switch on several levels -  the internal switches to remembering the intention, then 
the actual task-switch o f pressing a different key followed by the side switch itself. 
Moreover, a key characteristic of task-switching experiments, that the same stimuli can 
afford both task-sets, was met.
Thirdly, the interpretation that PM may also involve task preparation processes, and that 
this may partly explain the detrimental effect on ongoing task RTs, is based on data from 
very short RIs used within the present experiment. RIs of thirty seconds are short compared 
to other studies in the PM literature (e.g. Cicogna et al., 2005). In real life, intentions are 
held for much longer delays such that switches to acting out intentions are less frequent 
(e.g. post birthday card at lunch time, which is four hours away). Thus, the extent to which
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these preparation processes occur prior to less frequent PM task switches remains an area of 
uncertainty. Certainly, if these preparation processes are occurring and detracting from the 
ongoing task then the implication would be that any procrastination of tasks reduces current 
task performance (somewhat worryingly!). Seeking evidence from the task-switching 
literature does not help fill this void, as real life task-switching appears to be an area 
completely neglected, (apart from the multitasking studies which measure general 
perseveration), no doubt because of the difficulties inherent in measuring real life switch 
costs. Although it may be difficult to look for preparatory processes in longer RIs it would 
be a useful avenue for future research.
In addition, it could also be argued that because of the short RIs involved in these 
experiments processes more associated with vigilance tests may be implicated (e.g. see 
Burgess et al., 2003 for discussion of RIs). The similarity between vigilance and PM tests is 
that they both require participants to make a different response upon noticing specific 
stimuli (see Brandimonte et al., 2001). The key difference is that in vigilance tests this 
requirement to make a different response is very much at the forefront of the test, whereas 
in the PM tests the intentions become a background dual-task and must be retrieved from 
memory and initiated at the correct time. Accordingly, these two paradigms make different 
cognitive demands (Brandimonte et al., 2001). A good source of evidence that the 
experiments presented here are not comparable to the vigilance paradigm, and are more 
appropriately considered as PM, is the finding of faster RTs in experiments 1 and 2. 
According to the literature, vigilance tests should slow participants down as they await the 
specific stimuli; participants are required to monitor ‘online’. In experiments 1 and 2 
participants actually showed faster RTs in the PM conditions, suggesting that the intentions 
are not being maintained ‘online’ or it is unlikely (although granted not impossible) this 
effect could occur.
3.13. Summary
The aim of this Chapter was to examine the relationship between self-initiated PM and 
externally-cued task-switching. The results revealed that task-switching and PM recruit 
potentially separable processes and this was attributed to the difference in endogenous 
control required. Performance of the ongoing task changed across the RIs in a pattern that
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suggests PM may involve preparatory task-switching processes. However, analyses also 
demonstrated distinct differences in ongoing task performance between TB PM with and 
without a clock present; this interesting finding is considered further in experiment 5.
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Chapter 4
Internal Control in Prospective Memory
4.1. Introduction
The novel pattern of results from the first set o f experiments was that participants 
produced faster RTs to the ongoing task during the PM conditions in experiments 1 and 2. 
In contrast, during the third TB PM experiment participants were slower at the ongoing task 
during the PM conditions. The design and procedure o f the three experiments were 
identical except for the clock, which was either present, ‘revealable’ or absent. This 
variable appears to have altered the processes recruited for the task and this was attributed 
to different demands made on self-initiated retrieval processes and time estimation. This is 
consistent with previous PM research that emphasises self-initiated retrieval processes as a 
key variable in PM performance (Craik, 1986; Einstein et al., 1995).
Einstein and colleagues (1995) originally split PM into TB and EB PM tasks on the basis 
that the latter provides external cues for performing the intentions, whereas the former does 
not. From the outcome of experiment 1-3, I propose that TB PM can be split further along 
this internal/external cueing dimension according to the nature of the presentation of the 
clock. The presence of a clock on screen acts as an external cue and reduces both demands 
on self-initiated retrieval processes and on time estimation/time monitoring. However, 
when there is no clock available, or one must remember to check it because it is out of 
sight, these processes are necessary for successful completion of the PM task.
In everyday life, the presence o f a clock is quite common and this might reduce its 
efficiency as a cue because it is not salient (e.g. Cohen et al., 2003 for discussion on cue 
saliency). For example, in the workplace the clock on a computer screen is constantly 
displayed and may not be adequately associated with each TB intention (for example, 
attending a seminar at 5pm) such that it acts as an effective cue. Nevertheless, in a 
laboratory TB PM task, when there is a clock present - the participant may find the clock 
the next most salient stimulus, after the ongoing task. Indeed, the clock and the ongoing 
task may be the only stimuli presented to the participant (see below for description of clock
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presentation in previous studies). Arguably, this type of TB PM task is more externally- 
prompted than EB PM because all the information regarding when to carry out the intention 
is available to the participant. The hypothesis then that TB PM makes more demands on 
self-initiated retrieval processes is simply not apparent in this case. The notion that TB PM 
processing varies according to the nature o f the presentation of the clock is perhaps 
analogous to the proposition that EB PM has different processing requirements according 
to the properties of the cue (e.g. categorical vs specific cues, Einstein et al., 1995, 
experiment 2). Evidence for this hypothesis from neuroimaging studies will now be 
discussed.
4.2. Time-Based Prospective Memory
4.2.1. Neural Basis of Time-Based PM
The hypothesis that the nature of the presentation of the clock may affect the cognitive 
processes recruited in TB PM tasks stems not only from the first three experiments 
discussed in Chapter 3, but also from evidence from neuroimaging studies. Okuda, Frith & 
Burgess (2004, submitted) first discuss this possibility when they showed a differential 
pattern of activation in two TB PM tasks. In an earlier study, Okuda et al., (2002) 
conducted a PET study of PM tasks in which participants were instructed to perform mental 
arithmetic as the ongoing task and then clench their fist at particular cues. In the EB version 
participants clenched when a specific digit was presented within the ongoing task stimuli. 
During the TB version participants were asked to clench after particular time intervals 
(about 30 seconds). Crucially, no clock was presented in the TB task because the 
investigators sought to maximise the difference between the time and event versions, such 
that full time estimation was required. Previous neuroimaging studies of EB PM have 
established activation in the rostral prefrontal cortex, particularly Brodmann’s area 10 
located in the anterior part of the prefrontal cortex (Okuda et al., 1998; Burgess, Quayle & 
Frith, 2001; Burgess, Scott & Frith, 2003; Okuda et al., 2004). In this TB versus EB PM 
study similar areas of activation were reported. Compared to just performing the ongoing 
task alone, both types of task activated the left anterior frontal sulcus, the right middle 
frontal gyrus and the left hippocampus. The left superior frontal sulcus was described as 
showing more activation in the TB version of the PM task.
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The later study by Okuda, Burgess & Frith (2004, submitted) again compared a TB and EB 
PM task, but in this study the investigators presented participants with a digital or analogue 
clock during the TB task. Activation differences between the TB and EB PM tasks in the 
earlier study could be explained by the need for time estimation processes. Thus by 
providing a clock, an aim o f this study was to attempt to dissociate processes involved in 
maintaining and retrieving the TB intention from these time estimation processes. The 
experiment revealed a dissociation between activation in the rostral prefrontal cortex for TB 
and EB prospective remembering. The medial region o f this area was more active during 
the TB version whilst the lateral region of the rostral PFC showed more activation during 
the EB version of the task. This pattern occurred regardless o f the ongoing tasks used 
(syllable judgement of words or shape judgement o f rectangles) or the type of clock 
presented (digital or analogue). The authors argued that the results could not be related to 
differences in performances of the two types o f PM task i.e. related to task difficulty or 
performance of the ongoing task. Instead they contend that the activity is likely to be 
directly associated with processes involved in the PM task itself, such as planning, 
maintenance and execution o f the intentions. The patterns of activation were in 
concordance with previous studies (Burgess et al., 2001; Burgess et al., 2003) supporting 
the notion that rostral prefrontal cortex plays a key role in prospective remembering.
Of key relevance here is that Okuda and associates report a different pattern of activation 
for the TB task in this study compared to the earlier study in which there was no clock 
presented to the participants. To the extent that dissociations in activation may represent 
dissociations in cognitive processes (see Henson, 2005), the combined evidence from these 
studies indicates the possibility that a different set of processes were actively involved in 
the time task without a clock, compared to with a clock. Indeed, the TB task without the 
clock shared more common activation areas with the EB version of the second study. 
Okuda et al. frame this in light o f a new model o f the functioning of the rostral prefrontal 
cortex -  the Gateway hypothesis (Burgess et a l, 2005; Gilbert et al., 2005). This hypothesis 
(discussed in Chapter 1) describes the rostral prefrontal cortex as a gateway that mediates 
an attentional bias between stimulus-independent thoughts (SIT) and stimulus-orientated 
external cognitions (SOT). The region is further functionally divided with the proposal that 
lateral rostral PFC modulates attention towards internal thoughts and goals, including 
switches between internally- and externally-guided behaviours, whereas medial rostral PFC
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plays a role in the orientation of attention towards SOT cognitions. Okuda and colleagues 
(submitted) use this proposed dissociation in their interpretation of the PM imaging results, 
arguing that lateral PFC is activated during EB tasks because of the switching between 
internal thoughts (cue rehearsal) and monitoring the external stimuli for the cue. Similarly, 
in the TB task without a clock, lateral PFC is also found because of the reliance on 
internally-guided processes (i.e. internal time-estimation and self-initiated retrieval 
processes). In contrast, the TB task with a clock activates medial PFC of the orientation 
towards the external world (i.e. the clock-watching).
Although this is a relatively new hypothesis o f rostral PFC function there are several lines 
of evidence that supports the proposal, including neuroimaging and neuropsychological 
studies (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.). However, as a theory it is in its infancy and 
undoubtedly will be refined and developed as new research accrues. Nevertheless, the 
differential patterns of activation in the two TB tasks does require explanation and it is easy 
to fit the presence and the absence o f the clock into theoretical accounts of PM that 
emphasise the degree of internal cueing as a key variable. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and 3, 
theoretical accounts of TB PM are sparse compared to EB PM, however I will now 
consider the accounts available in light o f the proposal that the nature of the presentation of 
the clock is a crucial factor. I will then review this proposal in relation to previous 
empirical studies of TB PM. Finally, I will introduce experiment 5, which is intended as a 
direct test of the proposal that TB PM processing varies according to the nature of the 
presentation of the clock.
4.2.2. Cognitive Accounts of TB PM with Respect to the Nature of the 
Clock
The idea that EB PM requires more continuous attention is in line with Smith’s (2003) 
model of EB PM that states there is constant strategic monitoring for the cue and this is 
reflected in the RTs of the ongoing task. As touched on in the previous Chapter, a 
prediction can be developed, from combining the research of Smith on EB PM and the 
Test-Wait cycle (e.g. Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Ceci & Bronfenbrenner, 1985; Park et al.,
1997), that RTs and/or accuracy of the ongoing task may fluctuate across the retention 
interval (RI) in TB PM (see also West & Craik, 1999). During the ‘Wait’ periods of the RI, 
the performance of the ongoing task may be equivalent to having no intention because few
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resources for monitoring are being used. During other periods of the RI (e.g. Test) ongoing 
task performance may be impaired (compared to a baseline no intention condition) because 
of the demands made on self-initiated retrieval and monitoring processes. This attentional 
disengagement hypothesis is consistent with the results of experiments 2 in which clock- 
checking behaviour was lowest during the middle period of the RIs. Einstein et al., (1995), 
Park et al., (1997) and Logie et al., (2004) all found evidence for the Test-Wait time 
monitoring strategy as measured by their participants’ clock checking behaviour.
However, the preceding analysis o f TB PM may not extend to TB situations in which there 
is no clock available, such as experiment 3. In these cases full and constant time estimation 
and monitoring is mandatory if the intention is to be executed at anything like the correct 
point in time. The use of ‘wait’ periods (at least over short RIs) may be counterproductive 
because one would lose track of how much time has passed and one could forget altogether 
about the intention (because there is no clock acting as a cue). So the more strategic route to 
successful PM performance might be to continuously monitor the passing of time (i.e. 
maintain the psychological clock). Of course, this strategy would place continuous 
demands on cognitive resources (Zakay & Block, 1997; 2004), in contrast to the ‘Test 
Wait’ cycle in which there are periods where resources are ‘freed-up’.
One important element of remembering TB intentions then is the availability of a clock, as 
it is predicted that this has an impact on the time monitoring strategy one can use. The time 
monitoring strategy utilised (i.e. Test-Wait cycle or continuous time estimation) will, in 
turn, affect the degree o f cognitive resources available during RIs and this will be reflected 
in ongoing task performance (Smith, 2003). Hypotheses for experiment 5 will shortly be 
discussed below based on this theoretical account.
4.2.3. Clocks in previous TB PM Research
The hypothesis submitted is that the nature of the clock affects the recruitment of cognitive 
processes. If the clock is present for participants to use then fewer self-initiated retrieval 
processes are required because the clock can be consistently watched, acting as the cue for 
intention performance. Similarly, if there is a clock present for participants during PM tasks 
then this may encourage them to use a Test-Wait strategy for time monitoring, rather than 
continuous internal time estimation. This different pattern of time monitoring is likely to be
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reflected in their ongoing task performance, as described above. Studies from different 
researchers and labs have varied in the presentation o f their clock despite the predicted 
large influence the nature of the clock can have on participants’ performances.
For example, Einstein et al. (1995) in their first experiment used a large digital clock placed 
behind participants. Participants had to physically turn around to look at the clock in order 
to see how much time had passed. In a third experiment comparing TB and EB PM in older 
and younger adults, they changed the clock such that participants just pressed a key to 
reveal the clock on the screen (on which the ongoing task was presented). Both experiments 
found an age-related impairment in TB PM. Park et al., (1997) asked participants to pull a 
lever located at the side o f the computer monitor for their participants. The lever was 
attached to a clock and pressing a different button on this clock briefly revealed the time 
elapsed from the beginning of the experiment. These researchers also found an age effect. 
Logie et al., (2004) used a computer screen to display the clock, which was placed at a 90° 
angle to the display o f the ongoing task, so that both could not be seen at the same time. 
Logie and colleagues in the description of the clock within their methods section foresee 
the hypothesis put forward here by stating: ‘they [participants] could not see the screen 
while looking at the clock and vice versa; therefore, the clock could not function as an 
external, visible cue ’ (p. 445). Older adults were impaired on both the TB and EB PM tasks 
in this investigation when there was also a high secondary working memory load. 
Surprisingly, in the study by D ’Y'dewalle et al., (1999) in which no age effects on TB PM 
were found, the clock was displayed lm  away from the participants and they had to turn 
over their left shoulder to check it (thus the clock was not a constant cue). However, the 
authors attribute the good performance of the elderly in the TB task to the slow rate at 
which the ongoing task stimuli were presented, leaving ample time for clock checking.
The difficulty in trying to isolate the impact of clock presentation on PM or ongoing task 
performance within past studies is that other variables differ quite dramatically across the 
experimental procedures, for instance, the ongoing tasks used and the number of PM 
responses produced. It is also possible that a variety of qualities relating to the clock can 
affect PM performance, such as clocks that can be ‘revealed’ compared to those which are 
presented physically but require ‘turning to’. A possible hypothesis is that the physical 
presence of a clock -  even if it is out of sight -  is more of an external aid than a
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‘revealable’ clock on the computer screen. However, in order to establish that the 
presentation of the clock is a critical feature of TB PM processing I conducted an 
experiment to test the hypothesis directly.
4.3. Experiment 5
4.3.1. Aims and Hypotheses
The purpose of experiment 5 was to pursue the results of experiments 1-3 in which a 
different pattern of ongoing task performance was revealed between a TB PM task in which 
a clock was presented to participants and the same task in which there was no clock 
available. Thus, the main experimental comparison was between participants’ performances 
of the ongoing tasks in a TB PM task with a clock present and a TB task without a clock 
present and baseline performance (no TB PM demands).
Experiments 1 and 2 showed faster RTs to the ongoing task when they also had to recall TB 
intentions, whereas experiment 3 participants’ produced slower RTs to the ongoing task 
during the condition with the PM demands. An explanation of this finding is that 
participants experienced a ‘deadline’ effect in experiments 1 and 2. By observing the 
approaching time deadline for the intention they sped up (with no apparent cost to 
accuracy). If this finding can be replicated then, there are many implications for everyday 
life. However, if the finding is not replicated then the alternative explanation (that the 
results were simply due to slower task resumption after the externally-cued side switch) 
must be evoked.
Four predictions were made on the basis o f the theoretical and empirical background 
described. Firstly, if providing a clock on the screen during the TB PM task does reduce the 
demand on internally-guided processes, then better ongoing task and PM performance is 
predicted in this condition than compared to the no-clock condition. Secondly, if 
experiments 1 and 2 revealed a true ‘deadline’ effect, then it is predicted this same effect 
will occur in the clock condition in this experiment -  with participants showing faster RTs 
to the ongoing task. Thirdly, it is expected that the Test-Wait-Test-Exit cycle of time 
monitoring is not an appropriate strategy for TB PM tasks in which there is no clock 
present. Instead, participants should monitor internally their own psychological passage of
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time, processes which are likely to impinge on cognitive resources (Zakay & Block, 1997). 
Because of these differences in time monitoring strategy, it is predicted that there will be 
differences in ongoing task performance across the RI between the clock and no-clock 
conditions. Participants may show signs of attentional disengagement from the PM task in 
the clock condition between PM responses (i.e. produce faster RTs to the ongoing task), 
however, in the no-clock condition they are likely to produce slower RTs all through the 
RIs. Finally, the results of experiments 1 to 4 implicated possible self-initiated task switch 
preparation processes leading up to the PM response, indicated by slower RTs to the 
ongoing task in this period. Thus, it is predicted that there will be a significant slowing in 
ongoing task performance leading up to the PM responses in both the clock and no-clock 
condition (since both require a switch to the PM task).
4.3.1.1. Hypotheses Experiment 5:
In summary the hypotheses for experiment 5 are as follows:
The Effect of Internal/External Cueing on Task Performance
Hypothesis 1:
Expect differences in ongoing RTs, ongoing accuracy and possibly PM performance 
between no-clock and clock TB PM conditions because of differing levels of environmental 
support for task. Specifically, it is expected that participants will perform more poorly in 
the no-clock condition (in terms of ongoing task and/or PM performance) because of 
heavier reliance on self-initiated retrieval and time estimation processes.
Hypothesis 2:
In previous experiments 1 and 2 -  participants performed the ongoing tasks faster during 
the PM clock conditions, this was attributed to a ‘deadline’ effect. I expected to find this 
same pattern of performance during the clock condition but not the no-clock condition.
Changes in Task Performance across the Retention Interval
Hypothesis 3:
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Expect some differences in ongoing task performance across the retention interval in the 
clock condition but not in the no clock condition (because attentional disengagement 
possible in clock condition but constant time estimation and self-retrieval processes 
required in no-clock condition).
Hypothesis 4:
However, might expect significant slowing in both the clock and no-clock conditions as 
approach PM responses because o f self-initiated preparation PM task-switching processes.
4.3.2. Method
Participants & Design
Twenty-five adult volunteers recruited from a participant database ran by the UCL 
Psychology department participated in the experiment in return for monetary compensation. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 28, 14 were female and 11 were male. Participants 
completed a health screen questionnaire to establish any history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders, but no participants were excluded on this basis. All participants 
reported a similar level of educational background, with the majority being current UCL 
undergraduates. Testing was administered on an individual basis in a separate cubicle in a 
session lasting approximately 55 minutes. All participants performed all three conditions of 
the experiment in this repeated measures design (clock, no-clock and ongoing task only i.e. 
no PM demands). Each condition was presented as two blocks lasting 6 minutes. The order 
of block presentation was fully counterbalanced across participants.
Materials & Equipment 
The Ongoing Tasks
The presentation of the stimuli and response timing were performed on an IBM compatible 
Dell notebook controlled by software written in Matlab. The display screen was split into 
four quadrants by two white lines centrally aligned horizontally and vertically. The four 
tasks were presented simultaneously in each quadrant. Each task consisted of two coloured 
stimuli appearing on a black background on the left and the right (see Figure 4.1.). 
Participants were instructed that each task required them to make a decision determining
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the correct response from the two stimuli. The correct response depended upon the task 
demands, which were as follows: Task 1) decide which angle is bigger; Task 2) decide 
which face is happier; Task 3) decide which letter is nearer to the end of the alphabet and 
Task 4) decide which number is closer to 50. Participants pressed either the left or right 
arrow key (on a QWERTY keyboard) according to the position of the stimuli that they 
believed represented the correct answer (i.e. on the left or on the right). As soon as a 
participant had made a response, two more stimuli immediately appeared on the screen, 
thus producing self-paced trials. The stimuli on screen (including the inactive task stimuli -  
see below) changed colour after every trial so it was clear when the next trial had appeared. 
The colour of the stimuli was chosen randomly on each trial from a set of four different 
colours, these were dark blue, cerise, pink and green. Above the two stimuli of each task 
written in white, Arial size 40 font and aligned left was a short reminder of the demands for 
each task, for example, ‘bigger angle?’ ‘closer to 50?’ By permanently displaying the task 
instructions, there was no demand on working memory to maintain the instructions for each 
task. Each pair of stimuli was generated pseudo-randomly according to a set of parameters 
that maintained a consistent level o f difficulty within each task. The full details of the tasks 
and the parameters are as follows:
Task 1) Biggest angle?
Two angles, each created from two straight lines 2 cm in length, were presented. The two 
angles were displayed at any rotation (generated randomly) but were constrained such that 
the difference between them never exceeded 8° (minimum difference between them was 4° 
and the maximum difference was 11°). Participants made a perceptual discrimination of 
which angle was bigger and responded accordingly.
Task 2) Happiest face?
This task constituted two circles, 2.5 cm in diameter. Each circle contained a face: with 
eyes, a nose and a mouth. The task was to decide which face was happier out of the two and 
this was established by the expression of the mouth. The mouth, on either face, was one of 
the following on each trial: a down turned smile, a straight line or an upturned smile. 
Naturally, these mouth expressions represented sadness, neutrality and happiness, 
respectively. The program randomly generated which expression each face took on a trial- 
by-trial basis, but the faces always had different expressions from each other. Participants
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were required to always choose the smiling face but choose the neutral face when a smiling 
face did not appear.
Task 3) Nearest to Z?
Two letters, 1.5 cm tall, 1cm wide in Arial font size 80, from the English alphabet appeared 
on each trial of this task. The letters were generated randomly by the program but were 
always taken from the middle 14 letters o f the alphabet (G -  T). There was a minimum 
distance o f four places between the two letters (e.g. M and N could never appear, but M and 
R could). Participants simply had to determine which letter was closer to the end of the 
alphabet.
Task 4) Closer to 50?
Two integers from the range 25 to 75 were presented for this task 1.5 cm tall, 2 cm wide 
(together) and in Arial font size 80 on each trial. One integer was always greater than 50 
and the other was always less than 50. The integers were chosen randomly by the program 
but there had to be a minimum distance o f six between them (e.g. 54 and 49 could never 
appear, but 54 and 46 could). Participants were instructed to choose the integer closest to 
50.
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Figure 4.1. The screen design in the PM clock conditions in Experiment 5
At any one time, only one task (i.e. the two stimuli & instructions for that task) was active 
and thus considerably brighter than the other three inactive tasks, which remained difficult 
to see whilst inactive. Participants were instructed to respond to the brighter task 
throughout the experiment, whichever task this may be. Thus, the computer program 
switched the participants between the four tasks by altering the brightness of the tasks. A 
task switch was generated randomly either after 15 seconds or after 50 seconds throughout 
the whole experiment. The program also randomly determined the task that became active 
after a switch, such that all three inactive tasks had equal chance of becoming active. The 
rationale for this ‘multitasking’ approach to the ongoing tasks was to firstly ensure that 
participants did not reach ceiling on either the ongoing tasks or the PM task (because of the 
repeated measures design) or become too fatigued with the same ongoing task. McDaniel & 
Einstein (2000) commented that ‘changing the activity periodically might retain a higher 
level o f absorption in the ongoing activity' (p. S I40), and thus reduce the chance of 
participants ‘zoning out’ or achieving ceiling effects. Secondly, this multitasking approach
131
is more ecologically valid (Burgess et al., 2006). The previous Chapter demonstrated that 
these switches between the ongoing tasks should not interfere with PM processing.
Time-Based PM Task
The difficulty for the experimental design o f comparing PM ability with and without a 
clock present is that individuals will produce a lot o f variation in how often they make a 
PM response in the no-clock condition. This will lead to differences between the conditions 
in the length of the retention intervals and as this variable can have an effect on PM 
performance (e.g. Hicks et al, 2000), it was necessary to control for this. In order to achieve 
this, the RIs in the clock condition were based on the RIs o f the previous participant’s no­
clock PM responses. Thus, the computer programme extracted the length o f time between 
the PM responses within the no-clock condition and used these as the basis for the next 
participant’s RIs in the clock condition. The method of accomplishing this is described 
below.
Clock Condition
During the clock conditions an analogue clock 3.5cm in diameter was displayed centrally at 
the top of the screen. The lay-out was of a typical analogue clock but with a minute and a 
second-hand only (see Figure 4.1.). The individual minutes were demarcated on the clock 
with red lines and the ‘hourly’ points were demarcated with longer red lines (these actually 
represented 5 minutes, 10 minutes, 15 minutes etc). Participants were instructed to 
remember to press the Space Bar whenever the minute hand of the clock reached 5 minutes 
and the seconds hand hit the 12 o’clock position (i.e. the clock would normally be 
considered to signify the 1 o ’clock position). Participants were informed that the clock 
would start at different points, for example at 4 minutes 23 seconds in which case it would 
be 37 seconds before they needed to remember to press the Space Bar. Alternatively, the 
clock hands might start at the position 3 minutes 10 seconds in which case the correct time 
to press would be 1 minute 50 seconds later. These instructions were clarified by the 
experimenter as necessary and the practice ensure participants understood completely. 
When the Space Bar was pressed the screen flashed white and the clock hands reset in the 
correct position for the next RI.
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As described above, the RIs (i.e. the time between the starting position of the clock and the 
correct time-point at which to make the PM response, signified by the correct position of 
the clock hands) were matched to the previous participants’ no-clock PM responses. 
Consequently, the RIs in the two conditions were matched across participants. An extra 
participant was tested at the beginning of the experiment to provide the first set of matched 
retention intervals; their data was not included in the analyses.
No-Clock Condition
Obviously, in this condition there was no clock present on the screen and instead of 
participants having to use the clock to determine the correct time to make the PM response, 
they were instructed to simply press the Space Bar every time they thought 30 seconds had 
passed. Participants were further informed that they should not attempt to use any strategy 
to help them to do this (such as counting) as this would interfere with their ongoing task 
performance. Instead, they were instructed to simply estimate the time passed. Again the 
screen briefly flashed white when a PM response was made.
Ongoing Tasks Only Condition (Baseline)
As a comparison condition participants also performed just the ongoing tasks alone, with 
no extra PM demands. This was considered the participants’ baseline performances of the 
ongoing tasks.
Procedure
On arrival, participants were told the experiment was investigating how people perform on 
complex tasks, such as multi-tasking. Participants were then asked to remove any watches 
or other time-keeping devices and these were kept out of sight for the entire experiment. 
The instructions for the four basic tasks were presented on a sheet of paper. After reading 
these instructions, the experimenter questioned the participant to ensure they understood the 
task demands.
Participants were told that they must respond to the tasks using the index finger of each 
hand, left index finger over the left arrow key and right index finger over the right key. By 
asking participants to use both hands for the ongoing tasks throughout the experiment we 
ensured that they could not use their spare hand as an external cue for the PM demands, by,
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for example, keeping their fingers over the PM response keys. Participants then performed 
60 seconds practice of the four ongoing tasks in order to familiarise themselves with the 
display, the tasks and the means o f responding. In this practice block, participants 
performed 15 seconds of each ongoing task.
Following this practice, participants were given a second set of instructions on paper 
regarding the prospective memory elements o f the experiment. They were instructed that 
during some sections of the experiment they might also be required to do an extra task, as 
well as the four basic tasks. They were then provided with the instructions regarding the 
different TB PM conditions and performed a practise of the clock condition. Before 
beginning this 1 minute practice block, participants were told that the clock would start at 
the 4 minutes 30 seconds point and thus they had 30 seconds before they would need to 
press the Space Bar. They were encouraged to use this as an aid forjudging the length of 30 
seconds for the no-clock blocks.
A verbal prompt from the experimenter to press the Space Bar was given if they had not 
pressed the Space Bar 10 seconds after the correct time. Any other instructions were 
clarified by the experimenter as necessary. Participants then began the experiment, and 
were reminded to perform the ongoing tasks as quickly and accurately as possible and that 
the extra tasks were equally as important.
4.3.3. Results
These data were subjected to a series o f data processing steps before analyses were 
executed. For all conditions and analyses, calculations of mean RTs of the ongoing tasks 
excluded error and post-error trials, the first trial o f a block, pre and post PM response trials 
(to remove eye/finger movement noise), post task switch trials (to remove switch costs) and 
finally trials above and below 3 standard deviations from the mean (to remove outliers). 
Two participants made 0 PM responses in their first no-clock block and as a result, their 
matched clock block participants made no PM responses in their first clock blocks. The 
analyses of RTs and error rates presented below exclude ongoing task data from just the 
respective blocks of these four participants. Nonetheless, ongoing task data was collapsed 
across the 2 blocks of the same condition, thus the following analyses do include these
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participants’ data from the second blocks of the same conditions, in which they produced 
accurate PM responses.
4.3.3.1. Ongoing Tasks Analyses
The principal dependent variables o f interest in this experiment were the accuracy and RTs 
of the ongoing tasks. The design o f the experiment afforded two possible ways of surveying 
this data in order to analyse the effects of internally- and externally-cued TB PM. The four 
ongoing tasks could be analysed separately. For example, relevant trials from participants’ 
responses to task 1 (collapsed across both blocks o f the same condition) could be included 
to calculate the average error rate/RT for task 1 in each condition, and so forth for each 
task. An alternative approach was to collapse the four ongoing tasks across each condition. 
Thus, collapsed scores could be calculated by finding the mean of the mean of the four 
tasks for each condition (e.g. mean o f meantaskl clock, meantask2_clock, 
meantask3_clock, meantask4_clock).
Separate Task Analyses
Collapsing across the four ongoing tasks would increase statistical power because of 
increased sample size, and so this was the preferred approach, but for this to be appropriate 
it was important to establish that one ongoing task was not having a particular effect in one 
particular condition (i.e. that there was no condition x task interaction). With regard to this, 
error rates and RT data were subjected to a 4 (ongoing tasks: 1,2,3,4) x 3 (condition: clock, 
no-clock, baseline) repeated-measures MANOVA. There was a main effect of task on error 
rates, F(3,21) = 16.761, p>.001, no main effect o f condition and no significant condition x 
task interaction, (p.>.05). These findings were mirrored by the RT data, with a main effect 
of task, F(3,21) = 33.36, p.<.001, no main effect of condition and no significant interaction, 
(p.>.05). By collapsing across the conditions variable, the main effect of task was 
investigated further. T-tests revealed that the significant difference in error rates lay 
primarily between task 2 (low error rate with a mean o f 5.43%) and the other tasks. For 
instance, there was a significant difference between task 2 and task 4 which produced the 
highest error rate with a mean of 11.16%, t(23) = 5.75, p<.0001, one-tailed. Similarly, in 
terms of RTs, participants produced the fastest responses in task 2 (mean of 739.34 ms) and
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the slowest responses in task 4 (mean of 1217.39ms), a contrast which also produced a 
significant difference t(23) = 9.47, pc.OOOl, one-tailed.
The non-significant interactions between task and condition, combined with the 
randomisation of the ongoing task schedule across all participants and conditions, provided 
the rationale for pooling across the four ongoing tasks. Thus, mean RTs and error rates 
from this point forward were calculated as described above (collapsed across tasks). The 
rest of the results are split into analyses according to the hypotheses.
4.3.3.3. Hypotheses 1 and 2 — The Effect o f  Internal/External Cueing 
The first set of analyses looked at hypotheses 1 and 2, which concerned the effect of the 
presence and absence of the clock on ongoing task performance. Mean error rates are 
shown in Figure 4.2. and Figure 4.3. displays the mean RTs. Mean error rates from each 
condition, collapsed across the four ongoing tasks, were submitted to a repeated measures 
MANOVA with condition as the factor (baseline, clock TB PM and no-clock TB PM). The 
analysis with error rates indicated that the main effect o f condition was marginally 
significant, F(2,22)=3.413, p=.051. Planned t-tests were performed on the mean error rates 
and revealed that participants made significantly more errors during the no-clock TB PM 
condition than compared to the baseline, t(23) = 2.26, p=.017, one-tailed, and the clock 
conditions, t(23) = 2.41, p=.012, one-tailed. The same MANOVA conducted with RT data 
revealed a non-significant main effect of condition, (p>.05). Nonetheless, participants 
produced slightly, but not reliably, slower RTs during the clock condition, a likely 
consequence of eye movements to the clock. Indeed, bearing in mind that participants were 
glancing at the clock during this condition, it is noteworthy that the no-clock condition still 
shows most disruption to accuracy.
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Figure 4.2. Mean error rates of ongoing tasks - collapsed across tasks and 2 blocks
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Figure 4.3. Mean RTs o f ongoing tasks - collapsed across tasks and 2 blocks
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Hypotheses 3 and 4 -  Retention Intervals
The next set of analyses was conducted to compare ongoing task performance across the 
RIs, in order to test hypotheses 3 and 4. (The following analyses were also performed with 
the error data but there were no significant results thus just the RTs are reported). The RTs 
(excluding the same trial types as described above) were split into 3 equal time bands 
between PM responses, using the following procedure:
1) The RIs between each PM response were calculated,
2) Then divided into three equal time bands,
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3) The RTs from each trial were then assigned to a time band accordingly; in addition, 
the trials were still split according to ongoing task.
Thus, the first time band contains trials that occurred immediately following a PM response 
(or the beginning of the block), the second time band contains trials that occurred midway 
between PM responses and the third time band contained trials that preceded the next PM 
response. The absolute time within these time bands was, o f course, different for each 
participant (as each person had an idiosyncratic PM response pattern). However, the time 
bands represent all trials in their relative positions within the RIs.
Clock Blocks
After trials were split into the 4 ongoing tasks and also into the correct position within the 
RI, the overall mean RT for each condition and time band was calculated by finding the 
mean of the 4 ongoing tasks mean for each time band. (For example, the mean RT for the 
clock condition time band 1 = mean(taskl_timebandl_clock_mean,
task2_timebandl_clock_mean, task3_timebandl_clock _mean, task4_timebandl_clock 
_mean).
Each participant experienced a different schedule of ongoing tasks as a result of the 
randomisation described above, consequently there were cases where a participant did not 
have a mean RT for a particular task in a particular time band (because they did not 
perform any of that task during that time band). In these cases, a mean collapsed across the 
ongoing tasks was not calculated for that participant, and they were excluded from the 
MANOVA. This exclusion process left 21 participants in the clock condition and 19 
participants in the no clock condition.
The mean RTs for each time band of the clock condition were submitted to a repeated 
measures MANOVA (with the levels o f time band: 1,2,3). The main effect of time band 
approached significance, F(2,19)= 3.282, p=.06. The mean RTs for each time band of the 
RIs are shown in Figure 4.4. As the graph displays, the mean RTs increased linearly across 
the RIs and indeed this was borne out in a statistical test, there was a significant linear 
trend, F(l,20)= 6.892, p= 016.
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Figure 4.4. Mean RTs o f trials within 3 time bands o f  PM  retention intervals in clock
blocks - collapsed across 4 ongoing tasks
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The same procedure to calculate mean RTs for each time band o f the RIs was employed in 
the no-clock condition and again, a repeated measures MANOVA was conducted on these 
RT data (with the levels of time band: 1,2,3). There was a significant main effect of time 
band, F(2,17)= 5.655, p=.014, and this transferred into a significant linear trend, F(l, 18) = 
11.64, p=.003. In this condition too then, RTs of the ongoing task gradually slowed across 
the RI and were slowest as the participants approached the point at which they produced a 
PM response, see Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5. Mean RTs o f trials within 3 time hands o f  PM  retention intervals in no clock
blocks - collapsed across 4 ongoing tasks
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PM  Task Performance
The majority of PM studies use PM performance as the key dependent variable; however, 
this measure is complicated in the present experiment by the fact that the no-clock 
condition can produce a range of PM RIs because o f time estimation differences. This 
makes it difficult to assess performance in this condition (i.e. have participants forgot to 
make a PM response or have they just produced long RIs?). Instead, the important point to 
establish is that the participants are actually carrying out the PM intentions and that the 
number of PM responses is comparable across conditions. Thus, it is necessary to check 
that the mean RIs across the clock and no clock conditions are similar, in order to eliminate 
RI differences as the explanation for performance differences between the two conditions. 
Similarly, it is also necessary to check that there are no differences in the number of PM 
responses between the two blocks of the same condition (i.e. block 1 and 2 with the clock 
and block 1 and 2 of without the clock) since the previous analyses have collapsed error 
rates and RTs across both blocks (see Table 4.1.).
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Table 4.1. Displays the mean total number o f  P M  responses and the mean RI lengths in 
each o f  the P M  block in experiment 5
Mean Total Number o f PM  
Responses
Mean Length of Retention 
Intervals
Clock Block 1 8.77 33.43 secs
N=22 (SD=3.17) (SD=T0.72)
Clock Block 2 8.63 37.20 secs
N=24 (SD=3.09) (SD=11.91)
No-Clock Block 1 8.95 36.02 secs
N=22 (SD=2.95) (SD= 12.32)
No-Clock Block 2 8.29 39.05 secs
N=24 (SD=3.14) (SD=13.45)
A 2 (condition: clock, no-clock) x 2 (block: 1st, 2nd) repeated measures MANOVA was 
conducted on these data and revealed no significant main effects or interactions between 
condition (clock or no-clock) and block (1 or 2) in the total number of PM responses (all F 
< 1). The same MANOVA was conducted with the mean length of RI data. This showed no 
significant main effect of condition and no significant interaction (F < 1). There was a 
significant effect of block, F(l,19)=4.54, p<.046, so this was followed up with post hoc t- 
tests to check if there were significant differences between the two blocks of the same type. 
Paired t-tests revealed no significant differences in mean RI length between blocks 1 and 2 
of the no-clock condition, (p >.05), and blocks 1 and 2 of the clock condition, (p >.05).
Clock Match Accuracy
To inspect the accuracy of participants PM clock responses (i.e. how accurately participants 
responded to clock) a clock match accuracy score was computed. This score represented the 
mean absolute difference between participants’ no clock PM responses & their matched 
participant’s clock PM responses. For the first no-clock block and the equivalent first clock 
block this score was on average .996 seconds. For the second no-clock block and its 
equivalent clock block, this score was on average 1.24 secs. Clearly, participants were very 
accurate in their externally-cued PM responses (i.e. they pressed the PM response key at the 
correct times).
PM Performance Summary
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The results above demonstrate that participants were performing very similarly in both the 
clock and the no clock PM blocks since the mean RIs matched and the total number of PM 
responses matched. This suggests any differences between the clock and no-clock 
conditions cannot be attributed to differences in RIs or total PM responses. In addition, the 
results justify collapsing mean error rates and RTs across the two blocks of the same 
condition. No significant differences were found between the total numbers of PM 
responses made in each block of the same condition. Furthermore, paired t-tests indicated 
no significant differences between the mean RIs of each block of the same condition.
4.3.4. Discussion
To summarize, there were two main results in experiment 5. First, participants were 
significantly less accurate in their performance o f the ongoing tasks in the no-clock 
condition compared to the clock and baseline conditions. However, there were no overall 
mean RT differences between the three conditions. Second, the analyses of ongoing task 
performance across the RIs clearly demonstrated a significant linear trend in RTs in both 
the clock and no-clock condition, with participants slowing as they approached their PM 
responses. These findings were present despite no significant differences between the 
length of the PM RIs in the clock and no-clock conditions.
H ypothesis 1:
This is the first behavioural study to investigate the effect o f clock presentation on TB PM. 
The first hypothesis predicted that the performance of the ongoing tasks would be poorer in 
the no-clock condition compared to baseline performance and compared to the clock 
condition. This hypothesis was supported, as demonstrated by the higher error rates to the 
ongoing tasks in the TB PM condition without the clock. These results are consistent with 
the notion that a TB PM task involves different processes according to the degree of cueing 
provided by a clock (i.e. the clock’s availability). During the no-clock condition 
participants must maintain their own time monitoring and generate the PM responses 
entirely from internal prompts. The demands on these self-initiated retrieval and time 
estimation processes are likely to make extra demands on cognitive resources (Craik, 1986; 
Block & Zakay, 1997; Zakay & Block, 1997), and therefore affect performance of the 
ongoing tasks. Differences in TB PM performance may be a consequence of the level of 
internal time estimation as well as the degree of self-initiated retrieval used by the
142
participant. Extrapolating this hypothesis further, the demands on these self-initiated 
processes could also change according to the type of clock -  i.e. whether it is requires a 
button press to reveal the clock or merely a turn o f the head. The type of clock might affect 
the strategy participants take to perform the TB PM task. For instance, participants might 
be more inclined to use and check physical clocks more regularly because it is perceived as 
easier, leading to improved ongoing task performance. Harris & Wilkins (1982) discuss the 
possibility that individuals may vary in their time monitoring strategies and Einstein et al., 
(1995) also consider this possibility when describing the difference in the clock-checking 
behaviour of their older and younger adults. Einstein and colleagues pre-empt the present 
experiment and make the following comment in their excellent discussion: ‘In the absence 
o f external cueing from  someone (e.g. an experimenter) or something (e.g. an alarm clock 
or perhaps even a clock within the person’s fie ld  o f  vision), monitoring or testing the clock 
seems to be entirely self-initiated’ (p. 1006). They are relating the self-initiated nature of 
the clock checking to age-related decrements in TB PM performance. However, the point 
may be broader than they discuss, such that future studies could manipulate the presentation 
of the clock and measure any subsequent variation in time monitoring strategies.
Given that the no-clock condition produced poorer ongoing task performance than the clock 
conditions, the current study is consistent with experiments 1 to 3. However, accuracy of 
the ongoing tasks was affected here, as opposed to RTs in the previous experiments. There 
is no immediate explanation for this difference, except to say that the ongoing tasks were 
very different between the first set of experiments and the present study. One can merely 
surmise that the manner by which removing the clock compromises the ongoing task in TB 
PM is dependent on the type and complexity of the ongoing task(s). This could easily be 
tested in future experimental studies.
An alternative interpretation of why participants showed reduced accuracy in the no-clock 
condition is because they were also counting 30 seconds to produce an accurate RI. This is 
not a persuasive argument for four reasons. Firstly, participants were instructed quite 
clearly not to use a strategy for the 30 second RIs, instead they were instructed to simply to 
guess when they thought 30 seconds had passed. Secondly, if they had been counting the 
interference would have also generated longer RTs in the no-clock condition, this was not 
the case. Thirdly, if they had counted participants would have been likely to show
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particularly low accuracy and long RTs in the fourth ongoing task, the number task, again 
this was not the case. Finally, the ongoing tasks, and the multitasking style of the 
experiment, were chosen after a series of pilot studies had showed that they were 
sufficiently engaging to prevent any verbal rehearsal of the intention. Participants in the 
pilot studies were asked to do the tasks with and without counting to 30 seconds and RT 
changes were apparent.
The current findings are in line with neuroimaging studies that demonstrated differences in 
neural activation of TB PM (Okuda et al., 2002, Okuda et al., 2004, submitted). A TB PM 
task with a clock present showed different activation patterns to EB PM and these 
activations were different to those produced from participants undergoing a TB PM task 
without a clock. The Gateway hypothesis of rostral PFC function was provided as the 
framework for these results. TB PM without a clock and EB PM activated a similar neural 
region in the rostral PFC; a region hypothesised to play a role in co-ordinating attention 
with regard to stimulus-independent internal thoughts and switches between stimulus- 
independent thoughts and stimulus-oriented external thoughts. The TB PM task with a 
clock generated activity in a different area of the rostral PFC -  an area that is associated 
with the attentional modulation of externally-oriented behaviour. Thus, the interpretation of 
these patterns of activation is based on the degree of reliance on self-initiated processes. 
Crucially, the EB task is actually posited to use more, or equivalent, self-initiated processes 
than the TB task with a clock. A general implication here is that TB PM cannot be 
presumed to have a greater reliance on self-initiated processes than EB PM (Craik, 1986; 
Einstein et al., 1995; Cicogna et al., 2005). The multiprocess model of EB PM (McDaniel 
& Einstein, 2000) contends that EB PM tasks can vary in their dependence on self-initiated 
processes according to the particular parameters of each task. It is perhaps entirely 
reasonable then to suggest that TB PM tasks can also differ in the degree to which 
automatic versus executive processes are recruited. Indeed, I would propose a multiprocess 
framework for TB prospective remembering, as well as EB. Although the factors that affect 
the processes recruited are likely to be different. From the outcome of this study, it would 
seem one factor that influences this is the nature of the presentation of the clock. This factor 
certainly needs to be more systematically studied in future TB PM research and may 
account for some of the inconsistencies in the PM and ageing literature (Chapter 2, section
Hypothesis 2:
The proposed ‘deadline’ effect of experiments 1 and 2 was not replicated in the present 
study. Participants did not respond faster to the ongoing tasks during the clock TB PM 
conditions. This implies that the faster RTs in the two PM clock conditions of the first two 
experiments may be attributable to participants’ faster recoveries from the self-initiated side 
switch, compared to the automatic side switch in the non-PM conditions. The present 
findings therefore do not support the ‘deadline’ effect hypothesis.
H ypotheses 3 and 4:
The final hypotheses o f this study concerned the change in ongoing task performance 
across the RIs in the TB PM task conditions. Previous cognitive accounts of TB PM have 
described fluctuations in the consumption of attentional and cognitive resources across the 
RI, such as the Test-Wait-Test-Exit cycle proposed by Harris & Wilkins (1982). Park et al. 
(1997) have characterised the ‘Wait’ period of this cycle as a potential period of ‘attentional 
disengagement’ from the PM task. As discussed in the introduction, a direct prediction of 
these time monitoring accounts then are that during specific periods within the RI (e.g. the 
‘Wait’ periods) ongoing tasks should be performed more rapidly, as more cognitive 
resources are available. An analysis of RTs across the RI found that in the final third period 
of the RIs, RTs were considerably greater than those within the first period. Indeed, there 
were significant linearly increasing RTs across the PM RIs in both the clock and no clock 
conditions. This is consistent with the Test-Wait model of time monitoring of Harris & 
Wilkins (1982) since the availability of cognitive resources during the ‘Wait’ period 
enabled faster ongoing task performance.
Recall, however, that these models of time monitoring are based on participants being able 
to ‘test’ or check time elapsed with the aid of an external clock. In the present experiment, 
the condition without a clock produced a similar pattern o f RTs across the RI. Models of 
prospective time estimation include a description of an internal cognitive counter that 
accumulates time signals (which relate to the duration of time passed) and thus requires 
continuous attentional resources (Wearden, 2004; Zakay & Block, 2004). This attention 
subsuming cognitive counter can interfere with non-temporal processing. Following this 
theoretical position, there would be no expected fluctuations in RTs across the RI of the no­
clock condition.
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How then can the similarity of the RT patterns between the two TB conditions be 
reconciled? Two alternatives will now be discussed. One possibility is that participants in 
both TB conditions are showing a slowing in ongoing task performance towards the end of 
the RI because of self-initiated task-switch preparation processes for the PM task; the role 
of time monitoring processes are actually irrelevant. This was predicted by the fourth 
hypothesis as a result of the previous experiments in this thesis and also has empirical 
support from the voluntary task-switching literature (e.g. Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005). 
This supposition can certainly account for the data from experiments 1 to 3. Nevertheless, 
the supposition that the linear increase in RTs is due to executive task-switch processes is 
not mutually exclusive from the Test-Wait cycle account, at least in the condition with the 
clock. Indeed, it is possible that the RIs in this experiment were simply too short to be 
sensitive to other ‘wait’ periods. Or the opposite, the time bands were not fine-grained 
enough to detect changes in ongoing task RTs. This seems to be a general problem with 
current theories of time monitoring in TB PM: there are no elucidations of how the length 
of the RI changes the strategy employed. Further experiments that manipulate the length of 
the RIs and measure the RTs across these different lengths would need to be conducted in 
order to resolve these issues.
The second possibility, to account for the similar pattern of RTs in both TB PM conditions, 
is that the Test-Wait cycle o f time monitoring can also be applied to internal time 
estimation. In other words, participants may show a similar cycle of attentional allocation 
to internal time monitoring, with few resources devoted to this task at the beginning of the 
RI. There is little suggestion o f this in the time estimation literature (see Zakay & Block, 
2004 for a review) but the implication from this account would be that participants would 
produce short RIs because early time signals would not have been processed properly 
(Block & Zakay, 1997). Actually, the mean length of RI in the no-clock conditions was not 
far off 30 seconds (36.02 secs, SD 12.32 in block 1 and 39.05 secs, SD=13.45 block 2). 
Clearly, there is no control condition, in which participants just performed the time 
estimation task, with which to compare the length of RIs generated. However, the general 
accuracy of the RIs produced in the no-clock condition would suggest that participants 
maintain continuous attention to time monitoring. Nevertheless, the data from the present
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experiment cannot determine the correct theoretical position from these options without 
further experimentation.
The studies thus far provide strong evidence that PM is a cognitive task that relies
heavily on internally-guided control processes. However, they also indicate quite
persuasively that the reliance on these self-initiated processes can differ according to 
attributes of the PM task. Previous research has focussed on the factors in EB PM that 
modulate the dependence on self-initiated, strategic processes (e.g. Einstein & McDaniel, 
1990; McDaniel & Einstein 1993; Einstein et al., 1995; Einstein et al., 1997; Guynn et al., 
1998; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; McDaniel et al., 1998). Moreover, researchers have
emphasised that TB and EB PM differentially rely on self-initiated processes, with the 
former making more demands on these internal control mechanisms (Craik, 1986). 
Experiment 5 has demonstrated that this last assumption must be questioned. Instead, the 
evidence implies a hierarchy of dependence on self-initiated processes that crosses the type 
of PM tasks. The hierarchy might look something like this:
1) TB PM without a clock available: places very high demands on time
monitoring/estimation (which is thought to make demands on strategic processes 
(Zakay, 1993; Zakay & Block, 2004) & self-initiated retrieval processes.
2) EB PM -  Under certain task parameters EB PM can evoke little strategic 
monitoring and instead proceed relatively automatically e.g. if reflexive-associative 
processing occurring (McDaniel et al., 1998). However, EB PM can require 
strategic monitoring (Smith, 2003). Multiprocess framework posits the parameters 
of the EB task that mitigates the processes involved (McDaniel & Einstein, 2000).
3) TB PM with clock not on screen but available (e.g. ‘revealable’) -  Expect this to 
require some self-initiation to check the clock but the clock then reduces need for 
full time estimation and once the clock is checked this can act as an external cue for 
the intention.
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4) TB PM with clock always on the screen — external cue (clock) is obvious & 
participants know when target will occur. Requires little time estimation, little self­
initiation & minimal strategic monitoring. However, eye movements to clock may 
reduce the performance on the ongoing task.
Experiments 1 to 3 initially suggested the distinction between the TB PM tasks (i.e. the 
presence of a clock and the absence of it), and experiment 5 confirmed this. Consider 
experiments 3 and 4 however, a similar pattern o f results was demonstrated (in terms of 
ongoing task performance) between TB PM without a clock and EB PM. Despite this, in 
the proposed hierarchy above TB PM without a clock is posited to depend more heavily on 
self-initiated processes than EB PM. Although this makes theoretical sense, the claim 
nevertheless requires empirical substantiation since previous comparisons o f TB and EB 
PM, which are notably rare, have always included a clock o f some description in the time 
version of the task. This purpose of the next experiment was to provide this empirical 
support.
Before discussing the next experiment in more detail, a review of experiments that have 
directly compared TB and EB PM is necessary. Performances on TB and EB PM are 
infrequently compared within the same experiment. The exceptions to this have been 
ageing studies in which older and younger adults are tested on both types of PM (e.g. 
Einstein et al., 1995), and two TB studies (Cicogna et al., 2005; Cook, Marsh & Hicks, 
2005). Ageing studies compare performance on these types of tasks in order to determine 
which generates the largest age-related decrements. This, naturally, is useful for real-life 
applications since strategies can be developed to overcome these deficits (e.g. Gollwitzer & 
Schaal, 1998). The outcomes of these studies are also useful in constraining PM theorising, 
as described in Chapter 2. By establishing if the proposed hierarchy is accurate, these 
experiments hope to achieve the same aims.
The goal of Cicogna and colleagues’ experiment with a young population, was to 
investigate the effect o f interpolating another intention (either TB or EB) within the RI of a 
first TB intention. This is an extremely common scenario in everyday life (Ellis, 1996); a 
little introspection reveals that it is rare indeed we are burdened with only one future 
intention (Kleigel et al., 2000). Moreover, in most cases a pair or group of intentions is a
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mixture of both TB and EB PM tasks. To the extent that TB and EB PM both involve the 
following characteristics, submitted by Ellis (1996), then we would expect some overlap of 
processes:
1) formation and encoding o f intention and action,
2) a retention interval,
3) a performance interval i.e. period during which the intended action should be retrieved,
4) initiation and execution o f intended action,
5) evaluation of outcome (see also Martin, Kliegel & McDaniel, 2003).
Cicogna et al. (2005) hypothesised that because there is overlap in strategic processing then 
a dual mixed-intention condition should produce interference to one or both intentions, but 
that this interference would be much stronger when the two intentions are both TB. 
Essentially, two TB intentions will require double time estimation and the operation of two 
‘psychological’ (or internal) clocks. Their methodology was to give participants an extra 
intention (e.g. remember to press a specific key after 4 minutes (TB), or remember to press 
a specific key when a target word appears (EB)) during the RI of the main PM TB task i.e. 
after participants had already started the main task. Interestingly, the authors reported a 
facilitation effect to the main TB task when an interpolated TB task was added (although 
this came at a cost to the interpolated TB task). This is comparable to reports from 
participants involved in a naturalistic procedures who claimed that remembering one 
intention would also remind them of another approaching future (but unrelated) intention 
(Morris, 1992; Sellen et al., 1997). It is also consistent with a previous report that an 
increase in the numbers of intentions improved overall PM performance (Park et al., 1997).
Participants in the Cicogna et al. study who had to execute an interpolated EB intention 
performed slightly, but not statistically, poorer on the main TB PM task. Cicogna et al. 
suggested that: ‘the sharing o f  attentional resources between cue detection and time 
estimation, lowering the frequency o f  clock checking, might account fo r  the impairment o f  
performance on the main task’(p. 237). In other words, they are proffering that it is the 
demands made on self-generated processes that produces the interference, i.e. strategic cue 
monitoring and strategic time monitoring. The claim is difficult to uphold given that it was 
not a significant effect of the interpolated EB PM task on the main task. However, some 
support for this viewpoint is provided by an experiment conducted by Cook, Marsh &
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Hicks (2005, experiment 3). They report reduced performance in a TB task when it was 
combined with an EB PM task. Two accounts were provided for this effect; firstly, and 
consistent with Cicogna et al., that strategic monitoring for the cue interfered with time- 
monitoring because of the increased load on working memory (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
Marsh et al., 2003; Smith, 2003). By making extra demands on executive resources, the 
participants were forced to rely on automatic associations between the TB intention and the 
context in which the correct target time was expected to occur in order to successfully 
execute the intention.
This account is relevant in this study because their objective was to explore the role of 
context in the retrieval of TB intentions. Participants were expecting that the correct 
moment to make the PM response would occur whilst performing a specific type of 
ongoing task (syllable-judgements) i.e. during a specific context. When this expected 
context did not coincide with the correct time to perform the intention (as manipulated by 
the researchers), participants often missed making the PM response. It was therefore 
assumed that an association between the activity and the expected context had occurred 
during intention formation and without this context the intention was more difficult to 
retrieve. When the correct context did appear, there was a robust contextual cueing effect. 
As described, with the addition of the secondary EB task participants Cook et al., argued 
that participants relied on the automatic association with the context to evoke the TB 
intention. Consequently, when the context did not occur participants missed the correct 
response times.
The second account considered by Cook et al. for explaining the decline in performance 
during the dual-intention condition is that participants simply chose to allocate their 
attention to the other tasks, at the expense o f the time task. Marsh, Hicks & Cook (2005) 
claim that participants can make strategic choices about the allocation of their attention 
according to metacognitive factors (e.g. perceiving one task as more important than 
another). This explanation is applicable to Cicogna et al.’s data since they found a 
facilitation of the main task when they added a second TB task. This facilitation came at a 
cost to the interpolated time task suggesting that participants perceived this interpolated 
task as less important, perhaps because the instructions were presented after beginning the 
main task. As Cook et al. highlight the two accounts they discuss are similar, differing only
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on ‘whether or not the deficit is caused by more versus less strategic processing on the 
participants’ p a r t’ (p. 356). Unfortunately, their methodology cannot distinguish between 
the two accounts.
As discussed previously in this thesis, Smith (2003) has reported that ongoing task 
performance can act as an index of strategic processing, such that there is a cost to the 
ongoing tasks when increased strategic monitoring (or ‘preparatory attentional processes’) 
is required to successfully execute the PM task. The studies by Cicogna et al. and Cook et 
al. failed to measure their participants’ ongoing task performances, by inspecting RTs and 
accuracy, and therefore perhaps reducing the studies’ sensitivities to interference and to 
changes in strategic processing and attention allocation. The present experiment was 
designed to address this shortcoming and use the ongoing task performance as the key 
dependent variable. This also addresses the problem of comparability between TB and EB 
PM. As described in experiment 5 measuring PM performance in a no-clock TB PM task is 
somewhat meaningless given that a participant may not have forgotten to make a PM 
response, but simply judged time poorly. By evaluating ongoing task performance rather 
than PM performance this difficulty is overcome and a measure of strategic processing is 
possible.
4.4. Experiment 6
4.4.1. Aims and Hypotheses
To summarize, the present experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that TB PM 
without a clock requires more internally-generated control processes than EB PM, and thus 
provide support for the hierarchy proposed above. Performance of the ongoing tasks was 
compared in conditions with only EB PM intentions and only TB intentions (without a 
clock). The present experiment also investigated the degree of shared processing between 
these two types of PM tasks by measuring any change in ongoing task performance during 
dual-intention and mixed intention conditions. The paradigm for this experiment was 
identical to experiment 5, but it is worth highlighting features of the experimental design 
that are direct attempts to improve previous methodologies:
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1) Use of a repeated-measures design rather than a between-subjects design. If participants 
do produce individual strategies for attention allocation, such that they make choices about 
which task to devote more attentional resources to (Marsh, Hicks & Cook, 2005), then by 
testing the same participants in the different conditions this variable is controlled.
2) Compare the time- and event- mixed intention condition to: a dual-time intention 
condition, a dual-event intention condition as well as a single-time intention condition, a 
single-event intention condition and a baseline condition (with no intentions). These 
comparison conditions allow for a more clear conception o f the interference caused by a 
mixed dual-intention condition. Cicogna et al. did include a dual-time intention condition 
but not a dual-event condition. Moreover, in their experiment the second intention was 
added during the RI of the main TB task (i.e. once they had already begun the task), which 
may have affected participants’ attentional allocation strategy.
With the conditions o f the experiment specified it is now possible to introduce a series of 
hypotheses.
4.4.1.1. Hypotheses Experiment 6 
Hypothesis 1:
Based on the assumption that there is increased reliance on self-initiated retrieval and time 
estimation, poorer performance of the ongoing tasks in the no-clock TB PM conditions 
compared to baseline and the EB PM conditions was predicted. In addition, there will be 
some reduction in ongoing task performance in the EB conditions compared to baseline, as 
found in experiment 4 o f this thesis and by Smith (2003), but that this decline will not be 
comparable to the TB conditions.
Hypothesis 2:
The prediction regarding the effect of the mixed dual-intention condition is a little trickier. 
The inclusion of the other dual-intention conditions allows for proper comparison 
conditions. However, the empirical evidence reviewed above cannot distinguish between 
two possible outcomes for the mixed dual-intention condition. For example, it is possible to 
argue that a decline in performance of the ongoing tasks in the mixed condition compared
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to baseline and the other dual intention conditions will occur, due to overlapping processing 
requirements e.g. strategic monitoring for cue and strategic time monitoring (e.g. Cook et 
al., 2005). As discussed in the introduction to experiment 5, neuroimaging data also 
suggests there may be similar neural mediation o f no-clock TB and EB PM (Okuda et al., 
2002; Okuda et al., submitted), which indicates that there will be shared processing and 
thus interference. The null hypothesis, however, is that there will be no extra interference 
to ongoing task performance from the mixed intention condition. Cicogna et al. (2005) 
showed no significant interference effect from adding an interpolated EB task to a main TB 
task. If the null hypothesis is true then the expectation is that performance of the ongoing 
tasks in the mixed intention condition would be comparable to that o f the single-TB 
condition. This is because the mixed intention condition does contain a TB demand, so the 
demands on time estimation and self-initiated retrieval will be equal to this.
Hypothesis 3:
It was also hypothesised that although there might be significantly poorer performance of 
the ongoing tasks in the single intention conditions and baseline, there would be no 
differences in ongoing task performance between the single-intention and the dual-intention 
conditions of the same PM task type. This is because studies have demonstrated that two 
sets of intentions can facilitate the remembering of another intention (Morris, 1992).
Hypothesis 4:
Finally, it was hoped this experiment would replicate the results of one aspect of 
experiment 5; ongoing task performance should decline across the RI in the TB PM 
conditions because of voluntary task-switch preparation processes.
4.4.2. Method
Participants & Design
Twenty-four adult volunteers recruited from a participant database ran by the UCL 
Psychology department participated in the experiment in return for monetary compensation. 
Participants were aged between 18 and 35, 13 were female and 11 were male. Participants 
completed a health screen questionnaire to establish any history of neurological or 
psychiatric disorders, but no participants were excluded on this basis. All participants
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reported a similar level of educational background, with the majority being current UCL 
undergraduates. Testing was administered on an individual basis in a separate cubicle in a 
session lasting approximately 55 minutes. All participants performed all six conditions of 
the experiment in this repeated measures design. The six conditions are presented in Figure 
4.7. Condition orders were fully counterbalanced across participants.
Stimuli & Materials
The Ongoing Tasks
The presentation of the ongoing tasks was identical to that described in experiment 5. 
Prospective Memory Tasks 
TB Prospective Memory Conditions
In the TB PM conditions participants were asked to perform the four ongoing tasks and 
were also required to remember to press a PM response key (instead of responding with the 
arrow key) after a certain amount of time had passed. The PM response key was assigned to 
either the Space Bar or Left Control Button and this assignment was counterbalanced 
across participants. In the single TB intention condition, participants were required to press 
the PM response key whenever they thought 30 seconds had passed (PM 1 response). In the 
dual-intention condition they were told they had to press the one PM key after they thought 
30 seconds had passed (PM 1 response), but the other key whenever they thought 2 minutes 
had passed (PM 2 response).
EB Prospective Memory Conditions
In the EB PM conditions the target events were created by the stimuli of the tasks turning a 
specific colour, specifically red or yellow (see Figure 4.6.). The program generated the 
target event schedule pseudo-randomly for each individual participant. In the single EB 
intention condition, the prospective memory targets appeared, with equal chance, after 10, 
20, 30, 40 or 50 seconds (PM 1 response). In the dual EB intention condition the first target 
events appeared with the same parameters and in addition the second colour target event 
appeared, with equal chance, after 100, 110, 120, 130 and 140 seconds (PM 2 response). 
The target schedule was designed to have a variable schedule of target events in order to
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prevent participants trying to predict the arrival of the next target according to the amount 
of time passed, and thus using time estimation processes. However, the average time 
between target events was 30 seconds for the first event and 2 minutes for the second event. 
If the participant did not make a prospective memory response to the target event colour, 
then the colour was presented again on every 2nd trial until the participant made the 
prospective memory response.
Figure 4.6. The screen design in the EB PM conditions -  the red stimuli signifies the PM 
cue
TB & EB Prospective Memory Condition
Finally, in the mixed dual-intention condition participants received both TB and EB 
instructions. In this mixed condition, half the participants received a 30-second TB demand 
(PM 1 response) and an EB target schedule of approximately every 2 minutes (varied 
schedule as above), which again I will label the PM 2 response. The other half of the 
participants received the counterbalanced equivalent: an EB target schedule of
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approximately every 30 seconds (varied schedule as above), labelled the PM 1 response, 
and a 2-minute TB demand (PM 2 response).
Ongoing Tasks Only Condition (Baseline)
As a comparison condition, participants also performed just the ongoing tasks alone, with 
no extra PM demands. This was treated as the participants’ baseline performances of the 
ongoing tasks.
Block order, PM response keys and the colour of the EB PM targets were fully 
counterbalanced across participants. In all conditions, whenever a PM key was pressed the 
screen would flash white and then continue as before.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to that described in experiment 5 up until the point that the PM 
instructions were provided, the procedure was then as follows. Participants were given a 
second set of instructions on paper regarding the PM elements of the experiment. They 
were instructed that during some sections o f the experiment they would also be required to 
do an extra task. They were told that the extra task would be different for each section of 
the experiment and that they would be required to learn thoroughly the new instructions 
before beginning each section. The instructions included examples of the PM demands. 
Participants then performed a 60 second practise block in which they were also required to 
remember an EB PM demand. They were instructed to press the Space Bar whenever they 
saw the tasks turn either red/yellow (depending on their assigned event colour), two targets 
occurred at the after 10 seconds 30 seconds. Again, they completed 15 seconds of each of 
the four ongoing tasks. A verbal prompt from the experimenter to press the Space Bar was 
given if they had not done so after 3 presentations of the PM cue. Any other instructions 
were clarified by the experimenter as necessary.
Participants then began the experiment, which was split into the six experimental 
conditions (see Figure 4.7.) each 6 minutes long. Before each block (i.e. condition) began, a 
screen informed the participants about the ‘extra tasks’ they would have to perform (i.e. the 
PM demands) or if they were just to perform the four basic tasks alone. Participants were 
informed that they could take breaks whenever these information screens appeared, for as
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long as they required, before beginning the next block. The 30 second TB PM demand 
resulted in a total of 11 correct PM key responses. The 2 minute TB PM demand should 
have a total of 2 PM key responses. The EB PM conditions resulted in a different schedule 
of PM targets for each individual, thus the measure derived from these conditions was a 
percentage score of correctly identified targets.
Figure 4.7. List o f  block types each participant performed in experiment 6
BLOCK TYPES
Baseline___________________________________
Baseline + Single TB PM____________________
Baseline + Dual TB PM________________
Baseline + Single EB PM____________________
Baseline + Dual EB PM_____________________
Baseline + Single TB + Single EB PM________
4.4.3. Results
The data was subjected to the identical data processing steps as experiment 5, such that for 
all conditions and analyses, calculations of mean reaction times (RTs) of the ongoing tasks 
excluded error and post-error trials, first trial o f a block, pre and post PM response trials (to 
remove eye/finger movement noise), post task switch trials (to remove switch costs) and 
finally trials above and below 3 standard deviations from the mean (to remove outliers).
Performance of the ongoing tasks, as the key dependent variable again, is discussed first. 
PM performance is then considered afterward. Two participants were excluded from all 
analyses because one participant had very long RTs in all conditions (mean: 1920 ms in 
baseline condition, group mean = 978.07ms) and one participant had very high error rates 
in all conditions (mean: 32.01% in baseline condition). In addition, where participants have 
produced inaccurate PM performances, their ongoing task data has been excluded from the 
relevant conditions. Reasons for exclusion were 0 or 1 PM responses in a particular PM 
condition, as this is cognitively similar to simply completing the block without the extra 
PM task. Their ongoing task data was included in the conditions in which these same 
participants produced accurate PM responses. Consequently, 4 participants had missing
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data from the initial analyses on this basis. Including these participants’ ongoing task data 
in the relevant conditions did not significantly change the outcome of the results. Moreover, 
this problem was partly eradicated by pooling over the single and dual-intention conditions, 
as will be explained below, which allowed 3 o f the 4 participants to be re-entered into the 
subsequent analyses.
4.4.3.1. Ongoing Tasks Analyses 
Separate Task Analyses
As with experiment 5, it was important to establish that none of the individual ongoing 
tasks were affecting error rates or RTs in any o f the conditions specifically (i.e. that there 
was no condition x task interaction). This would provide further justification for analyses to 
be pooled across the four ongoing tasks. To this end, the accuracy and RTs of the separate 
ongoing tasks were subjected to a repeated measures MANOVA with the factors task 
(ongoing task: 1,2,3,4) and condition (baseline, single EB, single TB, dual EB, dual TB, 
dual mixed). The randomised schedule of ongoing task performance invariably resulted in 
not all participants performing all the 4 ongoing tasks in all 6 conditions. Indeed, only 10 of 
the 22 participants produced an entire data set that could be entered into these MANOVAs. 
For this reason, the results of the univariate test are reported because there were too few 
degrees of freedom available for the multivariate test. The ANOVA with these participants’ 
error rates data revealed a main effect of task, F(3,30) = 4.328, p=.012, and no main effect 
of condition (p>.05) or significant task and condition interaction (p>.05). The same 
ANOVA with RTs yielded the same pattern of results: a main effect of task F(3,27) = 
22.28, p<.001, and no main effect of condition or significant task and condition interaction 
(F < 1). These analyses did not include all participants. As in experiment 5, the main effect 
of task in error rates and RTs was investigated further by collapsing across the condition 
variable. Replicating the results of experiment 5, the lowest error rates and fastest RTs were 
produced in task 2 (mean 4.7% and 842.04 ms) and the highest error rates and slowest RTs 
in task 4 (mean 9.73% and 1422.8ms). Paired sample t-tests between these two tasks 
revealed significant differences, t(22) = 3.9, p=.001, and t(21) = 8.31, p<.0001 for error 
rates and RTs respectively.
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The clear non-significant interactions combined with the randomisation of the ongoing 
tasks across all participants, strongly suggests it is justifiable to collapse RTs across the 
four ongoing tasks. Hence, averages reported for the subsequent analysis are the 
participants’ mean error rates or RTs for the 4 ongoing tasks in the 6 conditions (see 
Burgess et al., 2001, 2003; Gilbert et al., 2005 for similar methodology in neuroimaging 
studies i.e. ‘conjunction design’).
Hypothesis 3: Number o f  Intentions
The comparisons between the single intention and dual-intention conditions were 
considered next. It was predicted that there would be no difference between the single and 
dual intention conditions, consequently pooling across this variable would also be 
appropriate to increase statistical power (i.e. over the single and dual-TB conditions and 
over the single and dual-EB conditions). Thus, the following analyses would become 
comparisons between baseline, time- and EB PM and the mixed dual intention condition.
Thus, to ascertain if there were differences between the single and dual intention conditions 
in terms of ongoing task performance, error rates and RTs were entered into two separate 
repeated measures MANOVAs with the factors of PM task type (TB or EB) and number of 
intentions (1 or 2). The analysis with RTs yielded no significant main effects and a non­
significant interaction (F < 1). However, the analysis with error rates produced a significant 
main effect of task type, F(l,18)=8.25, p=.010, but a non-significant main effect of number 
of intentions and a non-significant interaction, (F < 1). Thus, performing a TB task 
increased error rates but having one or two intentions of the same type did not affect 
ongoing task performance. The remaining analyses were therefore pooled across this 
variable. Thus, averages reported from this point forward, for the TB and EB conditions, 
are participants’ mean error rate and RT across the single- and dual-intention conditions 
(still also collapsed across the 4 tasks).
Hypothesis 1 and 2: Effect o f PM  demands:
The next set of analyses looked at hypotheses 1 and 2, which were concerned with the 
effect of PM task type and the mixed dual-intention condition on ongoing task 
performance. Mean error rates from each condition were subjected to a repeated measures
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MANOVA with the single variable of condition (baseline, TB PM, EB PM and mixed dual­
intention). This analysis yielded a main effect of condition, F(3,17)= 4.076, p=.024. 
Planned t tests revealed that the TB condition was significantly less accurate than the EB 
condition, (t(20) = 3.26, p=.002, one-tailed), and the mixed dual-intention condition was 
significantly less accurate than the EB condition, (t(20) = 2.6, p=.017, two-tailed). 
Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between baseline performance and any 
of the three PM conditions. The mean error rates are shown in Figure 4.8. and illustrate 
quite clearly the increased error rates in the TB and mixed dual-intention conditions, as 
well as the rather intriguing finding that EB PM produced better accuracy than baseline 
performance.
Figure 4.8. Mean error rates o f trials within PM different PM blocks - collapsed across 4 
ongoing tasks and single and dual intention blocks
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A MANOVA conducted on RTs with the single variable of condition showed no significant 
main effect, F(3,17), 2.68, p=.080. Although, there was a general linear pattern of RTs, as 
shown in Figure 4.9 .
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Figure 4.9. Mean RTs o f trials within PM different PM blocks -  collapsed across 4 ongoing
tasks and single and dual intention blocks
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H ypothesis 4: R eten tion  In terva ls
Further analyses were carried out on the mean RTs from the TB conditions in order to trace 
changes in RTs across the RIs. (The same analyses were performed with the error data (i.e. 
split across the RIs) but there were no significant results thus just the RTs are reported). 
The same procedure developed in experiment 5 was utilised to calculate the mean RTs for 
the three time bands of the RIs from the TB conditions. Recall that each participant may 
not necessarily have a mean RT for each ongoing task in each time band; this made it 
necessary to exclude different numbers of participants from the analyses below. There were 
three conditions that included TB RIs: the single TB PM condition, the dual-TB intention 
condition and the mixed dual-intention condition. The single intention condition is directly 
comparable to the no-clock condition of experiment 5 and will be considered first.
Single TB Intention Condition
The mean RTs for each time band of the single intention condition were submitted to a 
repeated measures MANOVA (with the levels of time band: 1,2,3). There was no 
significant main effect of time band, F(2,l 1)= .751, p=.494. Nevertheless, there was a hint 
of the general slowing pattern found in experiment 5.
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Dual TB Intention Condition
An identical MANOVA was carried out with the mean RTs from the dual-intention 
condition for the short RI responses (i.e. the PM 1 responses for the 30 second 
instructions). This yielded a marginally significant main effect of time band, F(2,7)= 4.703, 
p=.051, and a significant linear trend, F(l,8) = 6.955, p=.030. (It was not possible to enter 
the data from the PM 2 responses of this condition into an MANOVA because only 2 
participants had data from all the ongoing tasks in all 3 time bands).
Mixed Dual-Intention Condition
The data from participants who produced TB PM 1 responses in the mixed intention 
condition were submitted to the identical MANOVA. Although there was no main effect of 
time band, F(2,4)=3.948, p>.05, there was a significant linear trend, F(l,5) = 8.15, p=.036. 
However, the same analysis with the participants who produced TB PM 2 responses (i.e. 
approximately 2 minute RIs) yielded no significant main effects or linear trends, 
F(2,2)=.223, p=.>.05. Note the small number of participants entered into this latter analysis 
however.
PM  Task Performance
Again, the key issue with regards to PM performance is to ensure participants were 
carrying out the intentions correctly in each PM condition. The only measure useful for 
comparing between TB and EB based intentions is the total number of PM responses 
produced in each condition. Variance in the number of PM responses could account for 
differences in ongoing task performance between the conditions. To eliminate this 
explanation it is necessary to demonstrate the following:
1) That there were a similar total number of PM 1 responses in all the PM conditions.
2) That there were a similar total number of PM 2 responses in the dual intention 
conditions.
3) That there were a similar number of total PM 1 responses in the two counterbalanced 
versions of the mixed intention condition.
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4) That there were a similar number o f total PM 2 responses in the two counterbalanced 
versions of the mixed intention condition.
Mean Number o f  PM  Responses, Length o f  Retention Intervals and Correctly Identified EB 
Targets
The number of PM responses each participant generated during the PM conditions was 
recorded. In the EB PM conditions a correct response was included if participants 
responded immediately to the target event, correctly inhibiting the response to the ongoing 
task. From these data, a score was calculated that represents the percentage of first time 
correctly identified target events. The means and standard deviations for the TB and EB 
PM responses appear in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Mean number o f  P M  responses and length o f  retention intervals in each PM  
condition in experiment 6.
Condition Mean Number of PM 1 Responses
Mean Number of 
PM 2 Responses
Mean Length of 
Retention Intervals
Mean % of 
Identified Event 
Targets
Single TB 
N = 22 10.64 (SD =4.72) -
33.44 secs 
(SD =10.71) -
Single EB 
N = 22 11.23 (SD =1.82) - -
96.26% (SD= 10.07)
Dual TB
N = 22 9.5 (SD =4.81)
2.91 (SD =2.39)
PM 1 = 33.75 secs 
(SD =13.22)
PM 2 =  117.81 secs 
(SD =55.68)
-
Dual EB 
N = 22 11.55 (SD =2.39)
2.33 (SD =.483) -
PM 1 = 97.09%, 
(SD=6.84) 
PM 2 = 95.24%, 
(SD=14.37)
Mixed Intention 
PM 1 = TB 
PM2 -  EB 
N = 10
10.8 (SD =4.61) 2.4 (SD =1.07)
PM 1 = 34.43 secs 
(SD=14.75)
PM 2 = 92.78%, 
(SD=14.81)
Mixed Intention 
PM 1 = EB 
PM2 = TB 
N = 12
11.25 (SD =1.54) 2.5 (SD =1.45)
PM 2 = 138.93 secs, 
(SD=77.01)
PM 1 = 93.48%, 
(SD=13.03)
The total number of PM 1 responses were subjected to a 2 x 2 repeated measures 
MANOVA with PM task type (time/event) and number of intentions (single/dual) as the 
independent variables. There were no significant main effects and a non-significant
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interaction (number of intentions variable, F < 1), suggesting that the number of PM 1 
responses were comparable across the single and dual intention conditions. The total 
number of PM 2 responses were also subjected to a repeated measures MANOVA with the 
single variable of condition (dual TB intention, dual EB intention and mixed intention). 
This yielded a non-significant main effect (F < 1), indicating that participants PM 2 
responses were similar across conditions. Two paired sample t-tests were conducted to 
ensure the two counterbalanced versions o f the mixed intention condition generated 
comparable numbers of PM 1 and PM 2 responses. There was no statistically significant 
difference in the total number of PM1 responses in the two versions of the mixed intention 
condition, (p>.05). This same was true o f the total number of PM2 responses in the two 
versions, (p.>05). Finally, a comparison o f the mean length of the retention intervals of PM 
1 responses was considered between all TB conditions. Because of excluded participants 
and counterbalancing, only 10 participants in the mixed intention condition produced TB 
PM 1 responses so these participants’ RIs were compared. A repeated measures MANOVA 
with condition as the only factor (single TB intention, dual TB intention and mixed 
intention conditions) revealed a non-significant effect of condition on mean length of 
retention intervals of PM 1 responses, (F < 1). These results indicate that participants 
performed the PM tasks appropriately across the conditions, and indeed comparably across 
the conditions. Henceforth, PM performance is not considered as a possible explanation for 
ongoing task differences.
4.4.4. Discussion
The aim of the present experiment was to compare the recruitment of internally-guided 
controlled processes in TB PM tasks without the presentation of a clock and EB PM tasks, 
and to measure shared processing. To summarize the results: as hypothesised, participants 
were significantly less accurate in the TB PM conditions than in the EB conditions. In 
addition, participants were less accurate in the mixed dual intention condition compared to 
EB, but performance in this mixed condition was no worse than in the TB conditions. 
Participants did show numerically slower RTs in the mixed condition than any of the other 
conditions, but this was not significant. Moreover, as predicted, participants did not differ 
in their performance of the ongoing tasks in the single intention and dual intention 
conditions, when the intentions were o f the same type. Analyses demonstrated that PM
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performance was comparable across conditions, thus any changes in ongoing task 
performance cannot be attributed to differences in PM responses or RIs. In terms of 
changes in ongoing task performance across the RIs o f the TB PM responses, there was 
replication of the significant linear slowing as participants approached the PM response. 
However, the data did not always exhibit a statistically significant pattern of slowing.
Thus, the results of this experiment demonstrate that TB PM tasks without the presentation 
of a clock produce poorer ongoing task performance than EB PM tasks, supporting the first 
hypothesis and the hierarchy proposed in the introduction to this experiment. The 
interpretation of this cost is that the TB task is requiring conscious capacity for self- 
initiated processes, and thus taking resources away from the ongoing task. This 
interpretation is consistent with past research, which has shown increased impairment of 
PM performance in TB tasks compared to EB tasks in the elderly population (Einstein et 
al., 1995; Park et al., 1997; d’Ydewalle et al., 2001). Previous researchers have argued that 
the difference in performance o f TB PM tasks compared to EB PM is due to the absence of 
external cues, which induces increased dependency on self-initiated retrieval (Craik, 1986; 
Einstein et al., 1995). Clearly, in the TB conditions in this study participants had to rely 
heavily on internal cues, because of the absence of a clock. However, in this study -  for the 
very reason that there was no clock at all — the reduced accuracy could also be a result of 
loading on time estimation processes, given that time estimation requires at least some 
executive resources (Zakay & Block, 2004). I will consider this further below.
The second hypothesis concerned the effects of mixing TB and EB intentions. As 
discussed, current empirical evidence regarding the interference effects of mixing types of 
PM intentions is rather ambiguous. Moreover, theoretically there is little understanding of 
the shared mechanisms in TB and EB PM. For these reasons, a tentative hypothesis was 
proposed, which stated that poorer ongoing task performance is expected in the mixed 
intention condition compared to the other dual-intention conditions. The data showed that 
the mixed intention condition did not produce any slower or more inaccurate performance 
than the TB conditions (with the data collapsed across the single and dual intention 
conditions). This suggests that TB and EB PM are not loading on the same processes, at 
least for the tasks in this experiment. These data corroborate Cicogna and colleagues study 
who found no statistical difference in PM performance when mixing a TB PM task with an
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EB PM task -  although there was some slight non-significant reduction in PM performance 
in the mixed intention condition. They interpreted this slight interference as a sharing of 
attentional resources between cue detection, that is, strategic monitoring and time 
monitoring. There was also some evidence of shared processing from the pattern of RTs in 
this experiment, with a significant linear trend in RTs to the ongoing task. The data would 
suggest that it is the interaction o f strategic cue monitoring and time monitoring that creates 
this slight interference since other stages o f PM processing the mixed intention condition 
has in common with the dual intention conditions (e.g. encoding of two intentions, 
interruption of ongoing task).
However, this interpretation should be considered with caution for two reasons. Firstly, 
there were no significant RT differences between the TB and the mixed intention 
conditions. Furthermore, there were no significant differences in ongoing task performance 
between baseline and the EB PM conditions. According to previous research (Smith, 2003) 
impairments in ongoing task performance acts as index o f strategic processing used for the 
PM tasks. The implication here is that the EB PM tasks in this experiment were not 
drawing heavily on internally-controlled strategic processes, and instead participants were 
using automatic association mechanisms to achieve this PM task (e.g. McDaniel et al., 
1998, see Chapter 2, section 2.4.1.). This fits with the multi-process framework proposed 
by Einstein & McDaniel (2000) in which factors of the PM task and so forth affect the 
processes recruited. Several factors regarding the nature o f this EB task might encourage 
participants to use automatic processes rather than load strategic monitoring. For example, 
the event-cue frequency is veiy high, averaging at every 30 seconds, and is consistently the 
same event-cue (i.e. red or yellow task stimuli). Given this frequency and consistency the 
PM task may become habitual which lends itself to automatic processing (Einstein et al.,
1998). Moreover, the event-cue is specific; no categorical processing is required (e.g. make 
PM response to primary colours) which also increases PM performance because of easier 
recognition of the cues (and presumably reduces dependency on self-initiated processes) 
(Einstein et al., 1995; Ellis & Milne, 1996). If the EB PM task here is not depending 
heavily on self-initiated processes then this can explain the lack of interference in the mixed 
intention condition and why this condition produces ongoing task performance almost 
equivalent to just having a TB task. Nevertheless, the data still provides the necessary 
empirical support for the theoretical position that TB PM without a clock draws more
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heavily on self-initiated processing than EB PM. I would argue that this is likely to be the 
case even if the EB PM did require more controlled processing.
Thus, the suggestion is that there is only slight shared processing in the mixed intention 
condition because the EB PM task is relying on less attentionally demanding retrieval and 
maintenance processes. Interestingly, another line of evidence is available from this 
experiment to support this suggestion, this evidence stems from a cognitive model of time 
estimation, which I will now briefly review.
Prospective time estimation requires attentional resources, such that as the non-temporal 
information processing demands increase then time estimation becomes less accurate. 
Under conditions of high attentional load fewer time units can be processed and 
consequently, the duration of time is perceived as shorter (Block & Zakay, 1997; Pouthas & 
Perbal, 2004; Wearden, 2004; Zakay & Block, 2004). Employing prospective time 
estimation as a secondary task thus permits a good understanding of the attentional 
demands of the non-temporal task (Zakay & Block, 2004). That is, increasing non-temporal 
attentional load -  reduces length of time perceived -  and so shorter RIs are produced which 
can be measured and compared. This is perhaps intuitive with everyday life; if we are 
busily engaged in another task then we may misjudge our TB PM task (e.g. miss the 
seminar that is at 5pm) because the passage o f time feels shorter. The relevance for this 
study is that there were no significant differences in the mean length of RIs between the TB 
PM conditions, including the mixed PM conditions. In other words, participants did not 
produce shorter RIs in the mixed PM condition compared to the other TB PM conditions. 
In the mixed intention condition, they were able to process an equal number of time units. 
This suggests that indeed participants were carrying out the EB PM task with relatively 
non-attention demanding processes (although this does not imply that PM was achieved 
completely automatically e.g. self-initiated task switch requires executive resources as 
discussed in the previous Chapter), and can explain the lack of significant interference in 
the mixed intention condition.
The apparent lack of shared processing in the TB and EB PM tasks found in this study at 
first glance appears to conflict with the findings from neuroimaging studies (described in 
the introduction to experiment 5). Okuda et al., (2002) found similar activation patterns in
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TB PM without a clock and EB PM. In a later study, Okuda, Burgess & Frith (submitted) 
relate this PM imaging data to the Gateway Hypothesis (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.). 
Okuda, Burgess & Frith argued that in the earlier study the TB PM task without a clock and 
the EB PM task both activated rostro-lateral PFC because of the load on internal control 
processes in the former, and the switching between internal processes and the external 
stimuli in the latter. However, in the present experiment the evidence suggests the EB PM 
task is not making demands on internally-guided strategic control processes for retrieval but 
instead relying on the external cues to bring the intention to mind, perhaps because the 
nature of the cue was colour-based. Conversely, the TB PM task is still heavily recruiting 
self-initiated processes. As a result, according to this Gateway Hypothesis this can explain 
the lack of interference between the conditions, as there is slightly different neural 
mediation.
The results for the third hypothesis are quite clear and in line with the prediction. 
Performance on the ongoing tasks was not impaired further by adding a second PM 
intention of the same type. In other words, performance in the single intention condition 
was identical to that of the dual intention condition. These data also fit with Cicogna et al., 
(2005) who found that when a TB PM task shares a portion of the RI with another 
prospective task -  the overlap doesn’t generate an interference effect (in terms of 
performance of main PM task). Indeed, they found slight facilitation of the main TB PM 
task when participants had two TB PM intentions (although a slight decrease in the 
interpolated PM task). This also supports the participants reports from Morris’s (1992) 
naturalistic procedure, they maintained that remembering one intention can also remind 
them of another impending future (but unrelated) intention. Similarly, Kidder et al. (1997) 
found that participants performed better on a 12-interval condition (1 response every min) 
compared to a 6-interval condition (1 response every 2 mins). Other research has 
demonstrated that there is no effect o f cue set size or frequency (Ellis, Kvavilashvili, Milne, 
1999; Marsh et al., 2003), although participants can show practise effects. In the present 
experiment participants appeared to have used the same degree of strategic monitoring for 
the cue and the time for both sets of intentions. This is perhaps because both intentions 
were cued by the same stimuli in the EB task (i.e. the colour of the ongoing task) and the 
TB intention only required the calibration of one internal clock (i.e. 30 seconds and 2 
minutes only required one psychological clock to operate, see Cicogna et al., 2005). The
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implication is that imposing a second PM intention of the same type does not hinder 
participants’ PM performance or ongoing task performance.
A final aim of the present study was to replicate the findings of experiment 5, which 
demonstrated a linear slowing o f RTs to the ongoing task across the RIs in the no-clock 
condition. As argued previously, any slowing of RTs as participants approach a PM 
response may reflect voluntary preparatory task-switching processes (Arrington & Logan., 
2004, 2005). After all, the pattern clearly cannot be attributed to increased clock-checking. 
These data partly replicates these findings. Certainly, in some of the RIs of the TB 
intentions the RTs to the ongoing tasks did follow a significant linear pattern -  slowing 
down across the RI. This supports the framework for TB PM task-switching outlined in the 
general discussion of Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the data also presents inconsistency. RTs 
from the RIs of the single TB intention condition, although showing the equivalent pattern 
numerically, did not show a statistical linear slowing. Similarly, the RTs from the longer 
RIs (i.e. 2 minutes) did not follow this pattern. This could cast doubt on the interpretation 
that these RTs reflect preparatory task-switch processes. However, the number of 
participants entered into these analyses was greatly reduced because of missing data, 
undoubtedly minimising the statistical power available. Moreover, the longer RIs (i.e. 2 
minutes) contained within them the shorter RIs (i.e. 30 seconds) it is thus conceivable that 
the cycle of the RTs within the short RIs disrupted the pattern of RTs across the longer RIs. 
As has become apparent, the design of the present experiment with four ongoing tasks was 
not ideally suited to trace fluctuations in RTs across the RIs. Future studies need to address 
this inconsistency by using a single ongoing task, and indeed single-intention conditions 
only. Further reasons for this apparent inconsistency in RT data across the RIs are 
discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.2.3.
4.5. Summary
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the importance of internally-guided control 
processes in the successful execution o f PM tasks. The assumption that TB PM tasks must 
rely more heavily on these processes is challenged by the results from experiment 5. In 
place of this assumption, I have offered a theory that maintains there is a hierarchy of 
dependency on self-initiated processes and this hierarchy crosses the TB and EB
169
distinction. Experiment 5 illustrates this point more precisely by demonstrating that a TB 
PM task in which the presentation o f the clock is constantly available generates few 
demands on self-initiated processing, as indexed by ongoing task performance. Experiment 
6 provides further support for the hierarchy by demonstrating that self-initiated processes 
have a more important role in TB PM tasks in which the clock is absent, compared to an 
EB PM task. The implications of this theory are evaluated in Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.
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Chapter 5
Individual Differences in Internally-guided Control Processes in a 
Healthy Population
5.1. Self-Regulation & Multitasking Revisited
The present chapter aimed to investigate individual differences in the internally-guided 
cognitive control systems (self-regulation) of the healthy population. Recall from Chapter 1 
that frontal patients can demonstrate deficits in this system, leading to self-regulatory or 
strategy application disorder (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Goldstein et al., 1993; Levine et 
al., 1998, 2000; Burgess et al., 2000). Shallice & Burgess (1991) first describe Strategy 
Application Disorder (SAD) in three patients who showed inaccurate plan formation or 
modification, faulty marker creation or triggering and/or poor evaluation and goal 
articulation. All processes linked to the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS). Levine et 
al. (1998, 1999, 2002) discuss their frontal patients with SAD or self-regulatory disorder as 
an inability to regulate behaviour according to internal goals. Impairments in these internal 
control systems become most apparent in ill-structured tasks because there are a variety of 
different approaches to these tasks, such that participants must decide for themselves how 
they allocate their efforts (Alderman et al., 2003). The use of ill-structured tasks -  or 
multiple subgoal tasks - with focal lesion and TBI patients has now produced considerable 
research attention (e.g. Bechara et al., 1994; Whyte et al., 1996; Goel & Grafman., 1997; 
Robertson et al., 1997; Schwartz et al., 1998; 1999). The application of these 
neuropsychological tasks to the healthy population is, however, minimal. Yet the use of 
these tasks seems entirely warranted to determine the cognitive processes that contribute to 
their success in the healthy population. The experiments described in this Chapter were 
developed for this aim and utilised modifications of the multitasking tests described in 
Chapter 1. I will briefly revisit the empirical and theoretical background to multitasking 
before discussing the new Advanced Multitasking Test.
The cognitive and neuroanatomical bases of multitasking are discussed in detail in Chapter 
1 section 1.3.1. The current evidence seems to suggest three key components are vital to 
successful multitasking: retrospective memory (RM), planning and 3) intentionality (i.e.
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PM) (Burgess et al., 2000). Patients with lesions to different areas of the PFC appeared to 
have slightly different impairments on the multitasking test. Damage to the left anterior and 
posterior cingulates were associated with impairment to the RM aspects of the test, right 
DLPFC damage produced deficiencies in the planning component, and rostral PFC damage 
gave rise to difficulties in task switching and plan and rule following -  the intentionality 
aspects. The suggestion is therefore that there is a degree o f independence between these 
components contributing to multitasking. The argument that the set of processes 
contributing to multitasking are relatively circumscribed is a core feature of the following 
experiments (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.1. for further evidence).
5.2. Self-Regulation in the Healthy Population
As Burgess et al., (2000) describe, multitasking is a ubiquitous behaviour in everyday life. 
The workplace is the most obvious example in which people consistently switch between 
tasks, are interrupted, delay intentions and hold daily (or hourly) self-determined targets 
(e.g. Einstein et al., 2003). Despite this, research investigating healthy participants’ 
performance on these tests is inadequate, with this population primarily only appearing as 
controls for the patient studies. For example, Alderman et al., (2003) created a simplified 
version of the Multiple Errands Test (MET-SV) for use as a clinical tool. They tested a 
control group (range 21-58, mean =29.2) on the task and found generally good performance 
in this group (89% of controls made few errors i.e. less than 7). Scores on the NART-R (an 
IQ measure) were not significantly related to errors on the MET-SV in this group, although 
there were significant age correlations. The authors argue that the “MET-SV appears to 
have independence from  the potentially biasing effects o f  general intellectual ability, 
familiarity with the environment and gender” (p. 40). So how did their performance relate 
to everyday life? Correlations between the DEX questionnaire (a measure of everyday 
executive abilities) and the MET-SV were non-significant, but perhaps this is unsurprising 
given that the DEX was designed for use with brain-injured populations (although see 
Chan, 2001). Moreover, most of the control group performed close to ceiling on the MET- 
SV, producing little variance in performance. Other measures relating performance to 
everyday life were not included.
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Levine et al., (2000) also tested a healthy control group as a match for their TBI patients. A 
strategy measure from their R-SAT correlated with a questionnaire measuring psychosocial 
outcomes, the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP), in the patient group. Patients with low 
strategy scores responded to SIP items that reflected impaired functioning in social and 
occupational situations. The corresponding correlations were not significant in the healthy 
group but this questionnaire also considers physical health as part of the assessment, again 
perhaps deeming it unsuitable for the healthy population. Thus, the use of inappropriate 
measures for the healthy population in these studies, combined with the ceiling 
performances, limits the conclusions that can be drawn about the processes that contribute 
to, or correlate with, multitasking in this group. Therefore, despite the ubiquity of 
multitasking few empirical studies have attempted to evaluate the processing characteristics 
in the healthy population.
Performance on multitasking tests appears to be unconnected to performance on other 
executive tasks and IQ tasks, in terms of cognitive processes and neural mediation in the 
frontal patient groups (Burgess & Shallice, 1991; Goldstein et al., 1993; von Cramon & von 
Cramon, 1994; Crepeau et al., 1996; Duncan et al., 1995; Alderman et al., 2003). An 
important question then is to what extent this is true within the healthy population. 
Alderman et al., (2003) as described above, provided some evidence that IQ and 
multitasking are relatively unrelated in a control population. Thus, if multitasking loads on 
a relatively discrete set of processes, as Burgess et al. (2000) posit, then these tests are a 
possible novel set of indicators. A range of individual differences can be expected on these 
sorts of task (e.g. Morrin, Law & Pellegrino, 1994, McFarlane & Laratello, 2002), which 
might offer an insight into: “a person’s ability to regulate behaviour according to internal 
goals” (Levine et al., 2002, p. 451), as opposed to the patients’ inability to do just that. 
Thus, extrapolating from the neuropsychological data somewhat, performance on these 
tasks in the healthy population might relate to skills such as time management, avoiding 
distractions, planning and remembering intentions (Burgess, 2000; Burgess et al., 2000). 
All skills which are crucial for everyday life. Experiments 7 and 8 were therefore also 
designed to investigate the relationship between multitasking performance and real life 
outcomes. Thus, providing a direct test of Burgess (2000) proposition that multitasking 
tests require a specific set of processes which are “at the very heart o f  competency in 
everyday life ” p. 279).
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5.3. Experiment 7
The design adopted in this experiment was similar to an approach taken by Levine et al., 
(1998) in their study that compared patient groups and controls on a newly developed 
Strategy Application Test. Firstly, they administered an ill-structured multitasking test to 
their experimental groups. Secondly, they evaluated the contribution of processes 
secondary to strategy application/multitasking (e.g. RM) to their multitasking test and 
finally, they calculated correlations between performance on the multitasking test and other 
cognitive measures. Accordingly, these procedures were also present in experiment 7:
1) A multitasking test was administered to a group o f healthy participants.
2) The contribution of secondary processes to multitasking was evaluated by measuring 
rule recall before and after administering the multitasking test.
3) Other cognitive tasks and real life outcome measures were administered to determine the 
relationship of these measures with multitasking.
In order to avoid the ceiling effects that healthy populations usually obtain on ill-structured 
tasks (e.g. Manly et al., 2002; Alderman et al., 2003) modifications were made to the 
Greenwich Test (Burgess et al., 2000). The development of this ‘Advanced Multitasking 
Test’ will now be described.
5.3.1. Advanced Multitasking Test (AMT)
As described in Chapter 1, section 1.3.1, Burgess et al., (2000) proposed the following 
criteria that comprise a multitasking scenario:
1) Many tasks
2) Interleaving required
3) One task at a time
4) Interruptions and unexpected outcomes
5) Delayed intentions
6) Differing task characteristics
7) Self-determined targets
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8) N o immediate feedback
Thus, to create an advanced multitasking test, two new components were added to the basic 
Greenwich Test design. Firstly, an interruption task was added. Interruptions are specified 
as one of the key features o f multitasking and are a common feature in everyday life, such 
as in the workplace (e.g. Hudson et al., 2002). An interruption can increase demands on 
self-regulatory processes, for example suspension of the ongoing task, resumption of the 
ongoing task and modification of plans (Zijlstra et al., 1999). The second component added 
was an extra PM load. Multitasking tests have a PM element (Burgess et al., 2000) and thus 
by adding an extra PM task overall task complexity was increased.
5.3.2. The Effects of Interruptions
The effects of interruptions, although rarely touched in the neuropsychological literature, 
are studied in other research contexts, such as in the occupational and human computer 
interaction fields. I will briefly review this research in order to address design implications 
for the AMT.
Studies in these contexts have demonstrated that interruptions can be disruptive to 
performance of the ongoing task, and this has applications for the design of computer 
interfaces. For example, Gillie and Broadbent (1989) describe a study in which participants 
were interrupted during a computer task and report reduced ongoing task performance 
when the interruption task was similar and complex. Consistent with this, Adamczyk & 
Bailey (2004) showed that a peripheral task that interrupts an ongoing task has a greater 
impact on performance of the ongoing tasks, than if the same peripheral task is presented in 
between execution of the ongoing tasks. This effect was attributed to the reduced mental 
workload that occurs within ongoing task boundaries (Miyata & Norman, 1986). Both of 
these experiments utilised several ongoing tasks, mirroring elements of the multitasking 
tests (also see Edwards & Gronlund, 1998). Thus, to increase difficulty of the multitasking 
test the interruption task was presented exactly half way through the AMT, so that the 
participants were fully interrupted. Moreover, the instructions forced participants to carry 
out the interruption task immediately, as McFarlane (2002) has shown that forcing people 
to immediately engage in the interruption task seems to be more difficult than allowing
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them to self-determine when to engage in the new task. In addition, although the 
interruption task was relatively simple to ensure participants understood instructions (and 
reduce the interruption lag, the time between receiving the interruption task instructions and 
beginning the interruption task -  see Law et al., 2004), it was different from any of the 
subtasks in the AMT. There is some controversy over whether interruption tasks that are 
similar or dissimilar to the ongoing task are more disruptive (see McFarlane & Latorella, 
2002 for review). During the AMT, however, individual participants will be performing 
different subtasks when the interruption task is presented. To control this variable then, the 
interruption task was designed to be completely different from all the subtasks. Dissimilar 
tasks may be more disruptive than similar tasks because of increased switch costs (Speier et 
al., 1999).
Finally, the interruption task was designed to be relatively open-ended, in order to load 
further self-regulatory (i.e. self-determined) processes (Burgess et al., 2000; see also Law et 
al., 2004). This type of interruption task also contrasted with Manly et al.’s interruptions 
(2002). Their study demonstrated that interjecting brief interrupting auditory alerts within a 
multitasking test improved the performance of a group of head injury patients. However, 
these alerts did not require participants to switch tasks. Instead, participants had been 
instructed to use them as a moment in which they could assess their current task 
performance. This was quite a different kind of interruption. Nevertheless, there is other 
evidence that interruptions may not be disruptive. A study by Law et al. (2004) should be 
mentioned at this point. They took a very similar approach to creating a multitasking test 
suitable for the healthy population but published their study after this experiment had been 
completed. They too introduced an interruption task to a basic Greenwich Test design, 
based on the same rationale. Participants were interrupted with a picture-naming task whilst 
they performed the subtasks. Participants were in one of 4 groups: 1) not interrupted, 2) 
early interruption (after 3 mins), 3) late interruption (after 7 mins) and 4) early and late 
interruption. There was no evidence in their study of the interruptions impairing ongoing 
task performance; indeed there was a hint of participants completing ongoing task items 
faster when given an interruption. Their conclusion that multitasking induces a difference 
cognitive demand to an externally-cued interruption task is consistent with many of the 
arguments in this thesis. Other studies showing facilitation of the ongoing task thanks to an
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interruption have also previously been reported (e.g. Speier et al., 1999; Zijlstra et al.,
1999)
However, Law et al., report only two measures from their multitasking test: an efficiency 
score (the number of items worth more points that were completed as a proportion of the 
number of items completed) and the number of items completed overall. Neither of these 
measures was affected by the interruption. Other measures may have revealed disruption 
however. Law and colleagues do not report, for instance, how many of their participants 
attempted all of the subtasks or followed their plans. It may be the intentionality aspects of 
the multitasking tests that are affected by interruptions based on the following rationale. 
The Zeigamik effect (1927; 1938) is a well-established phenomenon in which participants 
recall interrupted tasks more successfully than completed tasks. This explanation proposed 
is that there is increased activation for the suspended task during the interruption 
(Zeigamik, 1938; Lewin, 1951). This increased activation may interfere with the increased 
activation for PM intentions, as conceived in the intention superiority effect (e.g. Goschke 
& Kuhl, 1993; Altmann & Trafton, 2002). Einstein et al., (2003) demonstrated that even a 
15-second interruption was detrimental to PM performance, and the authors argued the 
impact of the task-switch makes it difficult to ‘reactivate’ all of the task demands on 
finishing the interruption task. The effect of the interruption on PM performance was 
assessed within the present experiment by examining the impact of the interruption on the 
PM slide task.
The complexity of the task may also affect whether the interruption task has a positive or 
negative effect (Speier et al., 1999). Increasing complexity of the ongoing tasks can 
increase the disruptiveness of the interruption task. The AMT comprises an extra element 
of complexity compared to the Law et al. test, because an extra PM task was also included, 
for this reason I expected the interruption to make the AMT more difficult and produce a 
wide range of performances (see McFarlane & Larotello, 2002 for discussion on individual 
differences).
5.3.3. Prospective Memory Load
‘Intentionality’ is a key component in multitasking tests (Burgess et al., 2000, see Chapter 
1). For example, participants must remember to switch between the subtasks, they must
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remember to follow their plan and so forth. Thus, to create the AMT increasing the load on 
these PM processes could increase task complexity. A TB PM task was added for this 
purpose. Participants were asked to write down the number and letter from a slideshow 
presented on a large screen every 30 seconds. They were informed that the number and 
letter change every 5 seconds. This loads on PM but also mimics some real life situations in 
which one might have to monitor for a certain time or event to arise whilst in a multitasking 
situation.
5.3.4. Other Design Elements of the AMT
Following Levine et al. (1998) the influences o f extraneous variables on multitasking 
performance was controlled through: 1) Item difficulty; Levine and colleagues argue for 
simple subtasks in order to reduce the possibility that attentional capacity is directed away 
from strategy application and towards the tasks themselves. The subtasks used in the AMT 
were very straightforward for this population. 2) Measuring participants’ recall of 
instructions and participants’ understanding o f the task demands. This was achieved by 
including cued and free rule recall measures prior to beginning the AMT and after finishing 
the test. It was also ensured that instructions for the AMT were available throughout the 
test.
5.3.5. Cognitive and Real Life Measures
RM is considered an essential component of multitasking (Burgess et al., 2000) and this 
was tested by including a word list recall test. I predicted that RM would correlate 
specifically with PM measures from the AMT, because RM is necessary for PM, although 
not sufficient (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). RM is less crucial for strategy application 
(Levine et al., 1998), except to recall the rules, and thus no relationship, or a very weak 
relationship, was expected between RM and the strategy score from the AMT. To test if the 
AMT is measuring a set of processes different to IQ, as suggested by the multitasking 
literature, the Raven’s Advanced Matrices were also administered (Raven, 1976) with the 
prediction that participants’ scores from this would not correlate with the intentionality 
scores of the AMT. However, there may be positive correlations between IQ scores and 
other AMT measures, because there is evidence of involvement of lateral PFC in both 
Raven’s (Gray et al., 2003) and planning (Unterrainer et al., 2004). Finally, the real life
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measures administered were relatively exploratory and opportunistic. Firstly, academic 
qualifications were gathered from participants since multitasking processes are likely to be 
essential to examination success, specifically the processes o f planning, RM and PM. 
Similarly, because multitasking performance has been related to everyday planning and 
organisation (Burgess et al., 1998; Alderman et al., 2003; Knight et al., 2003), at least in 
clinical populations, participants also filled in a questionnaire concerning everyday time 
management skills and abilities, as well as lists of hobbies and interests. Time management 
entails prioritising goals, plus planning and scheduling tasks accordingly to the available 
time and resources (Lakein, 1973; Francis-Smythe & Robertson, 1999). Positive 
correlations were predicted between these questionnaires and scores from the AMT. 
Finally, a questionnaire concerning the participants’ life satisfaction was also administered 
as a general life outcome measure.
5.3.6. Summary of Hypotheses
Performance on the AMT 
Hypothesis 1:
The extra task demands of this new AMT is expected to increase task difficulty by making 
more demands on self-regulatory processes, and thus produce a wide range of performances 
in the healthy population.
AMT Performance and Relation to Cognitive Measures 
Hypothesis 2:
RM is necessary for PM, although not sufficient (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), so the 
hypothesis is that there will be a small positive correlation between PM scores of the AMT 
and RM test scores.
Hypothesis 3:
It was hypothesised that there would be a positive correlation between Raven’s and the 
strategy scores of the AMT, but not the scores that represent the intentionality aspect of the 
AMT.
AMT Performance and Relation to Real Life Outcomes 
Hypothesis 4:
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Based on the clinical and lesion evidence, it was hypothesised that multitasking 
performance would correlate with measures of life outcomes.
5.3.7. Method
Participants & Design
Participants were 83 undergraduate psychology students at University College London. 
Their mean age was 19.26 (SD = 1.26) and 11 were male, 72 female. All participants were 
fluent English speakers. This was a correlation design so all participants were subjected to 
the same procedure and tasks as described below.
General Procedure
Participants completed the tests, including the AMT, in one session. The tests were 
completed in the following sequence: immediate word list recall, Raven's matrices, the 
AMT, delayed word list recall and the questionnaires. The entire set of tests took 
approximately one hour 25 minutes. The description and the procedure for the AMT will be 
described first, followed by the other measures.
AMT Procedure
Participants were provided with all instructions for the AMT and supplied with all the 
handouts before beginning. After an opportunity to ask questions about any aspect of the 
AMT, the handout of the rules were briefly recollected whilst the rule recall tests were 
administered. Upon completion, participants were then given the rule sheets back and were 
allocated 4 minutes to look over them to establish answers to any questions they had not 
known. Participants then began the AMT. The same procedure was performed with the rule 
recall tests after the 15 minutes had elapsed, but after this all handouts and answer sheets 
were collected in before beginning the delayed word list recall.
Materials
Advanced Multitasking Test -  Materials & Procedure
Three basic subtasks, modified from the Greenwich Task into pen and pencil tests, 
comprised the AMT, along with the interruption task and the PM slide task. Participants 
were given 15 minutes to complete the entire test. Thus, the AMT consisted of several
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handouts for the participants: the list of rules for the whole task (16 rules), an answer 
booklet (10 sheets of lined paper), and the task stimuli. The time-based PM slide task, timer 
and overhead projector screen were visible to all participants at all times at the front of the 
room so participants could just glance up to monitor the time and check the slides.
The Subtasks of the AMT
The ongoing subtasks were chosen on the basis o f pilot studies showing that each task took 
a similar amount of time to complete, although they did vary slightly in difficulty. The 
subtask stimuli consisted of the three tasks separated into sets A and B, each set containing 
100 items on two pages. All pages were clearly labelled with the task number and the 
alphabetical set.
As with the other multitasking tests, there were far more items available than could be 
completed in the 15 minutes. This required participants to take a strategic approach to 
performing the task.
Task 1) Word Association - Each A and B set comprised 100 simple word items e.g. 
coffee. Participants were asked to write down the first word that came to mind on reading 
each word. They were informed that there were no right or wrong answers, but that they 
should just write down the first word that comes to mind.
Task 2) Mirror reading -  Each A and B set contained 100 word items which were written 
back to front e.g. REWOLF. Participants were asked to identify the words that were 
presented as they appeared in a mirror.
Task 3) Where would you find a ...?  -  Each A and B set consisted of 100 questions 
beginning with the phrase ‘Where would you find a ..?’ e.g. where would you find a 
stapler? Participants were asked to write down an appropriate answer to the question. They 
were informed there was more than one right answer.
As in the Greenwich Test there were certain rules attached to completing the AMT. These 
were presented as a handout to participants and comprised the following:
AMT Rules:
1) Score as many points as possible by answering items of the subtasks.
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2) Attempt parts of both sets of the three subtasks (i.e. A and B).
3) Earlier items are worth more points than later ones in all subtasks.
4) Subtasks and items within the subtasks can be completed in any order.
5) There is one constraint on this: you cannot shift from set A of one subtask to set B of the 
same subtask or vice versa.
Rule Recall Tests:
To check rule understanding o f the AMT two rule recall tests were administered. A free 
rule recall instructed participants to write down as many of the rules they could recall as 
possible in two minutes, this free recall was only included to aid rule learning. 
Subsequently, participants were given a cued rule recall. Participants answered nine 
questions about specific key rules (see Appendix A) and the scores for this are reported. 
Before beginning, participants were encouraged to read over any rules they were uncertain 
of. In addition, the rule sheet was available to participants throughout the 15 minutes of the 
test. At the end of the AMT the participants underwent the same cued rule recall.
Prospective Memory (PM) Slide Task:
A powerpoint presentation, displayed on a screen visible to all participants, consisted of 
180 slides with one letter and one number on each slide chosen pseudo-randomly e.g. A7. 
Each slide was set to appear for five seconds. A digital timer was also projected on the 
screen and counted down from 15 minutes displaying minutes and seconds (due to an error 
in the programme the timer stopped with 59 seconds to go, this was accounted for in the 
scoring). Participants were instructed to write down the letter and number that were on 
display at each 30 second point. Importantly, it was emphasised that they should complete 
this task throughout the entire 15 minutes of the test.
Interruption Task:
The interruption task was presented on an overhead projector at 7 minutes 40 seconds (after 
the 30 second point so that participants could complete the PM slide task). This task 
consisted of the presentation of the names of forty famous people in a list e.g. the current 
U.K. Prime Minister, Tony Blair. Pilot studies showed that they were easily recognisable 
names. Again, though it was emphasised that there was no right or wrong answers. Due to 
the nature of the interruption task, no details were provided at the beginning of the test
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about this task. The objective of the task was for each participant to choose and write down 
the ten people from the list that they would most like to meet, and then do the same for a 
relative (e.g. mother or father). This was explained within 20 seconds of putting the list on 
display. Participants were told to carry out the interruption task immediately and then return 
to the multitasking test (with no instructions regarding which subtask they should return 
to).
Measures Derived from the AMT
A range of scores was calculated for the AMT. These scores were based on dependent 
variables from previous multitasking tests (Levine et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2000) and 
reflect the most strategic approach participants can take. The optimal strategy on this test 
was to score the most points whilst breaking the fewest rules. This could be achieved as 
follows: by attempting all sets of the 3 subtasks as instructed, by obeying the order rule and 
completing an equal amount o f items in each o f the sets of the 3 subtasks (as early items are 
worth most).
Thus, the measures were as follows:
• Pre test cued rule recall -  total correct rules recalled out of 9.
• Post test cued rule recall - total correct rules recalled out of 9.
• 1 pt for attempting both sets o f 3 subtasks.
• Number of subtasks attempted.
• Number of rule breaks.
• Number of subtask switches.
• Percentage Opt Score -  see below.
• Total number of items completed.
Scoring of the Percentage Opt Score
This represents the deviance from the optimal percentage of items that should have been 
completed per subtask set. The score was calculated by finding the number of items 
completed in each subtask (e.g. word assoc. A) and dividing this by the total number of 
items completed. This produced a percentage deviance from the optimal number of items 
for each set. Minus signs were then removed and all the task deviance scores were totalled
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to create the overall Percentage Opt Score. It takes into account the number of items each 
individual completed. Thus, 0 represents the most strategic time allocation for each 
participant and thus the larger the score from this -  the poorer the performance (in strategic 
terms). (See Levine et al., 1998, 2000; Burgess, 2000; Manly et al., 2002 for similar scoring 
system.)
PM Task Score
• Score out of 28 for total number of times reported correct slide.
Interruption Task Score
The interruption task itself was a straightforward list-making exercise, thus there was no 
accuracy measure. However, what is a measure o f interest is whether participants continued 
on the PM slide task whilst carrying out the interruption task as discussed in the 
introduction. Thus, the score was simply:
• 1 pt for continuing PM task during the interruption task
Other Cognitive Measures
Materials and Procedure 
Word List Recall
As a measure of retrospective memory two word list recalls were administered to 
participants. Sixteen words were verbally presented at the beginning of the testing session 
(See Appendix A). Participants were then asked to recall as many of the words as possible 
within two minutes. The first recall immediately followed the presentation of the words; the 
delayed recall was administered at the end o f the series of tests (approximately 45 minutes 
later).
• Participants were scored on the number of words recalled in the delay condition (out 
of 16).
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (1976)
To assess fluid intelligence the Advanced Raven’s Matrices were administered to 
participants using an overhead projector. The test is thought to be culturally fair and with
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good reliability (Raven, 2000). Each problem was printed onto separate acetates so that 
they could be presented one at a time. The first seven Raven’s problems were presented for 
ten seconds each and problems eight to twelve were presented for twenty seconds. The 
participants indicated the correct option on an answer sheet.
• Participants received a score out o f twelve for the number of correct problems 
solved.
Other Measures -  Real Life Outcomes 
Materials and Procedure
Satisfaction with Life Questionnaire (Diener et al., 1985):
This consists of five statements concerning global life satisfaction. Participants answer 
using a 7 point Likert type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Studies 
suggest the scale has good internal consistency and reliability (Diener et al., 1985) and 
positive test-retest results (Diener et al., 1985, Pavot and Diener, 1993). Pivot et al. (1991) 
report the scale as suitable for a wide range of applications and age groups and as showing 
a high degree of convergence between peer and self ratings of life satisfaction.
• The sum of the five statement ratings produces one overall life satisfaction score.
Academic Qualifications Questionnaire
Details of academic qualifications were collected. Points for graded qualifications were 
then calculated according to standardised systems in the U.K. educational system. GCSE’s, 
half GCSE’s and O-Levels were scored according to the Department of Education 
guidelines. As Levels and A-Levels were scored according to the UCAS points system (see 
Appendix A).
Leading to 3 measures:
• Total qualification points (A levels, AS levels, GCSEs, half GCSEs or O-levels).
• Total A and AS level points.
• Total GCSE and half GCSE points.
Time Management and Hobbies Questionnaire
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Six 5-point Likert-style questions on time management were developed for use with this 
sample (see Appendix A). These included questions on use of strategies for time 
management (diary keeping, revision plans, meeting deadlines etc). Participants’ responses 
were calculated by summing their responses (1-5) for each question. A higher score on this 
questionnaire represents superior time management skills. Participants were also asked to 
list their hobbies and interests that they regularly participate in as part of their everyday 
lives.
This questionnaire therefore produced two measures:
•  Total points on time management questions.
•  Total number of hobbies.
5.3.8. Results
5.3.8.1. Performance on the AMT 
Hypothesis 1:
The hypothesis stated that the extra task demands of this new AMT would increase task 
difficulty by making more demands on self-regulatory processes, and thus produce a wide 
range of performances in the healthy population. Table 5.1. displays the descriptive 
statistics on the range of AMT scores.
Recall of Test Rules
Participants were tested with 9 cued questions and a free rule recall at the beginning of the 
test and at the end of the test. After the first rule recall tests participants were provided with 
some time to reread the instructions, which were also available throughout the test. 
Unsurprisingly therefore rule recall was very high, with 75 out of 83 (90.36%) of 
participants correctly answering 7, 8 or 9 questions before beginning the test and 81 out of 
83 (97.6%) scoring 7, 8 or 9 at the end o f the test. Table 5.1. displays the mean scores for 
both of these measures. Participants recalled an average of 4.87 (SD=1.62) rules before 
beginning the AMT and 5.89 (SD=1.59) upon finishing, on the free rule recall tests.
186
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics o f  the AMT measures.
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Total subtasks attempted 83 1 6 4.87 1.64
Total rule breaks 83 0 3 .20 .62
Total number o f switches during test 83 0 10 3.96 2.24
Percentage Opt Score 83 2.15 166.68 64.23 45.88
Total number of times reported a slide 
for PM task
83 1 70 22.40 11.41
Total number of times reported correct 
slide on PM task
83 0 28 17.39 6.93
Total percentage of slides correctly 
reported
83 0 100 62.09% 24.74
Total number of subtask items completed 83 33 202 87.05 28.14
Pre test cued rule recall 83 4 9 8.04 1.11
Post test cued rule recall 83 5 9 8.54 .77
As Table 5.1. illustrates there was a wide range of performance, with no hint of ceiling 
effects. A key measure -  the Percentage Opt Score -  which reflects participants’ strategic 
time allocation to the test, ranges from a number extremely close to 0 (an almost perfect 
strategy) to a much larger deviation score. The PM slide task also showed variable 
performance, ranging from 0 to 28 slides correctly reported, with a mean of 62.09% 
correctly reported. Moreover, only 59% of participants attempted all six tasks, another key 
measure of previously used multitasking tests (see Figure 5.1.). Rule-breaking was less 
common, however, only 10 participants (12%) broke order rules (see Figure 5.2.). Finally, 
the total number of items completed reflects a crude measure of speed, and again 
performances spanned a broad spectrum from 33-202 items completed.
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Figure 5.1. Rule breaks frequency chart (subtask order rule breaks)
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The Effect of the Interruption
The effect of the interruption on AMT performance can be assessed indirectly. Firstly, the 
mean percentage of participants who continued reporting the PM slides during the 
interruption task was of particular interest. Only 50.6% of participants performed the PM 
slide task during the interruption task, an interesting finding given the emphasis on the 
instruction that the PM task was to be performed throughout the 15 minutes. The number of
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participants who reported any PM slides correctly during the interruption task was even 
lower (38 participants reported at least one slide correctly = 45.78%). Another interesting 
aspect of the interruption is to consider its effect on participants’ plans. This can only be 
considered indirectly as there was no plan measure. However, consider that participants are 
unaware that the interruption task will be introduced before beginning the task. Once the 
interruption has occurred, a strategic reaction would be to increase the number of subtask 
switches post interruption to ensure all subtasks are attempted. Only 8 participants had, by 
the beginning of the interruption task (i.e. mid point), attempted both sets of all 3 subtasks. 
Yet, the mean percentage of subtask switches made pre-interruption was 60.18% 
(SD=27.38) compared to the mean percentage of subtask switches made after the 
interruption, which was 32.69% (SD=22.43). A Paired sample t test revealed that this 
difference was significant (t=5.7, df=82, p<.001). Thus, although the opposite pattern might 
be expected, that more subtask switches would occur post-interruption to compensate for 
lost time, participants actually switched more often pre-interruption. Another measure of 
post-interruption behaviour, following Law et al., (2004), indicated that 48% of participants 
continued on the same subtask immediately following the interruption. This is a 
considerably smaller percentage than the 88% reported by Law and colleagues.
Correlations between the AMT scores were also calculated since previous research has 
implicated PM processes in multitasking and planning. Thus, of particular interest were the 
relationships between the PM slide task score (correct number of slides reported) and the 
other AMT scores (Percentage Opt Score, rule breaks and number of subtasks attempted). 
Surprisingly, Spearman Rho correlations revealed no significant relationships between 
these measures. The correct number of slides reported showed faint signs of a significant 
positive relationship with total tasks attempted (coefficient = .145, p =.09, N = 83), the total 
number of switches during the test (coefficient = .161, p=.07, N =83) and a significant 
negative relationship with the Percentage Opt score (coefficient = -.155, p =.08, N = 83).
5.3.8.2. Relationship o f AMT Scores to Other Cognitive Measures 
Hypothesis 2:
The relationship of multitasking scores to RM processes was investigated by calculating 
Spearman Rho correlations between the AMT measures and the RM measures. Table 5.2.
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displays the correlation coefficients between the key AMT measures and scores from the 
two RM tests. Generally, the immediate word list recall and the delayed word list recall 
showed the same pattern of correlations with the AMT measures. Modest relationships 
were found between these tasks and the number of subtasks attempted, the number of 
subtask switches, the number of correct slides reported on the PM task and the total number 
of subtask items completed. However, the delayed word list recall also showed a modest 
correlation with the Percentage Opt Score. To be certain that rule understanding was not a 
factor in these relationships, the same correlations were calculated but excluding 
participants who scored less than 7 out of the 9 cued rule recall questions (but including 
those who scored 7). This led to 8 participants being excluded from the analyses.
Table 5.2. Spearman Rho correlation coefficients between R M  tasks and the AM T scores
AMT Measure N Immediate word list 
recall
Delayed word list 
recall
Total subtasks attempted 83 .195 .265
p=.077A p=.016*
Total rule breaks 83 -.090 -.014
p>.05 p>.05
Total number of switches during test 83 .206 .287
p=.062A p=.009**
Percentage Opt Score (see above) 83 -.084 -.193
p>.05 p=.081
Total number of times reported correct 83 .187 .175
slide on PM task p>.05 p>.05
Total number of subtask items completed 83 .323 .204
p=.003** p=.064A
Completed PM slide task during 83 .055 .129
interruption task? p>.05 p>.05
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Calculating the same correlations but only including participants who scored over 7 on the 
pre-test cued rule recall (N=75) produced a similar pattern of correlations but with stronger 
relationships (see Table 5.3. below which shows only the changes in significant 
correlations).
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Table 5.3. Spearman Rho correlation coefficients between RM tasks and the percentage opt
score including only participants who scored 7 or more on rule recall measure
AMT M easure N Im m ediate word list 
recall
Delayed word list 
recall
Total subtasks attempted 75 .240 .285
p=.038* p=.013*
Total number of switches during test 75 .241 .302
p=.037* p=.009**
Percentage Opt Score (see above) 75 -.195 -.241
p=.093 p=.037*
Total number of subtask items completed 75 .233 .114
p=.044* p=.330
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Hypothesis 3:
Spearman Rho correlations between Raven’s and the AMT measures revealed modest 
correlations between IQ and the following AMT measures: the total number of correctly 
reported slides in the PM task and the total number o f subtask items completed. Table 5.4. 
displays the correlation coefficients for these measures. Identical correlations with the same 
8 participants excluded from the analyses are also displayed in Table 5.4. These data 
indicate the same pattern of correlations with the addition of a relationship that approached 
significance between the Percentage Opt score and Raven’s scores (negative) and a weaker 
relationship between total items completed and Raven’s (positive).
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Table 5.4. Spearman Rho correlation coefficients between Raven’s scores and the AMT
scores
AMT M easure N Raven’s N -  parts who 
scored 7+ on pre 
cued rule recall
Raven’s
Total tasks attempted 83 .176 
p=l 12
75 .182 
p=. 118
Total rule breaks 83 -.014
p>.05
75 .022
p>.05
Total number of switches during test 83 .209
p=.058A
75 .220
p=.058A
Percentage Opt Score 83 -.122
p>.05
75 -.209
p=.072A
Total number of times reported correct 
slide on PM task
83 .236
p=.016*
75 .227
p=.025*
Total number of subtask items 
completed
83 .290
p=.008**
75 .208
p=.073A
Completed PM slide task during 
interruption task?
83 .000
p>.05
75 -.016
p>.05
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 evel (two-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
5.3.8. 3. Relation to Real Life Outcome Measures 
Hypothesis 4:
The final hypothesis concerned the relationship of AMT scores to real life measures. 
Participants reported their academic qualifications and completed the life satisfaction and 
time management questionnaires. To ensure comparability only participants reporting 
standard U.K. qualifications were included in the analyses. Seventy-five out of the 83 
participants tested were in this category. However, analyses with these participants revealed 
no significant correlations between the 7 key AMT measures and the qualification measures 
(all p>.05). Moreover, there was only one correlation close to significant between the AMT 
scores and the life satisfaction questionnaire total score. This was between the dichotomy 
score of whether participants continued on the PM slide task during the interruption task 
and life satisfaction (Spearman’s Rho correlation coefficient = .215, p=.051, two-tailed). 
There were however, several significant correlations between certain AMT measures and 
the time management questionnaires as shown in Table 5.5.
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Table 5.5. Significant Spearman Rho correlation coefficients between time management 
questionnaire and the AM T scores
AMT Measure N Time Management 
Questionnaire 
Score
Total Hobbies 
Listed
Total subtasks 83 .173 .233
attempted p>.05 p=.034*
Total number of 83 .236 .264
switches during test p=.036* p=.016*
Percentage Opt 83 -.233 -.209
Score p=.034* p=.057A
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 evel (two-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Calculating the same correlations but only including participants who scored over 7 on the 
pre-test cued rule recall (N=75) produced the same pattern o f correlations, but the 
relationships become stronger.
5.3.9. Discussion
Ill-structured tasks have been used effectively to measure self-regulatory (or strategy 
application) impairments within clinical groups (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Bechara et 
al., 1994; Levine et al., 1998; 2000; Knight et al., 2003). The aim of this experiment was to 
develop a suitable ill-structured test for measuring self-regulatoiy individual differences in 
the healthy population. Moreover, to investigate the possibility that multitasking situations 
may tap a specific set o f processes which are related to eveiyday life proficiency within the 
healthy population. The first step towards this aim was developing the AMT.
5.3.9.1. Performance on the AMT
The range of scores on the AMT suggests that it is a test sensitive to individual differences 
in the healthy population. Consider first the strategy score (Percentage Opt) reflecting how 
efficiently participants performed the subtasks to earn most points. To achieve the most 
efficient strategy participants several processes are required. Firstly, Burgess et al, (2000) 
argue that their analogous score from the Greenwich Test reflects planning processes; 
certainly an efficient strategy here would require planning the allocation of one’s time. 
However, the Percentage Opt score cannot distinguish between successful plan and plan-
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following processes, which are posited to be separate (Burgess et al., 2000). Levine et al. 
(1998) describe their efficiency score as reflecting supervisory attentional processes 
because participants must inhibit the usual tendency to complete items in the usual fashion 
(i.e. in spatial order). In the AMT, an efficient strategy similarly requires participants to 
avoid perserverating on one subtask. A range o f deviations from the most efficient strategy 
is reflected in this sample o f participants (2.15-166.68), presumably reflecting individual 
differences in the above-mentioned processes.
Another notable finding is that 41% of participants did not attempt both sets of the 3 
subtasks, quite a large proportion o f participants considering the instructions for this were 
so clear. Manly et al., (2002) found only 1 out o f their 24 participants did not attempt every 
subtask in their modified Six Elements Test. Similarly, Law et al., (2004, experiment 2) 
report all of their 14 control participants attempting all subtasks (although their participants 
were given the instruction that they would lose points if  they did not attempt all subtasks -  
this was not the case in the present experiment). Rule understanding is unlikely to be the 
explanation for the participants’ failures since cued rule recall was high (which included a 
specific question about this rule). Moreover, the rules were available to the participants 
throughout the AMT. It is possible that participants did not consider this rule important 
and, as empirical studies from the PM field show, task importance is a crucial factor in 
remembering to perform an intention (Kleigel et al., 2004). Nevertheless, this is a deficient 
explanation because participants generated very few rule breaks and there is no reason to 
assume that the order rule should be considered more important than the rule to attempt all 
the sets of the subtasks. Certainly, there was nothing in the instructions to suggest this was 
the case.
Levine et al. (1998) discuss dissociation o f knowledge from action in their patients. They 
describe this as: ‘awareness o f  a strategy but a failure to apply i t ’ (p. 256). Many of their 
patients exhibited this dissociation and Duncan et al. (1995) have described other patients 
demonstrating this type of goal neglect. I will discuss this further below. However, the data 
here is indicative of a similar dissociation of knowledge from action in the healthy 
population, possibly because the AMT was loading so heavily on self-regulatory processes. 
Another possible explanation is that participants, although knowing the rule, simply forgot 
to carry out their intention to attempt every subtask i.e. it was a PM failure. This measure is
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simply reflecting a failure of plan following. Levine et al. used a post test questionnaire to 
establish the reasons for the patients not carrying out the most effective strategy. Future 
studies with the AMT should use a similar procedure to glean the correct explanation for 
the surprisingly poor performance on this measure. Similarly, including experimental 
control conditions (such as with and without the extra PM task) may contribute to our 
understanding of why participants showed such goal neglect.
A crude measure of speed (Law et al., 2004) available is the total number of subtask items 
completed by participants. On this measure too, the range of performance was wide (33- 
202 items). This may relate to the number of switches an individual makes, given the cost 
of task-switching. If so, this perhaps undermines the usefulness of this measure since a 
participant could score highly by not switching subtasks (but be failing another key part of 
the test). However, analyses showed no significant correlations between the number of 
switches and the total number o f items.
Clearly there are individual differences in the strategies participants utilise to perform this 
open-ended task. By analysing the relationship of the cognitive measures that correlate with 
AMT performance it is possible to gain insight into processes that are linked to self­
regulation performance.
The Effect of the Interruption
The most notable effect of the interruption was to interfere with participants’ performances 
of the slide PM task. Only half of all participants continued on the TB PM slide task whilst 
completing the interruption task. Instructions at the beginning of the task had told 
participants to perform the TB PM task throughout the whole experiment, for the entire 15 
minutes, thus, participants had no reason to believe they were required to stop this task. 
Einstein, McDaniel, Willford, Pagan and Dismukes (2003) argued that ‘interruptions 
exacerbate the difficulty o f  successfully maintaining an intended action over a brief delay ’ 
(p. 160). This may explain why such a high proportion of participants ceased the PM slide 
task during the interruption. O f course, without a control group (including no interruption 
task) to compare with, it is difficult to understand the full effect of the interruption. 
McDaniel, Einstein Graham and Rail (2004) replicated the disruptiveness of the 
interruption task however, also showing that the length of the interruption did not affect PM
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performance. Thus, the participants who took longer to perform the interruption task were 
not necessarily the same participants who did not continue on the PM slide task.
McDaniel et al (2004) provided two interpretations for this effect. Firstly, that interruption 
tasks create task switching costs and the processes involved in task switching interfere with 
PM. Secondly, that performing the interruption task ‘mistakenly reduces tension for the PM  
intention — perhaps represented as a general goal to perform an action in addition to the 
ongoing activity’ (p. 541). Experiments 1 to 4 in this thesis provide evidence for the latter 
interpretation as they have demonstrated that task-switching processes do not necessarily 
disrupt PM processes. The increased activation for the suspended ongoing task (the 
Zeigamik effect, Zeigamik, 1938) is creating interference for the PM task; an effect 
potentially missed by Law and colleagues (2004), they reported no disruptive impact of the 
interruption, because they did not include a relatively pure PM measure. This interference 
may also account for the reduced subtask switches after the interruption task. The 
expectation was that participants would initiate more subtask switches after the interruption 
with the purpose of attempting all subtasks. Participants actually switched subtasks less 
frequently after the interruption, which is consistent with the explanation of a PM failure 
resulting from the interruption.
It is also possible that the change in ongoing task context during the interruption task 
generated the poor PM slide task performance. Cook et al., (2005) report that TB PM 
intentions are less likely to be performed if the context associated with carrying out the 
intention is not present (see Chapter 2, section 2.5). Participants encoded the PM slide task 
in the context of the three subtasks. Accordingly, the new list task, as a context not 
associated with the PM slide task, disturbed retrieval of this intention. Although the 
retroactive interference and the context explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
the challenge for further research is to design experiments that can dissociate between these 
theoretical possibilities. In the present experiment several dependent variables were not 
included that may help in this theoretical differentiation, for example, the length of time 
participants took to complete the interruption task was not measured, neither was accuracy 
of the interruption task. A more thorough understanding of the factors that mitigate the 
effects of interruptions seems warranted given the commonality in real life of workplace 
interruptions (e.g. Ziljstra et al., 1999).
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Participants in the present experiment did not show such a tendency to return to the subtask 
they were previously working on prior to the interruption, compared to the participants in 
Law and colleagues’ study. Law et al., argued that this tendency could be a planning 
heuristic aiming to minimise the impact o f the interruption. Alternatively, the return to the 
suspended subtask may be a consequence of the ‘tension’, created by the unfinished task, 
inducing participants back to complete it. Although, Law and colleagues favoured the latter 
explanation, the non-replication o f these findings would suggest that it might be a 
deliberate strategy by participants (i.e. some participants choose not to use this heuristic), 
rather than an automatic process, as implied by this latter suggestion.
Prospective Memory Slide Task
The mean number of slides reported correctly was approximately 60%. This is a somewhat 
disrupted performance compared to PM performances reported in the previous experiments 
of this thesis. For instance, in experiment 5 in the clock TB PM condition there was very 
high PM accuracy. Participants were involved in multitasking in experiment 5, in the sense 
that they switched between 4 ongoing tasks, although these switches were externally-cued. 
Thus, the demands made on self-initiated processing in the present experiment seem 
pertinent to the low performance on the PM task. Burgess et al., (2000) argues that PM is 
crucially involved in these types o f multitasking tests, for example, in remembering to 
switch between subtasks and to follow one’s plan. The relatively low performance on the 
secondary PM task supports this as it implies there is competition for these processes. This 
is only partially supported by the relationships between the PM score and the other AMT 
scores however. There are hints of appropriate correlations between the PM slide task and 
the strategy and multitasking scores, which suggests shared processes, but these 
correlations were very weak (see also Section 2.7.1). Further empirical work in which 
there is a comparison group with extemally-cued multitasking test (or no other multitasking 
demands) or with a separate PM task is required. After all, the clock condition of 
experiment 5 is not an ideal comparison condition because of the other differences between 
the two methodologies (e.g. the extra rules to follow in the AMT).
5.3.9.2. Relation to Other Cognitive Measures
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Hypothesis 2: RM and AMT
Burgess et al., (2000) posited that processes involved in retrospective memory (RM) also 
contribute to multitasking. These processes are crucial for learning the task parameters. 
Moreover, RM is also theorised to be crucially involved in PM, to recall the content of the 
intention (Burgess & Shallice, 1997). There were strong correlations between measures of 
the AMT and the RM measures. For instance, there were positive correlations between the 
word list recall scores and scores reflecting PM processes, specifically the total number of 
subtasks attempted. This fits the cognitive model Burgess and colleagues (2000) propose, 
in which RM processes facilitate the learning of the task rules and enable PM. However, 
the correct number of PM slides reported did not correlate with these RM measures, 
perhaps because the RM component is very low in this PM task.
In addition, RM scores correlated weakly with the Percentage Opt score (participants who 
scored greater than 75) and with the total number o f items completed. The first correlation 
(which is negative) shows that the strategic participants (in terms of completing a similar 
number of items from each subtask) also recalled more words after a delay. This 
relationship may connote successful rule learning, and yet no significant correlations 
between RM and rule breaks existed. Alternatively, the correlation may indicate planning 
on the participants’ behalf, a set of processes weakly connected to RM (Burgess et al., 
2000). Once more however, the Percentage Opt score cannot be separated from plan- 
following, an intentionality measure. All of these possibilities are supported by Burgess and 
colleagues cognitive analysis; it requires a more fine-grained scoring system (including a 
planning measure) to delineate between them.
The relationship between the number of subtask items completed and RM is slightly more 
complex. Burgess et al., (2000) did not consider this rough measure of speed. It was 
included in the present experiment following Law et al., (2004) who reported differential 
performance on this measure between their experimental groups. Perhaps this relationship 
is mediated by rule-learning, with participants’ who learnt the rules less efficiently (i.e. 
poorer RM) taking longer in order to check the rules during the test.
Hypothesis 3: Raven’s Matrices and AMT
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It was predicted that Raven’s scores would correlate with the strategy scores of the AMT 
because participants who scored highly on the strategy scores had successfully planned and 
plan-followed. Burgess and colleagues (2000) found that planning processes were linked to 
the DLPFC and neuroimaging studies support this (e.g. Unterrainer et al., 2004). DLPFC is 
an area also associated with general fluid intelligence (Duncan et al., 1995; Prabhakaran et 
al., 1997; Gray et al., 2003). These data only partly supported this hypothesis. Raven’s 
scores did correlate with the total number of switches. This measure may convey a level of 
planning but also denotes intentionality processes, as described above (see Burgess et al., 
2000). The two strategy scores showed a slight inconsistency. Raven’s scores did not 
negatively correlate with rule breaks, a score that partially depicts the planning involved in 
organising a permissible subtask order. However, participants’ Raven’s scores were weakly 
(approached significance) related to Percentage Opt scores (after excluding the participants 
who scored less than seven on the rule recall test). The Percentage Opt score is the measure 
most representative of strategy.
The Raven’s score also positively correlated with the number of correct slides reported in 
the PM task. Whereas the other measures may be indicating shared variance with planning 
processes -  clearly, this measure is a straightforward PM score. Several studies have 
reported significant correlations between nonverbal reasoning and PM (Cockbum & Smith, 
1991; Maylor, 1996; Groot et al., 2002; Salthouse et al., 2004). Indeed, Salthouse et al., 
(2004) reported that correlations between PM, fluid intelligence and speed of processing 
were as high as between PM and executive measures (primarily fluency tests). However, 
researchers have not discussed this relationship in detail. Christoff & Gabrieli also discuss 
evidence for a role of rostral PFC in nonverbal reasoning tasks, and they attribute this to the 
need for internally-generated information. The work of Kleigel and colleagues (see Chapter 
2, section 2.7.1.) has suggested that PM is partly comprised by planning processes (the 
extent of which depends on the exact task) and thus it may be this planning link that once 
more accounts for the relationship. Alternatively, the relationship may stem from the shared 
variance relating to working memory processes. DLPFC is associated with both working 
memory and Raven’s (Prabhakaran, 1997; Duncan et al., 2000) and working memory has a 
role in PM tasks (Cherry & LeCompte, 1999). Clearly, the present study cannot provide 
further evidence regarding the correct interpretation of these results and future studies with
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the AMT must tackle this issue by including a purer measure of planning (see Burgess et 
al., 2000 for an example).
Hypothesis 4: Relation to Real-Life Outcome Measures
Participants’ scores on the AMT did not correlate with the measures of academic 
qualifications, which were based on a national points system for UK qualifications. There 
was a significant correlation between one AMT measure and life satisfaction and 
significant correlations between the scores on the time management questionnaire and 
measures of the AMT, and similarly with hobbies listed. Although this was exploratory 
element of study, it was predicted there would be some relation to real life outcomes 
because of clinical and lesion evidence. The ecological validity o f these types of tests lead 
to the expectation that the processes used in multitasking reflect those recruited for 
everyday life tasks (Burgess , 2000).
For instance, achieving success in examinations is likely to make demands on multitasking 
processes including planning, RM and PM. It was therefore hypothesised that performance 
on a multitasking test may correlate with success on these examinations (as defined by 
qualification points). However, the hypothesis was not supported here. This can be 
explained by numerous extraneous variables that contribute to examination performance 
(e.g. motivation) that this study was unable to control. In addition, the sample used in this 
study was narrow. Participants had similar academic qualifications because all of the 
undergraduates were recruited from the same University, which demands certain 
qualification levels for entrance. With limited variance in the sample significant 
correlations are less probable.
Indeed, within the life satisfaction and time management measures there was more variance 
in participants’ scores and significant correlations were revealed. Predictions were based on 
previous multitasking studies and stated that there would be positive correlations between 
these measures and AMT measures (e.g. Levine et al, 1998). Interestingly, the measure of 
whether participants completed the PM slide task during the interruption task correlated 
with life satisfaction. This could be considered a key measure of self-regulatory behaviours 
since it requires many self-initiated responses and the maintenance of many subgoals (e.g. 
cope with interruption task, remember to initiate PM intentions, decide on satisfactory
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response to interruption task). This is rather tentative evidence that tasks which load heavily 
on self-initiated processes may be useful in relation to predicting real life satisfaction. Since 
everyday life is littered with open-ended tasks and decisions, life satisfaction may be 
indicative of success in completing these ‘life tasks’. There are, of course, many variables 
not considered here that contribute to life satisfaction (e.g. Diener et al., 2003), 
consequently the finding o f a significant relationship is very promising and is certainly a 
path for future research.
The time management questionnaire is a good reflection of everyday life planning and 
organisation and the self-regulatory processes involved in these appear to be partially 
captured by the AMT, as demonstrated by the significant correlations. The AMT and other 
multitasking measures may therefore provide an objective assessment of participants’ time 
management and planning abilities. Undoubtedly there would be useful applications for 
this, including within an organisational setting such as predicting job success in workplaces 
that require a great deal of time management (or indeed in Ph.D.s!) These data suggests 
further investigation into the relationship of AMT scores and real life outcomes in more 
depth is warranted, specifically life satisfaction and time management, perhaps utilising 
more sophisticated methodological techniques such as factor analysis. Of course, because 
of the correlational nature of this study it is only possible to extrapolate from the clinical 
data that these processes are responsible for successful everyday life tasks, rather than 
another group of processes mediating both. For example, Duncan et al., (1995; 2000; 2001; 
2005) would argue that processes that comprise 'g' are actually all that are being measured. 
This argument is set out below.
5.3.9.3. Alternative Explanations o f Self-Regulation Processes
Part of the rationale of this experiment is based on the argument that there is fractionation 
of PFC function, and thus dissociations between cognitive processes (multiple process 
theories, see Burgess and Simons, 2005). Areas of the rostral PFC appear to be involved in 
successful performance of multitasking tests (Levine et al., 1998), and are presumed to be 
the neural basis of self-regulatory processes. Conversely, the DLPFC is recruited in the 
Raven’s task and other relational reasoning tasks (Prabhakaran et al., 1997). For this reason
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and from the clinical studies, it was expected that there would be relative independence 
between these measures, with tests o f IQ missing an important group of processes. 
However, in contrast to predictions there was evidence of correlations between Raven’s 
(representing IQ) and the AMT. The first explanation for this was described above -  which 
suggested there is a role for DLPFC processes or more properly, planning processes, in 
multitasking tests. Another possibility is that the fractionation theory of PFC and executive 
function is erroneous.
An alternative account of PFC function is posited by Duncan (e.g. Duncan, 2001) and 
discussed in Chapter 1 briefly. Duncan suggests that the PFC acts in a more unified 
manner to control different types of goal directed behaviour in any task. The ability of the 
PFC to do this is reflected in an individual’s ‘g’ (or general intelligence) score. For 
example, Duncan et al., (1995) showed that frontal patients who exhibited everyday 
planning and organisational skills and showed impaired behaviour on multitasking tests 
also showed impoverished performance on a fluid intelligence test, or a high 'g' test. 
Moreover, Duncan et al., (1996) reported that 'goal neglect' in the healthy population is 
related to low 'g'. In their conception, 'g' reflects the action control functions of an 
individual's PFC. As described above, there is some evidence for participants exhibiting 
goal neglect in this study, presumably because the test was loading on these 'g' processes 
very heavily. Certainly, the AMT is high on the three factors that Duncan et al., (1996) 
argue load heavily on 'g' processes: novelty, weak feedback (i.e. low environmental 
support) and multiple concurrent requirements. Moreover, there were positive correlations 
between the Raven's (a high 'g' task) and AMT scores. To investigate the possibility that the 
AMT is simply measuring 'g', I analysed only participants who scored 8 or more on the 
Raven's (high 'g' score) and 27 out o f 40 of them attempted all 6 subtasks (67.5%). In 
addition, 15 out of the 32 (46.9%) participants who scored 6 or less on the Raven’s (low ‘g’ 
score) attempted all 6 subtasks. Clearly, participants ‘g’ score cannot be the whole 
explanation.
5.4. Summary & Limitations
Data from the AMT has indicated that even within the healthy brain population there can be 
degree of perseveration (for example, not completing all the subtasks and inappropriate
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allocation of time), which may lie on a continuum with patients’ performances. This is an 
interesting result and adds to the multitasking data from the clinical studies, as well as 
contributes to our understanding of self-regulatory processes in the healthy population. 
However, there are several limitations to the present experiment. Firstly, the study is 
correlational, so conclusions about causality must be drawn with caution. The exclusion of 
an experimental control group was purposeful in order to generate a large enough sample 
size for the correlations, but future studies with the AMT will require experimental 
manipulations to characterize the processes involved more fully. Moreover, the different 
approach by participants to the same test is both a strength of the test (as described above), 
but also a weakness. This is because it is difficult to describe the cognitive processes 
contributing to this test’s performance when each participant can be doing something quite 
different, for instance, the degree each participant plans or switches subtasks. This 
argument is considered further in the next experiment.
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5.5. Experiment 8
5.5.1. Introduction
A key measure from the AMT was the number o f subtasks participants attempted and, 
related to this, the number of self-initiated task switches. Participants showed a range of 
scores on these measures (range o f 0-10). Indeed, the crucial element of these types of tests 
is that they are ill-structured and are tackled idiosyncratically. Differences in the degree of 
planning, in the number of task-switches and the order and duration of subtasks performed 
are expected. For instance, some participants may switch tasks too often or perseverate on 
the same tasks and not initiate switching to new tasks (e.g. Worthington, 1999, Manly et al., 
2002; Alderman et al., 2003; Kleigal et al., 2004). That participants have almost total 
control of the manner in which they perform the task in this way distinguishes it from 
paradigms such as task-switching & dual-tasking (Burgess et al., 2000). As previously 
discussed, this gives the tests high ecological validity (Wilson et al., 1998; Burgess et al., in 
press). However, it makes it difficult to breakdown the cognitive components involved 
since demands on cognitive control processes can differ so. For example, there are 
differences within the same test (e.g. participants making more or fewer subtask switches) 
and there are differences between the ill-structured tests too, even between multitasking 
tests. For example, Burgess et al., (2000) describes the Greenwich Test as having fewer 
task-switches but with more rules to follow, compared to the Six Elements. This 
differentially affects the load on executive processes such as those involved in voluntary 
task-switching and PM processes. Moreover, the research by Levine et al., (1998; 2000) has 
emphasised the processes involved in strategy application over PM and task-switching 
processes. For example, Levine et al. (1998, 2000) relate deficits in strategy in their clinical 
groups to failures of inhibiting established responses, error correction and flexibility. 
Attempting to bring these different approaches together could be a fruitful area for research. 
Specifically, trying to understand how the differences between the demands of the 
multitasking tests affects other aspects of performance may help elucidate the cognitive 
mechanisms involved. As Law et al., (2004) acknowledge few experiments have 
manipulated variables within these tests to investigate ‘what factors might constrain or 
impair successful multitasking performance ’ (p. 285). The present study begins this process
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by considering how the frequency o f self-initiated subtask switching affects performance 
on other multitasking measures, such as strategy.
Relating these ideas to the healthy population and real life behaviours, researchers in the 
human-computer interaction field have investigated workers’ behaviours in order to 
determine the most effective interfaces. Czerwinski et al., (2004) completed a diary study 
of managers’ behaviours in the workplace. They reported participants switching tasks 
frequently, with 40% of these task switches being self-initiated. The authors concluded that 
‘the key findings gleaned from  our diary study, as well as explicit comments from  
participants, shaped our pursuit o f  designs fo r  interface tools that might better assist users 
with task switching’ (p. 180). Gonzalez et al., (2004) also performed a field study with 
information workers: analysts, software developers and managers. They found that the 
employees spent an average o f three minutes on an event (task) before another event was 
initiated, with participants interrupting themselves as often as they were interrupted. These 
data show the frequency of self-initiated task switching in the everyday workplace. Thus, 
understanding the effect of this variable on multitasking performance in the healthy 
population is crucial for real life application.
5.5.1.2. Self-Initiated Task-switching
As described, the number of subtask switches produced during these multitasking tests is a 
possible source of variance in performance between the participants and a possible source 
of impairment in patients. To what extent does the number of self-initiated task-switches 
affect performance on the other elements of multitasking? In real life, it is asking the 
question: does the number of switches between tasks we make (e.g. emailing, writing, 
phone calls etc) affect our overall performance? Is it better to move frequently between 
tasks, or does infrequent subtask switching lead to better performance?
Evaluating theoretical positions on the effect o f frequent subtask switches on multitasking 
performance is rather complex. The requirement to switch between these subtasks in 
multitasking tests draws on executive control processes for both the PM element of the task 
(to remember the intention, interrupt the ongoing task and carry it out) and for the switch 
between the subtasks (the reconfiguration of task set/inhibition of the old task set, see
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Chapter 3). Drawing from the task-switching literature, the expectation would be that 
frequent subtask-switchers would absorb more cognitive resources for this process (Rogers 
& Monsell, 1995) and show impoverished performance on other elements of the test 
compared to infrequent task-switchers. Recall that the voluntary task-switching literature 
would also predict this outcome since self-initiated task switches produce similar switch 
costs to the ongoing task (Arrington et al., 2004, see Chapter 3, section 3.5). However, 
there are differences between the voluntary task-switches in that paradigm and the self­
initiated task-switches generated in multitasking tests. As Burgess et al. (2000) describes 
the typical task-switching experiments ‘do not involve the deferral o f  task execution over 
lengthy periods o f time (switches typically occur with an interval o f  a few  seconds or less) ’ 
(p. 850), unlike the multitasking tests.
An alternative perspective is that the participants who switch between subtasks more 
frequently may reduce the need for conscious, executive control for remembering the 
intention to switch between tasks (i.e. the PM element). As the PM responses become more 
habitual with increased frequency (Einstein et al., 1998) this presumably increases the 
reliance on automatic processes. Similarly, decreased RIs can produce better PM 
performance (Brandimonte & Passolunghi, 1994). Reducing the demands on controlled 
processing may free up resources for the other elements of the test, thus improving 
performance on other aspects of the test.
In order to test these hypotheses a multitasking test similar to the AMT was employed, but 
with some modifications, such that the number of self-initiated subtask switches that 
participants were required to make could be manipulated. Participants were instructed to 
switch between subtasks every 30 seconds or every 2 min 30 seconds. As they switched 
subtasks they were asked to write down the letter and number from a slide show at the 
correct interval. Thus, this instruction manipulated the number of self-initiated subtask 
switches, but also the RI between PM responses. For this reason, a discussion of the effect 
of length of RIs on PM performance is relevant and is presented below.
These instructions also remove the need for the individual to plan when to switch between 
tasks, constraining one element of the multitasking test. Instead, a straightforward time- 
based PM task was inserted into the multitasking framework. This allows the PM element
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of multitasking to be investigated separately from the planning component. This is useful 
for other reasons too. By constraining the planning demands in the multitasking test it is 
then possible to inspect correlations with the Raven’s scores. Experiment 7 showed that 
measures of the AMT correlated with Raven’s, but it was uncertain whether this reflected 
the overlap of planning processes or ‘g ’ processes. The correlations between the measures 
from this multitasking test and Raven’s may shed light on this matter.
5.5.1.2. Retention Interval in PM  Tasks
The design of the experiment produced a manipulation of RI within the time-based PM task 
to switch subtasks (30 seconds vs 2 mins 30 seconds). Hicks, Marsh & Russell (2000) 
reviewed the literature that manipulated RIs in PM tasks. They predicted that PM should 
follow the RM forgetting curve, so longer RIs lead to lower PM performance. Support for 
this was obtained from Brandimonte and Passolunghi (1994) who found decreased PM 
performance when the RI was increased to 3 minutes (compared to recalling the intentions 
immediately), a result consistent with RM decay. Subsequent studies that manipulate RIs 
have produced results that are more mixed. For example, Hicks, Marsh and Russell (2000) 
found that longer RIs produced better PM performance. However, they also found that an 
increased number of task switches during the RI improved PM performance. They 
attributed this to an increase in opportunities for participants to self-remind about the 
intentions. Nigro and Cicogna (2000) found no effect of length of RI on PM performance. 
Although the authors reported much longer RIs (i.e. 20 mins, 2 days and 2 weeks), which 
are lengthier delays and more likely to be affected by extraneous variables. Nevertheless, 
other reports of RI manipulations have found no increase in PM errors with lengthier delays 
(Einstein et al., 1992; Guynn et al., 1998; Stones et al., 2001). A potential explanation for 
the mixed data is the large differences in RIs from 30 seconds to several days (Hicks et al., 
2000). According to Hicks and colleagues there is evidence that the critical period of 
forgetting of intentions follows the RM pattern (see also Einstein et al., 2000). For 
example, a study by Loftus (1971) study captured this critical window; the study employed 
RIs of 30-60 seconds and no longer than 3 minutes, but participants showed a significant 
decline in performance with the longer RI. The present study therefore utilised RIs of 30 
seconds and 2 min 30 seconds with this in mind. Hence, it was expected that the longer RI 
would require greater self-initiated recall than the 30 seconds condition, and so place
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greater demands on executive control. As described above, accuracy of subtask switching 
(i.e. PM performance) was measured by participants reporting the stimuli displayed on the 
slide show as they switched task (i.e. every 30 seconds or 2 minute 30 seconds). The 
percentage of correct slides reported acted as a measure o f PM accuracy.
5.5.1.3. Hypotheses
The background presented thus far cannot differentiate between two possible hypotheses 
for the manipulation of subtask switching on frequency. These are presented below:
la) Improved performance on multitasking in the infrequent task-switch group because of 
reduced demands on task-switching executive processes.
lb) Improved performance on multitasking in the frequent task-switch group because of 
reduced executive demands required for remembering the intention to switch.
Several measures of multitasking performance were compared in the two subtask switch 
frequency groups, but a key measure of multitasking performance is the strategy measure 
which is discussed in the methods section below. This measure is entirely independent from 
the number of subtask switches generated and acts as a good indicator of strategy and 
planning.
Correlations with other Cognitive Measures 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3:
To understand the relationship of multitasking processes with other cognitive processes the 
same measures were administered as in experiment 7. The hypothesis regarding the 
relationship of RM to PM was the same and a replication of findings from the previous 
experiment was expected. However, by instructing participants when they should switch 
tasks the planning demands are constrained, since participants no longer have to plan when 
they should switch between the subtasks. For this reason, lower correlations between the 
multitasking measures and Raven’s were expected than were found in experiment 7. This is
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based on the theoretical position that Raven’s taps different processes to that of 
multitasking, but is linked to planning processes (Burgess et al., 2000).
Correlations with other Real Life Measures
Hypothesis 4:
Finally, the same real life outcome measures were utilised as in experiment 7 in order to 
explore the relationship of multitasking and these outcomes. These were included in an 
attempt to replicate the results o f experiment 7. In experiment 7, non-significant 
relationships were found between variables that were theoretically predicted to correlate, 
thus this experiment also tested these relationships again, ensuring against making a Type 2 
error. Thus, the hypotheses for these measures were the same as in experiment 7.
5.5.2. Method
Participants & Design
The present group study was conducted with a sample o f 94 undergraduate (mean age = 
19.12, SD = 1.11) psychology students at University College London. All participants were 
fluent English speakers. The participants were split randomly into two independent groups: 
frequent task switchers (N=47) and infrequent task switchers (N=47). In the frequent task- 
switch group there were 39 females and 8 males, and in the infrequent group 40 females 
and 7 males. The two groups were tested separately but simultaneously.
Materials
Advanced Multitasking Test 2 -  Materials & Procedure
The general materials and procedure was identical to that described in experiment 7. 
However, there were some important design modifications to the multitasking test (and thus 
I shall refer to it as the AMT2). These are laid out below.
Modifications to the AMT
1) Participants were given 4 subtasks with two sets of A and B in this version of the AMT 
(in order for there to be more subtasks to switch between for the manipulation). Three of
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the subtasks were identical to those described in experiment 7 above. The extra subtask was 
as follows:
Anagram Solving
Task 4) Anagram Solving - Each A and B set comprised 100 simple word items with 
certain letters missing e.g. bra n. Participants were asked to fill the gaps with a letter that 
created a real word.
2) Participants were not presented with an interruption task in this test. The subtask switch 
frequency was the important manipulation here, and its effect on multitasking performance. 
Adding another task switch (albeit external ly-cued) in the form of an interruption task 
would lead to an overly complex design.
3) The extra instructions for this task were added to the other rules of the AMT (see section 
5.4. above). Participants were told when to switch between the subtasks (either at 30 
seconds or 2 minutes 30 seconds). The experimenter explained to the participants that a 
changing display of letters and numbers would be displayed on the large screen at the front 
of the room (note the same slideshow was used as in experiment 7 except an extra 5 
minutes worth of slides were presented, see below). Participants were instructed to write 
the letter and number down from the slideshow just before they switched subtask (i.e. at the 
30 seconds or 2 minutes 30 second point).
4) The AMT2 was 20 minutes in length so participants in the 2 minutes 30 seconds group 
were able to attempt both sets of all 4 subtasks (presuming they spend one 2 minute 30 
seconds interval on each set).
5) Finally, participants were told that items with asterisks next to them were worth more 
points (20 items in every 100 were marked with an asterisk, chosen pseudorandomly with 
the constraint that they were not consecutive items). This replaced the instruction that 
earlier items were worth more points. This was necessary because participants could not 
switch between the subtasks as they wished. This gave a veiy clear strategy measure and is 
comparable to measures from other multitasking tests (e.g. Levine et al., 1998), percentage 
of asterisks items completed out of total items completed).
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6) The new cued rule recall test questions for the AMT2 appear in Appendix B. The 
administration of the free and cued rule recall tasks were identical to experiment 7.
General Procedure
Participants completed a series of tests, including the AMT2 in one session. The two 
groups were tested separately. The tests were completed in the following sequence: 
immediate word list recall, Raven's matrices, AMT2, delayed word list recall and 
questionnaires.
Measures Derived from the AMT 2 
RM Component
• Pre test cued rule recall.
• Post test cued rule recall.
PM Component
• Total number of slides reported.
• Total number of correct slides reported
• Total percentage o f correct slides.
• Total number of correct subtask switches.
Other Measures
• Total number of subtasks attempted
• Total number of rule breaks.
• Total items completed.
• Total strategic asterisks completed (out o f order).
• Percentage strategic asterisks completed (out of order).
Other Cognitive and Real Life Measures
The materials and procedure for the cognitive and real life measures included in this 
experiment were the identical as those in experiment 7. See section 5.4. above for full 
details but the measures derived from these tests are listed below.
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Cognitive Measures
• Total immediate word list recall.
• Total delayed word list recall.
• Total Raven’s Matrices score.
Real Life Measures
• Total qualification points.
• Total GSCE points.
• Total A Level/AS Level points.
• Life satisfaction score -  summed responses from Diener et al., questionnaire.
• Total score on time management questions.
• Total number of hobbies.
5.5.3. Results
Due to six participants filling out the multitasking answer sheet in an inappropriate manner 
they were excluded from the analyses below. Other participants requested to leave the 
testing room briefly during the group testing session and thus have missing data from 
certain tests; this is reported where it arises.
Firstly, analyses were carried out to ensure there were no differences in rule recall between 
the two independent groups. The mean rule recall scores are displayed in Table 5.6. and 
show high rule recall scores in both group. Indeed, no statistically significant differences 
emerged between the two groups in the number o f correct rules recalled, either before 
(t=.644, df=86, p=.521) or after the test (t=.803, df=86, p=.424). It is therefore not plausible 
that any differences in performance between these groups are due to differences in rule 
comprehension.
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Table 5.6. Descriptive statistics o f  cued-rule recall scores
Frequent Task-switchers
N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Correct cued rule recall pre test (max =10) 43 9.40 .85 7 10
Correct cued rule recall post test (max =10) 43 9.56 .85 7 10
Infrequent Task-switchers
Correct cued rule recall pre test (max =10) 44 9.28 .97 6 10
Correct cued rule recall post test (max =10) 44 9.44 .75 7 10
5.5.3.1 The Effect o f  Frequency o f  Self-Initiated Task-switches on Multitasking 
Performance
Hypothesis 1
The first goal of the present experiment was to test the effects of subtask switch frequency 
on multitasking performance. Therefore, analyses comparing the two groups on each 
measure derived from the AMT2 are reported. The Mann Whitney U test, a non-parametric 
equivalent of a t-test, were used to compare the two groups scores, unless indicated 
otherwise. The descriptive statistics for these scores for both groups are displayed in Table 
5.7. and Table 5.8.
The first measure considered is the strategy measure, which in this test is operationalised as 
the percentage of asterisks completed out of sequential order (i.e. deliberately chosen). A 
Mann Whitney U test found no significant difference between the groups in the percentage 
of strategic items completed, U=892, p=.646, (N=44 in frequent task switch group, N=43 in 
infrequent task switch group). Generally, the number o f rule breaks (of order) was low 
amongst all participants in both groups. Two participants committed 2 rule breaks and 5 
participants committed 1 rule break in the frequent task switch condition and no 
participants in the infrequent task switch condition committed a rule break. This still 
resulted in a significant difference between the two groups, the frequent task switch group 
made significantly more rule breaks, U=814, p=.006. This is perhaps unsurprising given the 
increased opportunity to commit a rule break in the frequent task switch condition. The 
total number of subtask items completed also showed a significant difference between the
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groups, with more items performed in the infrequent task-switching condition, t=5.58, 
df=86, p<.001. The intentionality aspects of the test were also considered. The frequent task 
switching group attempted significantly more subtasks compared to the infrequent task 
switching group, U=857, p=.048. Six participants did not attempt all subtasks in the 
infrequent task switch group (13.64%) compared to 1 participant in the frequent task switch 
group (2.27%). Finally, the infrequent task-switch group reported a higher percentage of 
correct slides, although this difference only approached significant, U=749, p=.059 (N=43 
in frequent task switch group, N=44 in infrequent task switch group).
Table 5.7. Frequent task-switchers -  descriptive statistics o f  AMT2 scores
N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Total number of subtasks attempted 44 7.98 .15 7 8
Total rule breaks 44 .20 .51 0 2
Total number of switches during test 44 28.86 8.40 12 41
Total number of times reported slide on 
switching subtask
44 29.14 8.15 14 40
Total number of times reported correct 
slide on switching subtask
44 11.34 9.21 1 32
Total percentage of correct slides reported 
on switching task
44 29.58% 23.66 2.56 82.05
Total number of subtask items completed 44 143.50 35.59 78.00 231
Total number of strategic asterisk items 
completed (out of order asterisks items)
44 72.18 47.86 0 141
Total percentage of strategic asterisks 
completed (of total items completed)
44 53.59% 35.54 0 100
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Table 5.8. Infrequent task-switchers -  descriptive statistics o f  AMT2 scores
N Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
Total number of subtasks attempted 44 7.80 .59 5 8
Total rule breaks 44 0 0 0 0
Total number of switches during test 44 6.91 .56 4 8
Total number of times reported slide on 
switching subtask
44 6.68 .96 3 3
Total number of times reported correct 
slide on switching subtask
44 2.98 2.27 0 7
Total percentage of correct slides reported 
on switching subtask
44 42.53% 32.38 0 100
Total number of subtask items completed 44 193.91 48.18 96 358
Total number of strategic asterisk items 
completed (out of order asterisks items)
44 97.36 58.26 0 160
Total percentage of strategic asterisks 
completed (of total items completed)
44 52.52% 33.09 0 100
5.5.3.2. Relation to Other Cognitive Measures 
Hypothesis 2 and 3
The next set of analyses followed the same procedure as experiment 7, correlations between 
AMT2 scores and the other cognitive measures were calculated. Where there was no 
significant group difference between AMT2 measures the data was collapsed across both 
groups and correlations were calculated including all participants to increase power. The 
correlations reported are two-tailed Spearman’s Rho. As Table 5.9. shows significant 
correlations were found between the RM measures and the percentage of correct slides 
reported, but not with the strategy score. No significant correlations emerged between 
Raven’s Matrices scores and the percentage of correct slides reported or the strategy score.
215
Table 5.9. Correlation coefficients between AMT2 measures and cognitive variables —
collapsed across 2 groups f
Immediate word 
list recall
Delayed word list 
recall
Raven’s
Total percentage of correct slides reported .391 .209 .102
on switching task Pc.000** p=.055A p>.05
N=86 N=85 N=86
Total percentage of strategic asterisks .143 .105 -.016
completed (out of total items completed) p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
N=85 N=84 N=85
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
t  Calculating the same correlations but excluding participants who scored less than seven on the pre-cued rule recall (as in 
experiment 7) does not change the pattern o f results. This is the case with all the correlations reported below.
Where significant differences between the two groups did exist in the AMT2 measures 
correlations between these AMT2 measures and the cognitive measures were calculated 
separately for each group. Table 5.10. below displays these correlation coefficients, which 
showed no significant relationships. Participants in the infrequent task switch condition 
committed no rule breaks, thus, no correlations were calculated. Similarly, only one 
participant did not attempt all 8 subtasks in the frequent task switch group, thus no 
correlations were calculated with this measure in this group.
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Table 5.10. Correlation coefficients between AMT2 measures and cognitive variables —
separate groups
Frequent Task switch Group
Immediate 
word list recall
Delayed word list 
recall
Raven’s
Total number of subtask items -.038 .090 .007
completed p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
N=43 N=42 N=42
Total Rule breaks -.067 -.104 .208
p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
N=43 N=42 N=42
Infrequent Task switch Group
Total subtasks attempted .226 .247 .052
p>.05 p<.05 p>.05
N=43 N=43 N=44
Total number of subtask items .126 .168 .052
completed p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
N=43 N=43 N=44
5.5.5.3. Relation to Real-Life Outcome Measures
To understand the relationship between the real life measures and the AMT2, the same 
approach was taken as above with correlations between these two sets of variables. Where 
there were no significant differences between the two groups the correlations were 
calculated with all the participants, otherwise they were calculated for each group. 
Participants without the relevant U.K. qualifications were excluded from the correlations in 
order to have a standardised means o f measuring academic achievements, leaving 75 
participants included in analyses.
Qualification scores:
Academic Measures
1) Total qualification points (A levels, AS levels, GCSEs, half GCSEs or O-levels).
2) Total A and AS level points
3) Total GCSE and half GCSE points.
The correlation coefficients are shown in Table 5.11. and 5.12. There were significant 
correlations between several o f the academic measures and the AMT2 measures,
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specifically the percentage of correct slides reported correlating with total qualification 
points and almost with A Level scores. All the academic measures correlated positively 
with the number of items completed in the infrequent task-switching group, suggesting a 
speed measure is useful from these multitasking tests.
Table 5.11. Correlation coefficients between academic measures and AMT2 measures -  
collapsed across 2 groups
2 II
Total
qualification
points
Total A and AS 
Level points
Total GCSE 
points
Total percentage of correct slides .226 .216 .119
reported on switching task p=.051A p=.063A p>.05
Total percentage of strategic asterisks .069 .045 .189
completed (out of total items completed) p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
Table 5.12. Correlation coefficients between academic measures and the AMT2 measures -  
separate groups
Frequent Task switch Group (N=35)
Total
qualification
points
Total A and AS 
Level points
Total GCSE 
points
Total number of subtask items completed -.075 -.102 .089
p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
Total Rule breaks .159 .118 .182
p>.05 p>.05 p>.05
Infrequent Task switch Group (N=40)
Total subtasks attempted .329 .338 .098
p=.038* .033* p>.05
Total number of subtask items completed .466 .436 .398
.002** .005** p=.011*
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level (two-tailed).
Life Satisfaction scores
There were no significant correlations between the collapsed scores (percentage of correct 
slides reported, percentage of strategic asterisks completed) and the life satisfaction 
measures. Similarly, there were no significant correlations between two of the AMT2 
measures (total items completed and total rule breaks) and the life satisfaction measures in
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either of the separate groups. However, in the Infrequent task switch group the number of 
subtasks attempted correlated positively with life satisfaction (correlation coefficient = 
.315, p=.04*, N=43).
Time Management and Hobbies and Interests Questionnaire
Table 5.13. displays the correlation coefficients between the AMT2 measures and the time 
management questionnaire. There were no significant correlations between the strategy 
score and the correct percentage of slides reported (i.e. the collapsed scores) and the time 
management questionnaire. Similarly, no AMT2 score correlated with the hobbies and 
interests measure. Significant correlations emerged between the total number of subtasks 
completed and time management abilities in the infrequent task switch group. A negative 
correlation between number of subtask items completed and time management was found 
in the frequent task switch group.
Table 5.13. Correlation coefficients between real life measures and AMT2 measures -  
collapsed across 2 groups
Frequent Task switch G roup
Time Management Hobbies and Interests 
Listed
Total number of subtask items completed -.332 .025
p=.028* p>.05
N=44 N=42
Total Rule breaks .099 -.046
p>.05 p>.05
N=44 N=42
Infrequent Task switch G roup
Total subtasks attempted .273 .045
p=.073A p>.05
N=44 N=43
Total number of subtask items completed -.044 .017
p>.05 p>.05
N=44 N=43
A Correlation approaches significance at 0.05 level (two-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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5.5.4. Discussion
5.5.4.1. Effect o f Self-Initiated Task-Switch Frequency - Hypothesis 1
Two hypotheses were offered for the manipulation o f subtask switch frequency. These were
as follows:
la) Improved performance on multitasking in the infrequent task-switch group because of 
reduced demands on task-switching executive processes.
lb) Improved performance on multitasking in the frequent task-switch group because of 
reduced executive demands in the PM task.
This experiment was designed to assess the effect o f frequency of subtask switch on other 
elements of multitasking performance. Multitasking is considered componential (e.g. 
Burgess et al., 2000; Kleigel et al., 2000) and although different groups of researchers have 
assessed the cognitive mechanisms for each component (e.g. Levine et al., 1998; Burgess et 
al., 2000), the effect of one component on the others has been largely neglected. Indeed, 
because of inconsistency between multitasking studies in the measures reported, it is 
difficult to assess this effect. The entire range o f measures from the AMT2 was included to 
understand the impact o f subtask switching frequency on each component of multitasking. 
Each measure will therefore be considered in turn.
A key comparison measure between these two groups was the number of strategic items 
completed by participants (Law et al., 2004). For instance, previously SAD patients have 
demonstrated impoverished performance on this measure (Levine et al., 1998). This score 
was devised by calculating the percentage of items with strategic asterisks completed, as a 
percentage of total items completed. There were no significant differences between the 
frequent and infrequent task switch groups (53.38% in frequent group vs 52.52% in 
infrequent group). This suggests that the number of subtask switches generated may not 
affect strategic multitasking performance; there is some independence in processing. 
Consequently, it is plausible that individuals with SAD are not necessarily impaired 
because of the executive demands created by frequent subtask switches (i.e. task switching 
processes) or because of high executive demands from the PM element of the task (the 
infrequent task switch group). From correlational data with executive function tests, Levine
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et al., (1998) argue strategic responding requires three types of executive processes: error 
correction or monitoring, inhibition of an established response method and flexibility. 
These processes are not specifically associated with voluntary task-switching (e.g. 
Arrington & Logan, 2004, 2005) and indeed lends weight to the argument made by 
Arrington & Logan (2005) that inhibition is not required for self-initiated task-switching 
(and the switch costs are attributable to active reconfiguration processes, see Chapter 3, 
section 3.2.).
Overall, a relatively low percentage of strategic items were completed in both groups. 
Again, this suggests that this multitasking test is o f the correct sensitivity for use with the 
healthy population. Results are certainly comparable with Law et al., (2004), who used a 
similar but not equivalent multitasking test (with an interruption). Their population of 
undergraduates completed 49.6% (SD=15.3%) of higher scoring items. As discussed in 
experiment 7, this could also be characterised as evidence for ‘goal neglect’ (Duncan et al., 
1996) or a knowing-doing dissociation (Levine et al., 1998). This proposal is strengthened 
if just the participants who scored 10/10 in pre and post cued rule recall tests are considered 
(there was a specific question regarding the value of items). The mean percentage of 
asterisks completed in this subgroup was still only 59.4% (SD=31.98, N=43), certainly 
suggesting a ‘knowing-doing dissociation’ within the healthy population. Duncan et al., 
(1996) have described this before, and attributed the phenomenon to low ‘g’, or inefficient 
executive control functioning in the prefrontal cortex (Duncan et al., 1995, 1996). It is thus 
worth considering only the participants who scored 8 or above on the Raven’s task (i.e. 
high ‘g’ scorers), as per the procedure of experiment 7. The mean percentage of asterisks 
completed within this group was still only 52.98%, SD = 33.96, N=73 (and indeed with a 
more rigourous cut off point of 10 or above on Raven’s the percentage reduces further to 
only 49.97%, SD=34.33, N=36). Again, this is incompatible with Duncan and colleague’s 
theory, since they would predict goal neglect occurring only within low ‘g’ participants. 
This is certainly an interesting field o f enquiry for future studies, and perhaps a good 
starting place would be to give post-interview questionnaires to participants after 
completion of the test, as Levine et al., (1998; 2000) did to ensure participants knew about 
the possible strategy. Including a measure of planning could also filter out the suggestion 
that participants were not aware of the most efficient strategy because participants may 
include it as part of their plan.
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Other aspects of multitasking performance were affected by frequency of self-initiated task 
switching, specifically, the number of items completed, the number of rule breaks and PM 
performance. On these measures, the infrequent task switch group faired better. Participants 
in this group performed more items overall, with fewer rule breaks (which were essentially 
order rule breaks) and reported more slides correctly (though this was not statistically 
different between the groups). Thus, more generally hypothesis la  is supported; there is 
improved multitasking performance in the infrequent task-switch group because of reduced 
demands on task-switching executive processes. This was especially true for the number of 
items completed by each group, in which the cost o f frequent task switches certainly seems 
to outweigh the benefit of reducing the PM load. This is perhaps unsurprising; the 
infrequent task switch group switched subtasks on average 29 times, compared to 
infrequent task switch group o f approximately 7. The data is certainly consistent with the 
voluntary task-switching literature. However, the practicalities involved in the actual 
subtask switching (i.e. shuffling of papers) are also quite likely to lead to the completion of 
fewer task items. Thus, this study requires replication with a computerised version such that 
the actual task of switching is very easy and non time-consuming (see below).
Generally, an increased number of self-initiated task switches did interfere somewhat with 
PM performance, with the infrequent task group showing increased accuracy for switching 
at the correct time. Clearly, the frequent group generated more task switches and thus there 
were more opportunities to miss the correct slide. However, given the accuracy of previous 
participants in TB PM tasks such as this (e.g. experiment 1), this task should produce 
relatively accurate performance. This result is in contrast to results from experiments 1 to 4 
in which extemally-cued task switching showed independence from PM processes. This 
supports the notion of PM as a self-initiated task switch. Although the participants 
performed numerically better on the PM slide task in the infrequent task switch group, this 
group did have a higher proportion of participants who did not attempt all the subtasks once 
(6 out of 44 compared to 1 out of 44 in frequent task switch group). However, this should 
probably be considered a planning failure, rather than a PM failure. The infrequent task 
switch condition required increased planning to be able to attempt all 8 subtasks (and not 
break rules) because of so few switches. Nevertheless, arguably this need for planning did
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not outweigh the cost o f frequent task switches for most of the infrequent task switch 
participants.
The application of these results to real life is feasible since these types of ill-structured tests 
have high ecological validity. The overall picture would suggest that fewer self-initiated 
subtask switches in a multitasking situation, such as within the workplace, produces better 
overall performance. This is true at least in terms of speed of performance (number of 
items) and for remembering to carry out intentions (correct slides reported and rule- 
following). The strategy score is comparatively more artificial in nature, however, it 
arguably represents something such as goal prioritising, a process seemingly independent of 
the number of task switches. Thus, instead of developing computer interfaces that are 
intended to aid with self-initiated task-switching (Czerwinski et al., 2004), maybe operating 
systems should be designed that actually prevent people switching between tasks (or 
‘applications’) and encourage lengthier stays with one endeavour!
5.5.4.2. Correlations with other Cognitive Measures 
Hypothesis 2
As predicted, there were significant correlations between the RM measures and the AMT2 
measures. Specifically, the RM scores correlated with the PM measure but not with the 
strategy measure (total percentage of items completed that were worth more). This is in line 
with the hypotheses that RM is necessary for PM (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and replicates 
the results of experiment 7. Scores from the word list recalls did not correlate with the 
strategy score. This is different to experiment 7 in which RM also correlated weakly with 
the strategy score (percentage opt) and the number of subtask items completed. This could 
be because the percentage opt score in experiment 7 also represents remembering to switch 
between the subtasks after the correct amount of allocated time has elapsed, and thus partly 
representing PM efficiency — requiring RM processes. The strategy score in the AMT2 
may represent a purer measure of strategy application processes, which include flexibility, 
inhibition of usual responses and error monitoring (Levine et al., 1998).
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In this experiment, a self-initiated element of the multitasking was constrained: the subtask 
switching frequency. Consequently, the demand on planning processes was reduced (e.g. to 
plan how to allocate time between subtasks) whilst the demands on PM processes remained 
the same (to switch between subtasks). Thus, the expectation was that there would be only 
low (if any) correlations between AMT2 measures and Raven’s matrices score (compared 
to experiment 7 at least). This hypothesis was supported. There were no significant 
correlations between Raven’s and any of the multitasking measures. This provides supports 
for Burgess and colleagues’ (2000) theory that the planning component of multitasking is 
related to IQ measures, possibly because they share some processing and/or recruit similar 
PFC areas. Future experiments could test this hypothesis further perhaps by increasing the 
planning load in the multitasking tests, for example, increasing the number of rules 
regarding subtask order and then comparing these measures to Raven’s scores. 
Alternatively, participants’ IQs could be manipulated as the independent variable and 
planning scores from the multitasking tests compared between the groups. It is possible, of 
course, that only nonverbal reasoning IQ correlates with planning, because of some 
common mechanism (such as working memory), and thus, future studies should include 
other IQ measures (e.g. verbal IQ) and other cognitive tests (e.g. working memory tests) to 
examine this relationship in more depth.
5.5.4.3. Correlations with Real Life Measures
Hypothesis 3
In contrast to experiment 7, there were correlations between the AMT2 measures and the 
academic measures. I hypothesised that achieving success in these types of examinations is 
likely to make demands on multitasking processes e.g. planning, RM and PM, the latter of 
which are not necessarily related to IQ. The total percentage of correct slides reported 
correlated positively with total qualification points and approached significance with A- 
levels. This is despite the absence of correlations between the Raven’s (IQ) and these AMT 
2 measures. This hints at the possibility that the AMT2 is measuring processes different to 
a standard test of IQ, but which may still be related to important real life indicators such as 
examinations. Given the multiple correlations, these are quite weak correlation coefficients 
and so should be considered cautiously; nevertheless it seems an important area to pursue in
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future studies. The number of subtask items completed correlated with academic measures 
more convincingly, however, in the infrequent task switch group. Hunt (1978) relates speed 
of information processing to verbal intelligence, as does Kline (1991) and Salthouse (2005) 
to general intelligence, which may explain this relationship; this issue is discussed further 
in Chapter 6, section 6.4.3. Participants in the frequent task switch group did not exhibit 
such a relationship, perhaps because o f the more limited range of scores within this group 
(range =153 compared to 262 in the infrequent task switch group). In other words, the very 
short intervals during which participants were able to complete the subtask items may have 
prevented individual differences from emerging fully.
Hypothesis 4
There was only one small correlation between the number o f subtasks attempted and life 
satisfaction in the infrequent task switch condition. There were also small correlations 
between the total subtasks attempted, number of items completed and time management 
scores. This again is only weak support for the hypothesis that multitasking tests tap 
processes necessary for successful everyday life tasks (Burgess et al., 2000). However, it 
certainly interesting that the measures correlating with time management strategies possess 
a good deal of face validity (e.g. number o f subtasks attempted).
Undoubtedly, many extraneous variables in life satisfaction are also relevant that that were 
not considered in this study and certainly larger samples and range of measures are required 
in future studies. For example, measures which separate out different elements of life 
satisfaction or everyday life success and difficulties. For example, Chan (2001) has argued 
that the DEX (Dysexecutive Syndrome Questionnaire) can be used with a non-clinical 
sample. His study with the DEX showed a healthy population reporting a range of mild 
dysexecutive-like behaviours. A factor analysis found five factors within the DEX 
responses -  inhibition, intentionality, knowing-doing dissociation, in-resistance and social 
regulation (replicating Burgess et al., 1998). Each factor showed a distinct pattern of 
correlation with other executive functions tests e.g. intentionality factor (relating to 
everyday planning, decision-making and goal-following) correlated with planning, rule 
regulation and mental flexibility -  with the author arguing this factor relates heavily to 
goal-directed behaviour. This study provides evidence for the fractionation of executive 
function among the non -clinical sample, which the results from the study reported here
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also support, considering the different pattern o f cognitive and real life correlations. 
Another study found no relationships between the DEX and a multitasking test (Alderman 
et al., 2003) in their healthy control population, but this might be due to their overall high 
performance on the MET-SV. This study and experiment 7 have produced a wider range of 
scores in multitasking in the healthy population, thus future studies might want to also 
administer the DEX to ascertain if the tests are useful for identifying real life difficulties.
Turning to the time management correlations, a positive relationship emerged between the 
number of subtasks attempted and time management in the infrequent task switch 
condition, although it did not quite reach significance. Here it is reasonable to assume that 
the number of subtasks attempted also represents an ability to plan, and this is reflected in 
the time management score too. A second significant correlation is reported between the 
time management score and an AMT2 measure, but in this case a negative relationship with 
the number of items completed in the frequent task switch group. Participants who reported 
themselves as better time managers completed fewer items. A possible link between these 
two measures is time estimation. Francis-Smyth & Robertson (1999) report that their 
participants who perceived themselves as effective time-managers (self-report 
questionnaires) tended to underestimate the amount of time passed (as measured by a 
separate test), they believed time to be passing more quickly than it was. The authors 
attributed this primarily to ‘over-zealous monitoring o f  time and attention to the cognitive 
timer’ (p. 345). From an attentional model perspective of time estimation (see Chapter 3) 
increased attention to time monitoring leads to less attentional resources for performing the 
concurrent tasks (e.g. Thomas & Weaver, 1975; Zakay & Block, 1997). Applying these 
results here suggests that the effective time managers of the present experiment worked 
slower because more of their attention was dedicated to time monitoring. Future research 
could test this hypothesis by including RTs and error rates of the subtasks as dependent 
variables. Future research may also want to consider more general personality factors, such 
as conscientiousness, which may affect time management and multitasking performance, as 
well as contribute to the real life outcome measures (e.g. Calabresi & Cohen, 1968; 
Adamson & Covic, 2004). These data certainly suggests that further research of eveiyday 
time management strategies and multitasking performance is warranted. Indeed, these 
multitasking tests (or modifications of) might prove useful as occupational tests because 
not only do they correlate with reports of time management strategies but as cited they can
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also have independence ‘from  the potentially biasing effects o f  general intellectual ability, 
familiarity with the environment and gender’ (Alderman et al., 2003, p. 40). Further study 
might investigate if there are gender differences in performance of the AMT, as is 
suggested by popular culture, since the samples used here were heavily biased in favour of 
females. Certainly, evidence indicates that women participate in multitasking in everyday 
life more frequently (e.g. Michelson & Tipper, 2003). Other limitations of experiments 7 
and 8 and future research suggestions are considered further in Chapter 6, section 6.5. 
within the General Discussion. It is to this Chapter I now turn.
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Chapter 6
General Discussion 
6.1. General Aims and Hypotheses Reviewed
The set of experiments presented in this thesis aimed to investigate the cognitive control of 
internally-guided behaviours. As reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2, previous studies provide 
evidence that behaviour may be mediated by different regions o f the PFC according to the 
degree of environmental constraint afforded by the tasks. The experiments examined 
behavioural evidence for this dissociation by investigating two types o f tasks that depend 
heavily on endogenous control, PM and multitasking. In this final Chapter, I will briefly 
review the aims and the findings o f the eight experiments presented and examine the 
specific and broader theoretical interpretations o f these data, plus their implications and 
potential application. Additionally, I will evaluate the methodological limitations of these 
experiments and offer some proposals for future research that may help delineate between 
proposed theoretical possibilities.
6.2. Summary o f Chapter 3 - Experiments 1 - 4
The first empirical Chapter aimed to investigate the cognitive control of internally-guided 
behaviours by combining the externally-cued task switching paradigm with the PM 
paradigm. At the beginning of the Chapter evidence for separable processes involved in 
rapid, externally-cued task-switching and self-initiated PM task-switching was discussed. 
This evidence stems firstly from neuropsychological data, such as the SAD patients of 
Burgess et al., (2000) and SRD patients (e.g. Levine et al., 1998), who appear to have few 
deficits in tasks that are externally-constrained compared to internally-cued tasks (and task 
switches). Secondly, behavioural studies from the voluntary task-switching paradigm (e.g. 
Arrington & Logan, 2005) appear to show different sources of switch costs for voluntary 
versus externally-cued task switches, implying different cognitive processes. Finally, 
neuroimaging evidence (e.g. Dreher et al., 2002) has demonstrated different neural 
mediation of cognitive control according to the degree of predictability, and thus 
endogenous control, of the task switch. To test this hypothesis an additive factors design 
was employed, with the basic design kept the same across all four experiments. Participants
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performed one block of addition only and subtraction only, each block with and without 
PM instructions. In addition, they each performed two blocks of switching between 
addition and subtraction (ABAB), with and without PM instructions. Additive results were 
predicted based on the hypothesis that these two task-switching procedures draw on 
different executive resources.
In these four experiments the PM task was conceptualised as a self-initiated task switch and 
thus an externally-cued PM control condition was added to the basic PM paradigm. This 
was achieved by instructing participants to remember to move between two sets of ongoing 
task stimuli as the PM task. During the non-PM blocks, the computer automatically 
generated the equivalent procedure, but without the volition, by moving the participants 
between the two sets of stimuli automatically. This allowed for a comparison of the 
ongoing task RTs during the PM and non-PM blocks, before and after the side switch. This 
proved to be an effective means of investigating the effects of the self-initiated PM task 
switch, revealing significant RT differences in the PM and non-PM blocks. Consequently, 
these RT differences were discussed in terms of theoretical models of PM processing 
requirements.
In experiments 1 to 4, this combination of the PM paradigm and the task-switching 
paradigm was employed, as described above. The first experiment included a clock in the 
display and the second experiment included a ‘revealable’ clock in order for participants to 
be able to execute the PM intention at the correct time interval. The third experiment did 
not present a clock in order to increase demands on self-initiated processes. Previous 
studies in the literature have failed to compare task-switching and TB PM (e.g. Marsh et al., 
2002). More generally, previous studies have not measured the effects to the ongoing task 
of maintaining and executing TB PM intentions, a methodology used by Smith (2003) who 
obtained ongoing task performance decrements with the addition of an EB PM task. The 
final experiment in this Chapter used a EB PM task procedure.
Generally, the results were as predicted, with main effects of task-switching on ongoing 
task RTs and main effects of PM, but no significant interactions. The robust task-switching 
effect was replicated, with participants showing significantly slower RTs when alternating 
between addition and subtraction, than doing either just addition or just subtraction.
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Somewhat surprisingly though, in experiments 1 and 2 the effect of adding the PM 
intentions was in the opposite direction to that predicted and demonstrated by Smith 
(2003). Participants showed faster ongoing task RTs when they also had to remember to 
carry out the PM intention to switch sides, compared to the blocks in which the computer 
generated this side switch automatically (i.e. no-PM blocks). This effect occurred 
regardless of whether the participant was carrying out a ‘pure’ task block, or a task- 
alternating block. In experiments 3 and 4, participants demonstrated slower RTs during the 
PM conditions, replicating Smith (2003). Both of these findings are discussed in more 
detail below.
In what I hope will be a useful tool for TB PM research in the future, the data was also 
analysed in terms of change in cognitive processing requirements across the RIs in 
experiments 1 to 3. Thus, the retention intervals were split into three time bands and 
compared the mean ongoing task RTs in each o f these time bands in the PM and no-PM 
blocks. Interestingly, a broad pattern became apparent, with participants slowing as they 
approached a PM task and recovering faster from the side switch compared to the 
equivalent side switch in the no PM conditions. The possible processing implications of 
this are also discussed in depth below.
6.2.1. The Relationship Between Task-switching and Prospective 
Memory
The outcome of these four experiments is in line with the original hypothesis that there 
would be additive effects of PM and task-switching and no interaction. In all four 
experiments participants performed slower in the task-alternating blocks, replicating the 
standard task-switching effect (e.g. Jersild, 1927; Allport et al., 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). However, during the PM blocks the RTs were either faster or slower than the non- 
PM blocks, this is discussed further below. PM performance was not affected by the task- 
switching factor; participants were performing at ceiling on this dependent measure. The 
additive effects are attributed to the differences in the degree of external cueing guiding the 
two types of behaviour since this is consistent with the hypothesis that cognitive control 
over internally-guided, open-ended tasks may be mediated by different frontal regions to 
externally-constrained tasks, as proposed in the General Introduction.
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Differential processing in task-switching according to the degree of external cueing is 
consistent with Arrington & Logan (2005) who reported that voluntary task switches 
produced a smaller switch cost than matched, explicitly-cued task switches. Moreover, in 
an experiment that controlled for cue encoding processes, they found that the explicitly- 
cued procedure did not show reduced switch costs with increasing preparation time, 
whereas the voluntary task switch costs did diminish with increased preparation. Thus, the 
authors maintained that the environmentally-cued version may involve processes that 
resolve the interference from priming effects, rather than reconfiguration of the task-set, 
which may be responsible for the voluntary switch cost. This could explain the lack of 
interaction between the paradigms.
These data are also consistent with the Gateway hypothesis (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.2.). 
According to this hypothesis, the PM task switches require processes (supported by the 
rostral PFC) that enable the modulation of attention between SOT (the ongoing task) and 
SIT (the intentions). In contrast, the extemally-cued task switches do not require such 
processes because participants can just allow their behaviour to be ‘captured’ by the 
external cues and stimuli (see Waszak, 2003; Pollmann, 2004), there is no need to bias 
attention between SOT and SIT. Potential explanations o f the cause of the slowing prior to 
a PM task switch are discussed in detail below, but a prediction from the Gateway 
hypothesis might be that the involvement o f processes in biasing attention towards SIT 
could produce the slower ongoing task RTs in the PM conditions (e.g. see Burgess et al., 
2001). This fits with these data. However, according to this reasoning, presumably the 
processes involved in the biasing back to focusing on SOT (i.e. the ongoing task) should 
also produce some slowing (and thus produce a U-shaped pattern o f RTs in the RI) — but 
this was not the case. Participants showed faster ongoing task responding after switching 
back to the ongoing task in the TB PM conditions (i.e. at the beginning of the RI). Gilbert 
et al., (2005) provide support for the argument that the switch back to SOT should produce 
slowing too. They report that switching from internally-based to externally-based versions 
of the same task produced larger switch costs to RTs than switching from externally-based 
to internally-based versions. In other words, the internal-external switch does have an 
impact on RTs. However, this effect was modulated by the type of ongoing task the 
participants were performing, thus until more is known about how this variable affects 
internal/external switching costs it is difficult to draw a conclusion on this matter. Thus,
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future research could manipulate the ongoing task. In addition, it may be worth analysing 
RTs in finer-grained time intervals than 10 seconds as the slowing after the switch from the 
PM task, back to the ongoing task, may be short-lived, in which case an averaging artefact 
may have occurred in these data.
6.2.2. The Effects of the Prospective Memory Task on Ongoing Task 
Performance
I will first discuss the pattern of RT data in experiments 3 and 4 that are in line with the 
hypotheses, before discussing the RT data of experiments 1 and 2. The overall ongoing task 
slowing demonstrated in experiments 3 and 4 is a finding consistent with the PM literature. 
Smith (2003) has demonstrated a cost to the ongoing task during EB conditions, compared 
to control conditions. The author suggested this is compatible with the ‘preparatory 
attentional and memory processes’ (PAM) theory in which participants are also 
strategically monitoring for the cue whilst performing the ongoing task and this can explain 
the ongoing task slowing. The author also predicted this outcome in a mathematical model 
of the PAM theory (Smith & Bayen, 2004). Strategic monitoring for the cue can explain the 
outcome of experiment 4, in which the intention was connected to an environmental cue in 
the ongoing task stimuli. However, in experiment 3 the slowing cannot be attributed to 
monitoring for the cue, but perhaps to monitoring time and time estimation processes. This 
is the first study to demonstrate a cost to the ongoing task in TB PM. The data obtained 
from experiment 6 supports this notion that the significant slowing in experiments 3 and 4 
are consequences of separate processes, since there was no extra interference to the ongoing 
task when EB and TB PM were combined.
Another possibility, borrowed from the task-switching literature, is that bottom up 
processes may account for the performance decrements in the ongoing task during PM 
conditions, at least in the EB PM experiment. These stimulus-driven interference theories 
have previously not been applied to theoretical considerations of PM processes. Switches 
between the PM response and the ongoing task may generate stimulus-driven costs to the 
subsequent trials. For instance, Allport et al., (1994) attribute switch costs to task-set 
inertia, a consequence of residual activation o f the competing task-set or inhibition of the 
current task-set (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.). Indeed, Waszak et al., (2003) provided 
empirical evidence that ‘stimulus-elicited priming from  a prior, competing task can indeed
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have very large interference effects on the speed o f  response to the same stimuli, following 
a shift o f  task, and that these effects can be very long-lasting. ’ (p. 399). Stimulus-task 
bindings are formed from performing a task-set that are represented as memory traces, and 
may be automatically retrieved on presentation of the same, or similar, stimuli and the 
resolution of the competition this causes between task-sets comprises the RT costs.
Within the EB PM paradigm the same stimuli usually afford both tasks (e.g. Einstein & 
McDaniel, 1995) thus two potential sources of interference arise: interference to the 
ongoing task due to the PM response (i.e. task switch) and interference in switching to the 
PM response caused by priming from the ongoing task responses. The latter is difficult to 
evaluate because of the lack of data regarding the RTs of the PM responses, and valid 
comparison RTs (such as the baseline RT o f the PM task). In experiments 1 to 4 the PM 
response does not require any computation, unlike in the ongoing task (it is simply to press 
a different button rather than perform a sum), making the PM responses faster and 
meaningless for the analysis required to assess this argument. In assessing the former 
(interference to the ongoing task after the PM task switch) it is worth considering 
predictions from a computational model o f task-switching. Gilbert & Shallice (2002) 
demonstrated through modelling that asymmetric task switches arise when two tasks make 
different demands on endogenous control. The PM response requires a great deal of 
endogenous control, it is entirely internally-driven. According to Gilbert & Shallice’s 
model therefore this would produce smaller task switch costs when the participant makes 
the PM response, compared to when switching back to the ongoing task. However, they 
also include the factor of pathway strength within this model (i.e. the strength of the 
stimulus-response network), which also modulates the switch cost. As such, no prediction 
can easily be conceived regarding PM task switch costs until further modelling techniques 
are employed.
Task-set priming is certainly a potential variable affecting ongoing task performance and 
worthy of further research to resolve the issue. To investigate the effect of task-set inertia or 
other bottom-up processes during PM conditions researchers could compare ongoing task 
performance, when the stimuli affords both the ongoing task and the PM task, to ongoing 
task performance when the stimuli cannot afford both. For example, the ongoing task could 
be addition but the EB cue to make the PM response could be embedded in the pattern of
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the background screen (see Park et al., 1997 for a similar methodology). Univalent stimuli 
can reduce priming or task-set inertia effects (Waszak et al., 2003) and thus the relative 
slowing of the ongoing task could be measured.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed a facilitation effect to RTs during the PM blocks. The 
hypothesis derived from these results associated the external clock to a ‘deadline’ effect, 
such that participants speeded up because of the psychological pressure of the time. 
Evidence suggests that an interruption task can have such an effect (e.g. Speier et al., 1999; 
Ziljstra et al., 1999). This proposed effect was not replicated in the TB with clock PM 
blocks in experiment 5. Thus, the effect was attributed to the slower responding after the 
side switch in the non-PM conditions.
6.2.3. Explaining the Pattern of RT Data Across the Retention Interval in 
Experiments 1- 6
The slowing before a self-initiated TB task switch (i.e. the PM response) could represent 
several possibilities. Firstly, there is the simple notion that the participants are monitoring 
the time more frequently as they approach the correct time to make the switch. Cicogna et 
al., (2005) argue that time monitoring ‘occurs as an additional task with respect to the 
ongoing activity ’ (p. 222). As such, this time monitoring might lead to the ongoing task RT 
patterns found in these RIs (due to divided attention). Alternatively, the slower RTs found 
in these studies could be a consequence o f eye movements and/or clock orientated motor 
movements. The pattern of clock checking in experiment 2 is consistent with the proposed 
strategic time monitoring model o f Ceci & Bronfenbrenner (1985). The slowing before the 
switch then is consistent with their concept of the ‘scalloping’ phase, during which the 
participants increase clock-checking and are thus dividing their attention. However, the 
data reveal faster ongoing task RTs after the PM responses. This is inconsistent with the 
time monitoring explanation of the pre-switch slowing since clock checking is increased in 
this period (the ‘calibration’ phase).
Several other lines of evidence are inconsistent with the pre-PM response slowing simply 
reflecting increased time monitoring. Consider the experiments that did not include a clock 
on the display (experiments 3 and 5). Analyses demonstrated slowing prior to the PM 
response despite the absent clock. With the ‘revealable’ clock in experiment 2, the same
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pattern of data was found despite removing the trial before and after a clock check from the 
analyses. This eliminates eye and motor movements as an explanation, at least for these 
experiments. There is no reason to assume the slowing has the same basis in all of the PM 
experiments, (or indeed within the same experiment) but, given their similarity, they are 
likely to share some properties. Moreover, if time monitoring explains the slowing across 
the RI, there is no reason why trials immediately following a side switch in the first 3 
experiments should be slower in the externally-cued condition. Presumably after just 
making a PM response, participants do not need to check the clock, thus speed of 
responding might be equivalent to the externally-cued condition. O f course, experiments 5 
and 6 did not include the extemally-cued PM switch equivalent so some of the explanations 
described below may only apply to experiments 1 to 4.
A different account of this pre-PM response slowing then which can perhaps account for 
these data better, is the notion o f preparatory pre-task switch control processes. For 
instance, a distinction perhaps relevant to these data, and discussed by Waszak and 
colleagues (2003), is between ‘goal-setting’ and ‘task-readiness’ (Fagot, 1994). Goal- 
setting is a preparatory process which establishes which task is to be executed, these 
processes act to bias ‘the possible stable states to which the system is able to settle’ 
(Waszak et al., 2003, p. 401), and thus prepare the participant to execute the correct task. 
‘Task-readiness’, however, is ‘the time the system takes to settle to a task-relevant response ’ 
(Waszak et al., 2003, p. 401). Task-readiness can be affected by interference from bottom 
up processes. Thus, the pre-PM response slowing may be related to these goal-setting 
processes and can explain the faster recovery from the switch than compared to the 
extemally-cued equivalent side switch, as the system has been biased by the preparatory 
processes.
A similar account has also been proposed by Monsell and associates (2003) to explain 
differences between the effects of predictable and unpredictable switches. In predictable 
task-switching, they argue it is possible to commit entirely to the new task-set after a task 
switch, if the individual knows they will be repeating that task again. Consequently, there 
may be a more efficient ‘recovery’, and after the first trial, the participant is ‘ready’ to 
perform the same task again and the RT returns to a normal rate. They relate this task 
readiness to the possibility that individuals have endogenous control over the levels of
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activation and inhibition applied to the task-sets (e.g. Norman & Shallice, 1986; Gilbert & 
Shallice, 2002). In the externally-generated side switch blocks the participants are slower to 
recover, perhaps because they are less prepared to commit to ‘task-readiness’ as the task 
switches are unpredictable. As Monsell et al., (2003) claim then, there seems to be 
‘expectation-based modulation o f  endogenous control input’ (p. 336). In other words, the 
more predictable the task-switch, the more inhibition and activation is endogenously 
controlled and the better the performance of the ongoing task following the switch. Since 
participants have complete control over the task-sets they perform (because they must 
identify the correct cue or time) in the PM paradigm this is particularly relevant. The 
voluntary task switch study of Arrington & Logan (2004) also considered the position of 
the trial after the switch and found that with a longer RSI (i.e. with increased preparation 
time) the faster the recovery after the switch. This is also consistent with the task-readiness 
account in which endogenous control can be applied to bias the task-set response prior to 
the switch and reduce switch costs, if there is ample preparation time.
This is also consistent with Rubenstein et al., (2001) who argue that two active control 
processes account for the switch cost. The first is goal-shifting and involves deciding the 
correct production rules to be inserted into working memory, this can be achieved in a 
preparation period. The second is rule-activation, which is actually the insertion of these 
rules, and this can only be achieved once the exogenous stimulus has occurred. It could 
therefore be argued that there is early goal-shifting preparation occurring prior to the PM 
cue (i.e. time). Recall however, that the trial immediately preceding a task switch is not 
included in the analyses because of probable eye and motor movements, rendering the RTs 
meaningless. Thus, the extent to which any o f these preparatory processes can proceed 
several trials before the task switch is not discussed in the literature and remains an area for 
further investigation. Finer-grained analyses o f the RIs may improve our understanding of 
this issue. Perhaps if preparatory processes are occurring prior to the PM task switch then 
this might be reflected in the RT immediately before the PM response, and it might be in 
this trial alone that there is shared processing with the task-switching paradigm. As such, all 
of these hypotheses regarding the potential explanation o f the pre-switch slowing and faster 
recovery in PM task switches remain fairly speculative. Future studies should include this 
trial before a PM response and perhaps utilise PM task switches that do not include side 
switches as the intention.
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Several other caveats must be made to the discussion above. Applying the task-switching 
literature is relevant to PM because o f the self-initiated task switch inherent in the 
paradigm. Nevertheless, several differences remain between the two paradigms and 
therefore mapping the theoretical positions of the task-switching literature onto PM effects 
must be performed with some caution. Clearly, the major issue is that the task-switching 
paradigm primarily uses external cues to guide the behaviour of the participants and 
generate the task switch. All of the theoretical considerations are thus based on externally- 
guided behaviours, rather than internally-guided behaviours (naturally there is still some 
endogenous control involved, as described). The four experiments reported here showed no 
interaction between task-switching and PM processing, as such they are likely to be 
recruiting separable processes. The explanations above draw on the task-switching 
hypotheses and therefore may not be appropriate to account for the slowing. This, however, 
may be resolved by considering that the ABAB procedure used in these experiments 
provide little preparation time; new stimuli are generated as soon as participants have 
responded to the previous trial. As such, the preparatory processes described above may not 
be operating, hence showing no interaction with the PM processes. Alternatively, as 
Arrington & Logan (2005) contend and as discussed above, this strongly environmentally- 
cued task-switching methodology may generate switch costs only as a consequence of 
stimulus-driven interference, rather than executive processes. Or indeed, different types of 
executive processes may be at play (e.g. inhibition to overcome the bottom up interference 
in the ABAB procedure, Mayr, 2002). Future research could differentiate between these 
alternatives by looking for additive or interaction effects in experiments combining PM and 
other task-switching procedures, such as the explicit-cueing procedure, and manipulating 
the RSI.
Another caveat is that in experiments 1 to 6 there was not always a reliable pattern of 
slowing prior to the TB PM switch in all conditions. This may alter the interpretation of the 
pre-PM response slowing. If  preparatory processes were responsible then presumably this 
pattern of data is expected across all RIs. Two potential explanations follow. Firstly, as 
elucidated in the discussion o f experiment 6, the numbers of participants included in the 
analyses were low, reducing the power of the experiment to find significant effects. 
Secondly, there is an account in the task-switching literature that is consistent with the
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notion that participants do not always employ preparatory processes prior to a task switch. 
De Jong (2000) argues that occasionally participants will fail to employ preparatory 
processes (‘intention activation’), perhaps because of goal neglect (De Jong et al., 1999) or 
mental fatigue (Lorist et al., 2000), which leads to prolonged task switch RTs, even with 
large RSI’s. If this is also true o f PM task switches then this could lead to this slightly 
inconsistent pattern o f ongoing task RTs. Lorist et al., (2000) gathered ERP data during 
their task-switching study and found an enlarged frontal negativity in switch trials, 
compared to repeat trials. This was argued to reflect the task-set reconfiguration processes, 
but crucially this wave was less apparent during later trials (2 hours worth of task-switching 
was endured!) in which mental fatigue had reduced the likelihood of preparation. A similar 
ERP methodology could be applied during PM tasks to test this ‘fail-to-engage’ hypothesis.
One final comment regarding these experiments is a characteristic of PM processing that 
has so far not been touched on. Within the EB PM literature, there are several studies that 
demonstrate an ‘Intention Superiority Effect’ (ISE). Participants respond more readily to 
cues that have are to-be-performed actions associated with them than cues that are just 
remembered (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). They attributed this effect to a higher level of 
activation associated with intentions in order to make their retrieval easier. In the task- 
switching literature, the pathway strength or level o f activation associated with a task-set is 
also a factor mitigating the switch cost (Gilbert & Shallice, 2002). How then is the ISE 
interacting with the PM task-switch? This remains an area for future investigation.
6.3. Summary o f Chapter 4 -  Experiments 5 & 6
6.3.1. Experiment 5
The aim of experiment 5 was to investigate the effect o f the presentation of the clock on 
performance of the ongoing task in a PM paradigm. In experiments 1 to 3 different patterns 
of RTs were obtained in PM blocks with a clock, with a revealable clock and without a 
clock. Neuroimaging evidence also reported different neural mediation of clock and no­
clock TB PM, suggesting a possible dissociation o f processing according to the nature of 
the clock presented. Thus, the presence and absence of the clock was hypothesised to 
differentially affect both the overall RTs to the ongoing task in the PM and no-PM blocks 
and the pattern of RTs across the retention intervals. In this experiment and experiment 6
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however, it was overall accuracy rates o f the ongoing task which were affected by the clock 
manipulation, as opposed to the RTs. Participants were significantly more inaccurate in the 
TB PM block with no-clock compared to baseline (i.e. no PM intentions) and with a clock. 
Participants did show the expected change in RTs across the RIs, slowing as they 
approached the PM response in both clock and no-clock TB PM blocks.
These data were interpreted as the presentation of the clock altering the cognitive 
processing requirements of the task. With a clock present, the task is increasingly 
extemally-cued and the dependency on self-initiated control processing is reduced, hence 
improved ongoing task performance. During the no-clock blocks extra processing is 
required not only in terms of time estimation but also self-initiated retrieval, with increasing 
cognitive demands for the PM task performance o f the ongoing task is diminished.
Previous TB PM studies have rarely required participants to remember an intention without 
the presentation of a clock (except in neuroimaging, see for e.g. Okuda et al., 2002; 2004). 
In this sense, the experiments reported here are relatively unique. The original Einstein & 
McDaniel PM paradigm was designed to mimic the key features of everyday PM tasks in 
the laboratory (as described in Chapter 2, section 2.3.) and arguably by removing a clock 
the ecological validity of this paradigm is reduced. After all, everyday life is littered with 
clocks and timing devices, such as computers and mobile telephones. By removing the 
clock perhaps then the fundamental nature of a PM task is changed and this change is a step 
away from real life PM tasks, and thus, a step away from being applicable. Below I outline 
three arguments in defence of the methodological technique employed here:
1) The crucial point is that removing the clock helped demonstrate that clocks can act as an 
external cue, and that the degree to which they do so appears to lie along a continuum 
according to their presentation in laboratory paradigms. This forces open the 
methodological issue associated with TB PM studies and should be addressed in future 
studies. The application of these experiments then is partly to improve our lab paradigms, 
the theoretical applications are discussed in detail below.
2) In real life TB PM tasks a degree of time estimation may be required, from seconds to 
hours. The pulse and step distinction may be relevant here (see Chapter 2, section 2.5.).
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‘Step’ intentions that must be realised within a certain window of time (e.g. tomorrow 
afternoon) may incur a differential dependency on time estimation than pulse intentions, in 
which accurate time monitoring is required. As there are few TB PM studies that address 
this distinction, this remains a hypothesis to be tested. The time estimation literature 
distinguishes between various time intervals, and Lewis & Miall (2003) argue it is probable 
that interval judgements of different lengths recruit different cognitive systems. How this 
interacts with fulfilling TB PM intentions is also another avenue for future TB PM 
research.
3) The neuroimaging evidence showed a dissociation o f neural activity in clock and no­
clock versions. An aim of these experiments was to replicate this finding behaviourally. In 
pursuit of this goal, it was necessary to remove the clock entirely.
Future studies could proceed with researching the presentation of the clock by comparing 
‘revealable’ clocks with a constantly available clock, or indeed manipulating the type of 
revealable clock (such as a clock physically behind participants and one that is revealed by 
a key press). This could establish if this factor, which has not been controlled for in 
previous studies, may explain inconsistent data such as the ageing studies (see Chapter 2, 
section 2.6.). In addition, it would yield data to test the hierarchy theory posited in Chapter 
3, and revisited below.
Finally, the involvement of time estimation processes in the no-clock PM blocks 
complicates conclusions regarding the self-initiated retrieval processes involved. This is not 
particular to this set of experiments however. Previous TB PM studies have not often 
discussed the contribution o f these processes (one exception is Cicogna et al., 2005). Time 
estimation processes are likely to be employed even with a clock available, especially in 
methodologies in which the clock needs to be revealed. The experiments in this thesis 
suggest that the measurement of these processes may be obtained from ongoing task 
performance rather than PM performance, a dependent variable lacking in previous TB PM 
research (e.g. Cicogna et al., 2005; Cook et al., 2005). The extent to which increased 
internal time estimation produces better or worse PM performance remains to be seen 
(these experiments show no effect on PM performance, but the participants were 
performing at ceiling). Extrapolating from the time estimation literature, in which
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numerous studies have shown the requirement o f attention and memory processes for time 
perception (e.g. Pouthas & Perbal, 2004), PM performance during no-clock conditions 
might be expected to decline as dependency on strategic retrieval increases. Thus, any 
individual differences in the use of time estimation within TB PM studies is a factor worthy 
of consideration, in the same way that individual differences in general allocation of 
attention or effort is (e.g. Kliegel et al., 2004; Marsh et al., 2005). Some participants may 
clock check less because they rely on their internal clock. As the interactions between time 
estimation, retrieval and PM performance are delineated the importance of these individual 
differences may become apparent.
One means of dissociating time estimation from retrieval processes may be to use a 
factorial design to cross an easy TB PM intention (that reduces demands on self-initiated 
retrieval) and a difficult TB PM cue with presenting a clock and no clock. Perhaps the easy 
condition could include regular reminders about the intention whereas the difficult 
condition does not; meaning participants must rely on self-initiated retrieval. A main effect 
of clock presentation and PM difficulty might be expected (with poorer ongoing task 
performance in the no-clock and difficult conditions) but no interaction -  showing the 
relative effects of time estimation and self-initiated retrieval processes.
6.3.2. Experiment 6
Experiment 6 compared TB PM without a clock and EB PM tasks in order to test the 
hierarchy theory outlined in Chapter 4, which stipulates that TB PM without a clock 
requires more cognitive resources than EB PM because of the demands on time estimation 
and self-initiated retrieval. A second aim was to determine the degree of interference, and 
thus shared processing, these two types of PM tasks produce in a combined condition, after 
a neuroimaging study suggested they may be mediated by different neural bases (Okuda et 
al., 2002). Finally, the experiment also considered the pattern of ongoing task performance 
across the TB PM RIs, as in the previous experiments and discussed above. A similar 
methodological paradigm was used as in experiment 5 but several PM conditions were 
incorporated into the design for comparison with the mixed PM task condition. These were 
as follows: a baseline condition, single intention TB and EB and dual intention TB and EB.
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Previous research investigating the effects o f mixing PM tasks had not included this full 
range of comparison conditions (e.g. Cicogna et al., 2005; Cook et al., 2005).
Analyses revealed significantly poorer ongoing task performance (lower accuracy) in the 
TB conditions than the EB conditions, supporting the hypothesis derived from the hierarchy 
theoiy. In addition, the findings revealed no significant differences in ongoing task 
performance between the single and dual intention conditions of the same PM task type, in 
line with predictions and previous research (Cicogna et al., 2005). Interference between 
processing in the mixed intention condition did not produce significant detriments to 
ongoing task performance compared to the other conditions, although there was a hint of 
increased inaccuracy in the mixed intention condition. Generally, performance of the 
ongoing task was equivalent in the mixed intention condition and the TB conditions. 
Cicogna and colleagues also reported a similar outcome, with PM performance of the main 
TB PM task showing a slight, but non-significant reduction when an interpolated EB PM 
task was added within the RI. Cook et al., found a significant decrease in TB PM 
performance when participants were also maintaining an EB intention and the authors 
provided two potential explanations for this: interference between strategic cue and time 
monitoring or changes in attention allocation such that the TB intention loses out. Strategic 
monitoring was not evident in any of the EB PM conditions of experiment 6 (as there was 
no difference in ongoing task performance in the EB PM and baseline conditions), which 
could explain the lack of interference in the mixed intention condition. Arguably, this 
indirectly supports the first explanation offered by Cook and colleagues for their 
interference effect. This highlights the methodological benefit of also measuring ongoing 
task performance as an indicator o f strategic processing.
However, the explanation that cue and time monitoring share some processing resources is 
also consistent with the Gateway hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, interference 
between strategic time and cue monitoring may occur because in both cases rostro-lateral 
BA 10 is required to either switch between attention to the ongoing task and to bias 
attention to internal ruminations (i.e. EB PM) or simply bias attention towards SIT (i.e. TB 
PM). Clearly further research is required to test this prediction, for instance, applying 
neuroimaging to experiments that manipulate the degree of strategic processing required 
within the EB and TB tasks.
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In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4, adding TB PM intentions, without providing a clock, 
to an EB PM paradigm could provide an expedient framework for assessing the degree of 
attentional resources required for the EB PM task. The more resources that are used for 
non-temporal processing (e.g. strategic processes for the EB PM task) then the shorter the 
retention intervals should be between TB PM responses (Brown, 1997; Coull et al., 2004; 
Zakay & Block, 2004), thus allowing the degree of conscious control to be assessed 
between different EB PM manipulations (e.g. specific vs categorical cue). Future research 
may then be able to address this issue of whether strategic monitoring for the cue and time 
monitoring do require shared mechanisms.
Turning to some methodological issues regarding experiment 6, firstly, it is worth 
considering the counterbalancing procedure employed. In the mixed PM condition, half the 
participants were given short RIs for the EB PM task (with cues appearing approximately 
every 30 seconds) and long RIs for the TB PM task (with the instruction to make a TB PM 
response every 2 minutes). The other half of the participants received the opposite 
instructions, with short RIs for the TB PM responses and long RIs for the EB PM cues. 
With so many conditions already in the experiment, counterbalancing the EB and TB PM 
instructions in this manner seemed the most effective means of controlling this variable. 
Nevertheless, given the lack of empirical data regarding changes in time estimation 
strategies across different RI lengths in TB PM, future research could include both versions 
as separate conditions (i.e. participants carry out both versions). It may also be pertinent to 
consider if any time estimation processes are recruited to carry out the EB PM task when 
the cues appear at relatively regular intervals (as they did in these experiment, although the 
cues were staggered according to chance so it is difficult to assess this in this experiment). 
This raises the question of to what extent participants change their cue monitoring strategy 
over the course of the RI because they gain a sense o f the time intervals between the cues? 
Perhaps, as with TB PM, cue monitoring gradually becomes more substantial across the RI 
as participants gradually become expectant of the cue. (Although in experiments where the 
EB cue may only appear once or twice (e.g. Cook et al., 2005) this is unlikely to be a 
strategy the participants use). Again, future research could address this issue, for instance 
by manipulating the regularity of the appearance o f the EB PM cues. Post experimental
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interview with participants may also provide some information on this, a technique Cicogna 
et al., (2005) used to establish attention allocation in their dual intention conditions.
Another methodological consideration with regards to experiment 6 is the use of 
overlapping RIs in the dual intention TB conditions. Participants were requested to 
remember to press a specific key every 30 seconds (PM 1 response), and every 2 minutes 
remember to press a different key instead (PM 2 response). Consequently, the design of this 
condition may have imposed an extra memory task; participants may have chosen to keep 
an ongoing mental track of the number of PM 1 responses they had made to facilitate their 
PM 2 responding. In other words, participants are aware that every 4th PM 1 response 
should actually be a PM 2 response. Thus, decreased accuracy in this condition may have 
resulted from maintaining an online count of PM 1 responses. This does not undermine the 
central tenet that the TB condition without a clock requires increased internal control 
because this process of monitoring PM 1 responses is still under endogenous control. 
Furthermore, Cicogna et al., (2005) demonstrated, in their dual TB intention conditions, 
that participants exhibited diminished performance o f the interpolated TB task when the 
correct execution time of this interpolated task was closer to the execution time of the main 
PM task. This was attributed to the attentional overload generated from the requirement to 
start a new internal timer (as the interpolated task was added within the delay of the main 
task). In experiment 6, participants only required one internal timer (since 30 seconds and 2 
minutes overlap) -  thus the prediction would be that with non-overlapping RIs ongoing task 
performance would still deteriorate further.
6.3.3. Evaluation of the Hierarchy Theory
The outcomes of experiments 1 to 6 pointed toward a new theoretical position regarding the 
dependence on self-initiated processing in different types of PM tasks. TB PM with a clock 
and possibly with a revealable clock require less endogenous control than EB PM and TB 
PM without a clock. Previously it has been assumed that TB PM must rely on self-initiated 
processes more than EB tasks (see Chapter 1, section 2.5.). I thus proposed a new 
‘hierarchy’ theory of PM tasks in which the dependence on self-initiated processing 
changes according to the degree o f environmental cueing in the framework, rather than 
simply the type of PM task (i.e. TB or EB).
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At this stage, definite claims cannot be made regarding PM performance associated with 
these different types o f PM tasks. PM performance was close to ceiling in all 6 PM 
experiments reported in this thesis and all effects related to ongoing task performance. 
Future research could manipulate the parameters of the PM task to make them more 
difficult (see McDaniel & Einstein, 2000) and assess any PM performance decrements after 
manipulating the presentation o f the clock. Based on the EB PM research, increasing cue 
saliency (i.e. presenting a clock throughout the experiment) will increase PM performance 
and vice versa (e.g. Ellis & Milne, 1996; Cohen et al., 2003). Although, it is of course 
possible that a clock in constant view could reduce its saliency because of desensitisation.
A theory must be assessed on its usefulness and implications for everyday PM. The 
hierarchy theory would suggest that TB PM tasks in everyday life may be executed more 
successfully if an individual has access to a clock, either throughout the day, or at regular 
intervals. Conversely, TB PM tasks in which an individual does not have access to a clock 
are more likely to be forgotten or are more likely to affect performance of the ongoing task 
if they must rehearse the intention regularly. This rests on the presumption that the clock 
will act as a cue for the TB intention however, and in everyday life this may not be the 
case. Clocks in everyday life are unlikely to be as salient as in these experiments. Although 
participants in Sellen et al.’s (1997) naturalistic study did report in a post-experimental 
interview that clocks (and seeing or hearing things relating to time), did act as an external 
cue for their TB intentions. Indeed, the conclusions of their study fit perfectly with the 
hierarchy theory. The authors argue that two mechanisms are responsible for the 
remembering of intentions, one mechanism prompts from the ‘outside-in’ and the other 
from the ‘inside-out’, in other words external and internal prompts. Thus, although they 
concluded that generally the time task requires more internal control because the passage of 
time itself was not a salient enough clue; clocks could act as external prompts.
Despite the reports from the participants of Sellen et al., the usefulness of this theory is 
currently limited to PM tasks performed in this type of lab-based paradigm. Nevertheless, 
characterising clocks as potential cues is an important development for theorising about the 
cognitive processes involved in PM, as it questions a fundamental assumption of PM 
research, that TB PM draws more heavily on self-initiated processes. Indeed, it should 
encourage PM researchers to develop a multiprocess theory of TB PM, which could
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hopefully translate into a useful heuristic for predicting PM success in everyday life and in 
clinical populations.
6.4. Summary o f Chapter 5 - Experiments 7 & 8
The final experiments presented in this thesis attempted to explore individual differences in 
self-regulatory skills. Ill-structured tests, such as multitasking tests, have shown to be 
useful in the neuropsychological literature as measures of organisation and endogenous 
control (Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Levine et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2000). These tests are 
thought to tap a relatively discrete subset of executive processes that are recruited for open- 
ended, internally-driven situations, and thus may not be utilized in IQ or traditional 
executive function tests. Using these tests within the healthy population has rarely been 
considered in previous research (except Law et al., 2004). In experiment 7, therefore, an 
Advanced Multitasking Test (AMT) was developed for use with healthy volunteers in order 
to assess individual differences in this subset o f processes. Performance was also compared 
on scores from this test with other cognitive measures to observe if  this dissociation holds 
true in a non-brain damaged population. Finally, the relationship of these processes and 
real-life measures, such as time management and life satisfaction, was explored, with the 
rationale that these processes are crucial to everyday life (Burgess, 2000).
6.4.1. Experiment 7
The basic features of the AMT were kept similar to previous multitasking tests, such as the 
Greenwich test (Burgess et al., 2000). However, two new demands were added to the basic 
design -  an interruption task and an extra PM slide task. These increased the load on self- 
regulatory processes so the test was suitable for healthy participants, whilst maintaining 
ecological validity. Several performance outcomes were noted from the use of the AMT. 
Firstly, participants showed a wide range of performances on a variety of measures from 
the AMT. Secondly, a high proportion o f participants demonstrated ‘goal neglect’; they 
failed to execute basic task demands such as attempting all the subtasks. Thirdly, the 
interruption task disrupted performance of the additional, continuous PM slide task and 
finally performance was relatively low (compared to other experiments in this thesis) on the 
continuous PM slide task. The other set o f findings from this experiment (correlation 
analyses) are discussed below.
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Arguably, this range of performances assures the usefulness of this test in the healthy 
population. Moreover, it may be an effective test for investigating goal neglect in the 
healthy population. One current theory relating to this apparent dissociation of knowledge 
from action emphasises the importance o f ‘g’ (Duncan, 2001), but the results of experiment 
7 did not suggest that participants with lower Raven’s scores were more likely to fail to 
attempt all subtasks. O f course, this does not imply that low ‘g ’ is not a factor in producing 
goal neglect in other types o f task (see Duncan et al., 1997) but in this task it may be related 
to PM failure (perhaps as a result of the high load on PM). It would be interesting if future 
research could manipulate the load on PM in order to establish the ‘critical point’ of PM, 
that is, a point at which the high PM load prevents participants from performing other 
goals. Speculatively, this critical point might represent a situation in which there is 
attentional overload on the processes responsible for internally-driven behaviours. This 
could have direct implications for occupational settings in which employees endure a high 
degree of multitasking and self-initiated switching. Indeed, Hudson et al (2004) entitled 
their study of manager’s daily activities: ‘I ’d be overwhelmed, but it’s just one more thing 
to do’ to reflect the feelings o f their participants. Cognitive modelling may also help 
elucidate the cognitive mechanisms generating this goal neglect. Researchers have designed 
a cognitive architecture of human multitasking based on the ACT-R model of cognition 
(Anderson et al., 2004) that have demonstrated their usefulness in accounting for internally- 
driven multitasking behaviour and modelling everyday life tasks, such as driving (e.g. 
Kushleyeva et al., 2004; Salvucci, 2004). Successful cognitive models can simulate errors 
and other behaviours (such as when to switch tasks e.g. Kushleyeva et al., 2004) and thus 
may be able to simulate this ‘critical point’, if one exists.
Law et al., (2004) reported no effect o f an interruption task on the performance of the 
multitasking test, but they may have not included scores that could reveal the disruptions. 
Participants in experiment 7 seemed to show poor PM performance during the interruption 
task. I argued that this fits with the previous research, which contends that interruptions 
interfere with PM (e.g. McDaniel et al., 2004). However, this interpretation must be 
considered with caution because there was no control (without an interruption) condition 
with which to compare PM performance. Indeed, the lack o f experimental control groups 
does restrict the conclusions that can be drawn from this study, this is addressed to some
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degree by experiment 8. In addition, the precise timing of an interruption will mitigate its 
disruptiveness (e.g Monk et al., 2002; Adamcyzk & Bailey, 2004). Interruptions that occur 
between subtask boundaries (i.e. as the participants moves from one subtask to the next), or 
during other periods of reduced mental workload, are less disruptive than those which occur 
during a subtask is being completed (e.g. Iqbal et al., 2005). In this group testing procedure, 
the precise timing of the interruption was not controlled; hence, individual participants 
were doubtlessly at disparate points o f subtask performance. This may have hidden or 
worsened the disruptive effects o f the interruption task, thus future studies must 
individually test participants on the AMT and perhaps change from inserting the 
interruption task at an absolute point, to a relative point that matches participants’ subtask 
status (e.g. as they switch between two subtasks).
6.4.2. Experiment 8
The objective of Experiment 8 was to manipulate the degree o f self-initiated subtask 
switching present in the AMT in order to understand the impact of this variable on 
performance. Thus, this experiment aimed to begin the procedure of pinning down the 
variables that affect multitasking performance. Self-initiated task-switching was considered 
first because of its apparent cost to ongoing task performance between switches 
(experiments 1 to 3 of this thesis, and Arrington & Logan, 2004). This manipulation also 
produced a constraint on the planning required by participants, a variable which I was 
unable to measure in experiment 7. Predictions regarding the impact of self-initiated 
switching on multitasking performance were somewhat challenging because of the potential 
interaction between self-initiated task-switching processes and PM. However, the results 
suggested a performance dissociation between task-switching and the strategic (i.e. goal 
prioritising) elements of this test. This supports the use of these scores as separate and 
useful measures (although see below) derived from multitasking tests (e.g. number of 
subtasks attempted and proportion of high value items completed), and presumably reflects 
a different set of cognitive processes (see Burgess, 2000). Strategy generation and PM are 
consistent with the separate SAS processes posited by Shallice and Burgess (1996; see 
Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.), and these multitasking tests are successful means of tapping 
them. Future neuropsychological research may be able to further elucidate the degree of 
separation of these elements of multitasking and indeed find specific PFC regions that 
mediate them (see e.g. Shallice, 2002). For instance, Fletcher et al., (1998) report a
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neuroimaging study in which a specific region of the left lateral PFC appeared responsible 
for generating organising strategies for list recall. Nathaniel-James & Frith (2002) have 
related this PFC area with ‘sculpting the response space’, a mechanism required to produce 
top down modulation of responses when environmental triggering of schema is 
inappropriate. In contrast, as discussed in detail, is the role of rostral PFC in PM processes 
(Burgess et al., 2001). The relative importance o f these processes in successful everyday 
multitasking, such as in the workplace, requires delineating.
6.4.3. Correlations Between The AMT and Cognitive Measures in 
Experiments 7 & 8
As described in Chapter 2, section 2.7.1., Kleigel and colleagues (2002) demonstrated that 
50% of the performance variation on three phases o f their complex PM task (intention 
formation, intention re-instantiation and intention execution) could be predicted by 
executive test scores (Tower of London and verbal fluency) in their healthy sample. In 
contrast, the neuropsychological studies seemed to show a dissociation between traditional 
executive measures and multitasking performance (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1991). 
Although Levine et al., (1998) report both cognitive profiles, relative standalone SAD and 
SAD plus general executive impairment. The two multitasking experiments presented here 
certainly confirm the link between RM and multitasking (Burgess et al., 2000). In 
experiment 7, RM scores correlated with many o f the AMT measures whereas in 
experiment 8 this was restricted primarily to the PM measure. These correlations probably 
reflect rule-learning and intention content.
In terms of Raven’s, the results were somewhat mixed. Experiment 7 revealed modest 
correlations with some of the AMT measures, whereas experiment 8 revealed virtually no 
correlations with the AMT. This is possibly due to the reduced number of participants in 
the analyses of experiment 8 (although there were significant correlations between these 
measures and the real life outcome measures). In addition, there were slight differences in 
the dependent measures between the two versions of the AMT. This was necessary because 
of the manipulation required in experiment 8 but does make the interpretation slightly 
limited. For instance, the removal o f the interruption in experiment 8 is likely to have had 
an impact on the number of items completed and the number of subtasks attempted — thus, 
perhaps changing their relationship with Raven’s. Another potential explanation relates to
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the degree of planning required in the two versions of the AMT. There is a common neural 
area (DLPFC) associated with Raven’s (e.g. Prabhakaran et al., 1997, although also see 
Christoff & Gabrieli, 2001) and the planning component of the multitasking tests (Burgess 
et al., 2000). Since the AMT2 constrained the planning demands (because participants were 
told when to switch subtasks) maybe this can explain the lack of associations between these 
measures in experiment 8. Including a planning measure in future studies with the AMT 
could determine the validity o f this explanation. However, the evidence would suggest that 
the Raven’s correlations are probably linked to planning, rather than PM. Future research 
should use experimental designs with the AMT (such as manipulating the planning 
required) alongside correlational designs, since the latter reduce the causal conclusions that 
can be drawn.
Another missing source of information, besides a planning measure, is an indicator of speed 
of processing. Salthouse (2005) analysed the relationship between a range of cognitive 
tasks and executive tests, such as the WCST and Stroop. Using an analytical model 
methodology the author concluded, from two separate data sets, that many of the target 
variables (i.e. the executive test measures) are actually closely related to reasoning and 
perceptual speed. Multitasking tests were not included in the Salthouse study and, at least 
in experiment 8, the AMTs do not seem to be simply reasoning (i.e. Raven’s), nevertheless 
a speed of processing account o f the individual differences cannot be ruled out. Other 
executive tests can be highly influenced by speed of processing (e.g. Self-ordered pointing 
test, Bryan & Luszcz, 2001), although this has been explained in terms of its shared 
variance with ‘g’, in which case a speed test may have just exhibited the same pattern of 
correlations as Raven’s. The exact role of speed of processing in PM or multitasking is 
uncertain (e.g. Kleigel et al., 2004), thus, future studies should include such a speed 
measure in order to resolve this issue.
Two other methodological issues have become apparent from using multitasking tests. 
Firstly, that the scores from the tests are potentially measuring a variety of cognitive 
processes (as acknowledged by Burgess et al., 2000) and secondly, that there is 
inconsistency in the measures presented by researchers, making interpretation difficult. 
Consider the Percentage Opt score from the AMT in experiment 7. This score represents 
the degree of accordance with the optimal strategy (to gain maximum points from the
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subtasks). Participants may have scored poorly because they did not plan, they did not 
follow the plan, or they did not have the strategic capabilities to devise the optimal strategy. 
This is also true of the score measuring the number o f subtasks participants attempted. 
Unfortunately, due to time limitations, it was not possible to include a measure of 
participants’ planning before they began the AMT, this would have aided in distinguishing 
the reason for poor performance on this measure. Future research that utilises the AMT 
should include a planning measure. However, the Percentage Opt score also does not take 
into consideration that participants may prefer a particular subtask, or that they may find 
one subtask easier to complete, and thus spend longer on that subtask. If  the score is 
affected by these factors then it is not necessarily measuring any of the aforementioned 
processes. This is a common feature o f multitasking tests (e.g. Burgess et al., 2000, scored 
participants for spending less than 200 seconds on each subtask) but is improved by 
measuring strategy using the proportion of items completed that are worth more points, as 
in experiment 8. However, the criticism that participants may just prefer one type of 
subtask and thus spend a disproportionate amount of time on it can still be levelled at this 
type of scoring system.
The second methodological issue also relates to the measures that researchers devise and 
report in these multitasking tests. For instance, in the work of Kliegel and colleagues (see 
Chapter 2, section 2.7.1.), the authors conceived o f a measure of overall task performance 
on their complex PM task by subtracting the number o f rule breaks from the number of 
subtasks attempted. In their measure of overall task performance, Burgess et al., (2000) 
included these scores but they also awarded points for strategic allocation of time (as 
described above). As discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.2., Law and colleagues (2004) only 
reported two measures from their multitasking test (proportion of items worth more points 
completed, total number of items completed). These differences complicate cross studies 
comparisons. For instance, as described above, experiment 7 suggested a disruptive effect 
of the interruption on the PM measures of the AMT, but this was not measured by Law and 
colleagues. Perhaps as these more ecologically-valid tests are developed a taxonomy of 
scores can be agreed based on behavioural dissociations, neuropsychological dissociations 
and neuroimaging data.
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6.4.4. Correlations Between The AMT and Real-life Measures in
Experiments 7 & 8
These two experiments have only scratched the surface of the relationship between 
multitasking and real life outcomes. The initial rationale for these hypotheses were based 
on clinical data showing correlations between performance on multitasking tests and 
everyday life problems (e.g. Burgess et al., 1998; Knight et al., 2002). From this data, I 
extrapolated the types o f real life outcomes that performance on these tests might correlate 
with in the healthy population. There were hints o f significant correlations between AMT 
performance and life satisfaction and everyday time management in experiment 7. There 
was some replication o f these relationships in experiment 8, although the correlations 
remained weak (and in some cases inconsistent between the two experimental groups). 
Experiment 8 also produced significant correlations between the AMT2 and the academic 
qualifications (which were not related to ‘g ’). Despite the somewhat mixed results, future 
studies should pursue the goal of relating executive ill-structured tasks to real life outcomes 
in the healthy population as there is certainly intimation in these early studies that they may 
provide useful indicators. Everyday life is full o f open-ended tasks requiring endogenous 
control and the AMT may prove to be a useful representation of this (see Burgess et al., 
submitted).
Of course, a serious limitation with these experiments was the use of self-report 
questionnaires for measures of real life outcomes. Time management and organisational 
capabilities might be better assessed by using ‘other’ ratings, perhaps from employees or 
friends and families, as with the DEX questionnaire (Wilson et al., 1996). Moreover, future 
research could include validated time management questionnaires (such as Macan et al., 
1990), which also have subscales that can provide more information on specific elements of 
time management (e.g. goal setting versus perceived control of time). Similarly, although 
these multitasking tests have higher ecological validity than traditional executive 
functioning tests, they remain somewhat artificial, especially the subtasks employed. 
Finding a task that is truly novel (and thus tapping executive function) and yet shares 
features of everyday life tasks is difficult but will no doubt prove to be a rewarding exercise 
(see Burgess et al., submitted). Future research investigating the relationship of these tests 
with real life outcomes could develop methodologies along the lines of more real life
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multitasking. For instance, Stone et al., (2001) developed a paradigm based on air traffic 
control procedures that produced more realistic multitasking scenarios.
6.5. Cognitive Control o f Internally-guided Behaviours
6.5.1. Broader Implications and Conceptual Considerations
At the broadest level, the experiments presented in this thesis support the theoretical 
position that there are multiple executive processes rather than single process theories (see 
Burgess & Simons, 2005 for review). Independent processes appear to be recruited for task- 
switching and PM and there is some evidence for a behavioural dissociation between 
multitasking processes and other complex tasks. It is difficult to reconcile these results with 
a single system/construct theory (e.g. Duncan, 1995; see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.) of 
executive control. A capacity-limited, general-purpose executive mechanism would 
presumably share processing resources in the PM and task-switching experiments and 
produce interference.
Cohen and colleagues (e.g. 1998; see Chapter 1, section 1.2.2.) have suggested that the PFC 
maintains context representations which bias lower-level processes to control behaviour. 
This same mechanism, of maintaining task context and using this to provide top down 
support, produces several different functions including working memory, inhibition and 
attention. However, the lack o f interference between PM and task-switching suggests that 
this theoretical framework requires elaboration. Studies with the Continuous Performance 
Task (CPT) -  a test o f sustained attention and vigilance -  have supplied the empirical 
evidence for this theory (e.g. Braver & Cohen, 2001, Braver & Bongiolatti, 2002) and 
neuroimaging studies have placed this context representation mechanism within DLPFC, 
rather than the PFC in its entirety (Braver et al., 2002). The CPT requires little internal 
guidance in terms of initiating responses (all the cues are presented), suggesting this context 
representation model might be more suitable for describing the role of executive processes 
in externally-constrained tasks. This position is consistent with the absence of rostral PFC 
activity in the imaging studies.
In terms of the cognitive control of PM, a ubiquitous internally-driven behaviour, it is 
evident that processing demands alter according to the degree of environmental support,
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even in TB PM. Experiments 5 and 6 cannot directly address the question of fractionation 
of executive processes however. The realisation o f intentions within the environmentally- 
cued conditions of these experiments may be achieved automatically, at least the retrieval 
of the intentions (i.e. with little executive control). As such, it is not possible to argue that 
different executive mechanisms are mediating these versions of the tasks (i.e. clock or no­
clock and TB and EB), but both experiments do highlight the importance of this external 
cueing variable in cognitive tasks. Future neuropsychological studies on patients with focal 
frontal lesions can act as a crucial tool in dissociating executive processes involved in PM 
compared to other executively demanding tasks.
As discussed in Chapter 1, distinguishing between tasks according to the degree of 
environmental cueing is common in the executive function literature (e.g. Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). The basic proposition o f the action control theory of Norman & Shallice 
(1986) is that two different mechanisms implement schemas according to whether the 
behaviour required is routine or novel. In novel situations, endogenous control is required 
(via the SAS) to decide or plan the correct schema, using the cues from the environment is 
simply not enough. Given the hierarchal nature of this theory and the evidence regarding 
the possible role of rostral PFC (See Chapter 1, section 1.3.) these data seems consistent 
with different processing mechanisms according to the degree of self-initiated demands 
involved. Passingham (1993) proposed an analogous dissociation in relation to action 
control. Passingham contends that the medial premotor cortex area makes a larger 
contribution to self-initiated actions and the lateral premotor cortex mediates extemally- 
cued action selection. Of course, few behaviours are either fully stimulus-driven or fully 
self-initiated and part of the task o f cognitive psychology and cognitive neuroscience is to 
understand their interaction (see Pashler et al., 2001).
Other interpretations of the dissociation between task-switching and PM processes should 
be acknowledged. Firstly, as mentioned above, theories of executive function often 
distinguish between the control o f routine and non-routine (novel) behaviours (e.g. Stuss & 
Alexander, 2000; Cooper, 2002). Arguably, task-switching and PM may be qualitatively 
different regarding this variable and this can explain the independent control of each. For 
instance, Pollmann (2004) claims that: ‘task-switching... experiments are characterised by a 
clear rule-guided association between stimulus and response ’ (p. 273). Conversely, PM
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may be characterised as requiring relatively novel responses to the stimuli (although in real 
life it is a common task). To avoid this criticism, the PM responses were deliberately set to 
be more frequent than in other PM studies and a repeated measures design was employed. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that even routine tasks require executive control processes 
(e.g. Schwartz et al., 1991; see also Cooper, 2002).
As discussed, the ABAB task-switching paradigm and PM have been characterised as 
variations of task-switches along an internal/external continuum. This distinction is 
common in the literature; for instance, Brown & Marsden (1988) discuss Parkinson disease 
patients as an example o f a group who show impairments in task-switching only when there 
are no external cues. However, a second possible reinterpretation of these findings is based 
on a view presented by Rogers et al., (1998). They discuss the difficulty of this conceptual 
distinction, arguing that internal and external cues cannot be separated from the continuum 
of ‘cue strength’: ‘...any task cue presented in close temporal and spatial proximity to a 
stimulus will naturally have a greater impact on the subject’s actual performance than the 
inevitably weaker task cues that might be held internally, say, in working memory (Rogers 
et al., 1998, p. 817). No doubt there are differences in cue strength between internal and 
external cues. However, this perhaps just emphasises the need for internal control or the 
difficulty of cognitive control in initiating task-switches in the absence of external cues. 
Moreover, experiments using external cues do not control for cue strength. For instance, in 
the task-switching literature whether or not an addition cue (i.e. +) is weaker or stronger 
than a subtraction cue (i.e. -) is not discussed (although more recent task-switching 
paradigms include a cue-stimulus learning procedure, e.g. Logan & Bundesen, 2003). 
Separating cue strength from the internal/external continuum seems a difficult task to 
achieve empirically. For example, it seems rather challenging to make an internal cue 
stronger, if strength is defined by temporal and spatial proximity (and proximal to what 
exactly?). As such, cue strength may be more efficiently considered an element of the 
intemal/extemal continuum, rather than separate from it.
A good example of this stems from the PM literature with research involving 
implementation intentions. Implementation intentions are effective in increasing the 
likelihood that participants will execute an intention. They are verbalised IF-THEN plans 
(if situation y arises, then I will initiate goal-directed behaviour z) which are thought to
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mediate their effects by increasing the accessibility of the cue and strengthening the link 
between the cue and the response (Gollwitzer & Brandstatter, 1997; Sheeran & Orbell, 
1999). As such, they are reducing the dependency on conscious, controlled processing to 
realise the intention and instead allow behaviour to be initiated by automatic processes 
triggered by the environmental context. This emphasises the potential clinical applications 
of dissociating between externally-cued and internally-generated behaviours. By building in 
a rich environmental structure into tasks and daily routines, patients with SAD or SRD (and 
dysexecutive syndrome more generally) may benefit in their everyday organisation skills 
(e.g. Levine et al., 2000).
6.5.2. Future Directions
Several specific suggestions for future research have been presented throughout this 
Chapter, but it is perhaps important to summarise and extend a few of these ideas in this 
final section.
Firstly, neuropsychological studies with patients with frontal lobe damage are of crucial 
importance in the further testing o f the endogenous/exogenous control dissociation. Testing 
patients with specific focal lesions on the tasks presented in experiments 1-4 would reveal 
possible neural dissociations in function along this continuum. Gilbert and colleagues have 
recently presented one such patient (with rostral PFC damage) with the test used in their 
neuroimaging study of SIT and SOT attention switching (see Gilbert et al., 2005). The 
patient was able to complete all tasks successfully except when it was necessary to inhibit 
environmental cues that were acting as distractors, suggesting some impairment in this 
ability to switch (Gilbert, 2006). Other clinical disorders may also be o f relevance. For 
instance, post traumatic stress disorder entails the unwanted intrusions of internally- 
generated memories of a stressing event. Neural studies of this disorder suggest some 
involvement of the PFC and especially the medial and orbital PFC (Bremner, 1999; 2002). 
From the evidence discussed in this thesis, it seems possible that an impairment of 
executive processes involved in endogenous control could generate these symptoms. 
Burgess et al., (2005) also implicate the Gateway Hypothesis in schizophrenia because of 
the potential deficit in differentiating between one’s thoughts and experiences (i.e. 
hallucinations). Also somewhat speculatively, there may be a link between obsessive- 
compulsive disorder and these different executive control processes. The perseveration 
these patients can exhibit may again be a manifestation of poor endogenous control.
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Secondly, in terms of PM, there seem several fruitful avenues for research. Clearly, further 
empirical investigations o f the hierarchy theory are necessary as described, including 
naturalistic studies with clocks. The impact o f TB intentions on the performance of 
‘ongoing’ workplace tasks seems necessary to be able to relate the findings of this thesis to 
everyday life. Similarly, understanding the effects o f the length of the RI on the use of time 
estimation processes would also be informative for application to everyday life. An 
interdisciplinary approach with psychologists studying temporal cognition would therefore 
be productive. Researching other parameters that change the cognitive processing involved 
in TB PM is also of interest. For instance, perhaps the saliency of the time point at which to 
carry out the intention is a useful manipulation. If a more salient time point (perhaps 
5.12pm instead of 5pm) becomes a stronger external cue and this increases the likelihood of 
remembering that intention, then this has direct application in everyday life.
Finally, tests that are more ‘real-life’ are coming to the forefront o f cognitive neuroscience 
and neuropsychology (e.g. Channon et al., 2001; Burgess et al., submitted) because of their 
value as clinical tests, as well as the importance o f ‘cognitive ethology’ (Kingstone et al., 
2005). Future research could develop the AMT further to produce an increasingly more 
ecologically valid and useful test. For instance, instead of the PM slide task in which 
participants must remember to check the slides frequently, a task in which participants must 
just check something once or twice may be more realistic (see Manly et al., 2002, for 
example). Alternatively, healthy participants could even be taken ‘shopping’ as in the 
original MET. Another interesting way of investigating the relationship of ill-structured 
tests to real life outcomes might be to compare performance of populations of healthy 
participants, according to their position in an occupational setting (such as managers and 
senior-managers) on the AMT and other standard neuropsychological tests. There are also 
other ill-structured tests available, such as the Iowa ‘gambling’ test produced by Bechara 
and colleagues (2000), which may also show correlations with real life outcomes and are 
not yet well developed for the healthy population.
Patients tested on the original multitasking tests can break social rules when executing 
these tests (e.g. Alderman et al., 2003), as well as show general disorganisation. Thus, it is 
possible there is a link between multitasking performance and social cognition (see
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Channon & Crawford, 1999; Burgess et al., 2000). Intuitively, social cognition is likely to 
make demands on internally-generated information (such as mentalising), and thus it may 
be valuable to include measures of social cognition in future research with the healthy 
population. Neuropsychological tests with these and other executive function tests may 
yield further evidence o f dissociations between cognitive processes.
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Appendix A
Cued Rule Recall from Experiment 7 
Please answer the questions below about the rules of this test.
1. How many different tasks are there in this test?
2. What rules are there about the order in which to do the tasks?
3. How long do you have for the entire test?
4. How often must you write down the letter and number from 
the display on the screen in the Time Task?
5. When does the Time Task finish?
6. How often will the letter and number display on the screen 
change in the Time Task?
7. Within each of the tasks do you score more points for items 
that you do earlier or later?
8. How many tasks should you try and attempt?
9. How often can you consult the timer?
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Words presented for list recall tests in Experiment 7 & 8
1. Dance
2. Tent
3. Ladder
4. Spray
5. Pipe
6. Harvest
7. Cardboard
8. Flame
9. Kite
10. Money
11. Brush
12. Fan
13. Leather
14. Game
15. Document
16. Sponge
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Time Management and Hobbies Questionnaire for Experiments 
7 & 8 
Please answer the following questions as honestly and accurately 
as possible.
1) Do you think carefully about the time management o f your academic work, setting 
specified times aside to complete it?
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
2) Do you set goals for yourself o f things to achieve on a daily basis?
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
3) Do you set goals for yourself o f things to achieve on weekly basis?
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
4) Do you keep your diary up to date to help you remember events and/or deadlines? 
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
5) Is your day usually planned out in advance?
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
6) Is your week usually planned out in advance?
NEVER 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 ALWAYS
7) Do you consider yourself someone with a lot of interests/hobbies?
YES/NO
Please list the hobbies that you do on a regular basis:
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Academic Qualifications Scoring System for Experiments 7 & 8
According to the UCAS U.K. Tariff system (2003), A-Levels and 
AS-Levels are designated the following scores:
GCE A-Levels Grade
A =  120 
B = 100 
C = 80 
D = 60 
E = 40
GCE AS-Levels
A = 60 
B = 50 
C = 40 
D = 30 
E = 20
According to the U.K. Government Department of Education 
Website (2003), GCSEs are designated the following scores:
GCSE Grade
A* = 8
A = 7 
B = 6 
C = 5 
D = 4 
E = 3 
F = 2 
G = 1
Half GCSE Grade
A* = 4 
A = 3.5 
B = 3 
C = 2.5 
D = 2 
E =  1.5 
F = 1 
G = 0.5
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Appendix B
Cued Rule Recall from Experiment 8 
Please answer the questions below about the rules of this test.
1. How many different tasks are there in this test?
2. What rules are there about the order in which to do the tasks?
3. How long do you have for the entire test?
4. How often must you switch tasks?
5. When do you write down the letter/number on display?
6. How often will the letter/number display on the screen change?
7. Within each of the tasks which items do you score more points 
for?
8. How many tasks should you try and attempt?
9. How often can you consult the timer?
10. Do you have to do the items in order within each task?
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